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Preface 
This book deals with the foreign policy priorities of the United 
States as it enters the latter half of the 1980s and contemplates its 
role in the world during the 1990s. The titleAmerica Overcommitted 
was suggested by an article I contributed to the Foreign Service 
Journal in 1982, which concluded with this statement: "Whether 
the United States remains a super-power into the 21st century 
depends in large measure on how it decides its international 
priorities in this decade and marshals its resources to defend 
them. Reducing the range and the cost of worldwide U.S. com-
mitments is long overdue, and the Reagan Administration should 
not flinch from making the hard decisions to do so."1 This theme 
was elaborated in a paper entitled "National Interests and Nation-
al Strategy: The Need for Priority" that I presented to the National 
Security Affairs Conference of the National Defense University in 
October 1982. That paper came to the attention of the University 
Press of Kentucky, which had published my previous volume on 
U.S. national interests, and we agreed that it would make a 
provocative book. 
This volume is the fourth effort that I have made to develop 
and broaden a conceptual framework for defining U.S. national 
interests in the contemporary world. The first was United States 
National Interests in a Changing World (University Press of Ken-
tucky, 1973); the second was National Interests and Presidential 
Leadership: The Setting of Priorities (Westview Press, 1978); the third 
was my contribution to a 1981 publication of the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, entitled The National Interests of 
the United States in Foreign Policy. This study is the first, however, 
that analyzes U.S. interests and policies on a worldwide scale. 
1. Foreign Service Journal, March 1982, p. 30 
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Several things need to be stated at the outset. First, this is a 
policy oriented work and it deals with major issues in U.S. 
foreign and national security policy rather than with the theory of 
international politics, decision theory, or the morality of Amer-
ican foreign policy. Second, it is urgently concerned with estab-
lishing priorities among the vast number of U.S. defense commit-
ments and responsibilities around the globe. It is simply not 
going to be feasible, in my view, for the United States to pay the 
costs of all its forces currently stationed abroad while taking on 
new responsibilities in the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, and 
Central America. Hard choices among Europe, Northeast Asia, 
the Indian Ocean, and the Caribbean Basin will therefore have to 
be made in terms of manpower, economic resources, and military 
and economic assistance programs if the United States is to 
remain financially strong and emotionally committed to an inter-
national rather than an isolationist foreign policy. Third, this 
study assumes the rational-actor model for deciding what inter-
ests and policies the United States should pursue in the world, 
and it accepts the view that the President has the primary, al-
though not exclusive, constitutional authority to determine the 
national interests of the United States and propose the policies 
needed to defend them. Fourth, although the study deals with 
policy issues and is aimed at a large audience of opinion leaders as 
well as serious students of international affairs, it includes a 
conceptual framework for analyzing policy choices that should 
prove helpful also to the general reader in sorting out his/her own 
priorities about the importance of specific regions of the world 
and the appropriate policies to pursue in them. Finally, this study 
represents my own views-not those of policy-makers, scholars 
or military planners-as to what U.S. national interests and pol-
icies ought to be in the 1980s and 1990s. In some cases I agree with 
official policy and in others I do not; but the important point is 
that readers should be able to make up their own minds about the 
U.S. stake in the world, not simply on the basis of the opinions 
and judgments contained herein but by the use of the conceptual 
framework suggested in Chapter 1 for establishing international 
priorities. 
The book is divided into three rather distinct parts. Chapters 1 
and 2 suggest a methodology for focusing the discussion on 
priorities and policy tools, using the national interest matrix that I 
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developed earlier and that is recognized as a useful tool of analy-
sis. Chapter 1 also sets the criteria for deciding which interests 
should be considered vital to the United States, thus requiring the 
urgent attention of top policy-makers. Chapter 2 describes twen-
ty instruments of policy that are available to a President in dealing 
with foreign policy and national security issues. This chapter also 
suggests a correlation between the levels of national interest and 
the instruments of policy that might be employed. Chapters 3 
through 8 analyze U.S. interests and policies in seven different 
regions of the world and suggest changes in policy that will 
benefit the United States and many of the countries concerned. 
Finally, Chapters 9 and 10 are my effort to establish worldwide 
priorities among U.S. national interests and policies and tore-
view the Reagan administration's handling of U.S. priorities dur-
ing its first three years in office. 
This is an ambitious undertaking. I know of no other scholar 
who has attempted it recently. The book will not satisfy those 
who think that national interest is too imprecise a way to analyze 
foreign policy issues and international relations. It may not ap-
peal to those who believe that American foreign policy since 
World War II has been misguided on ideological grounds or 
corrupted by unwarranted confidence in the efficacy of military 
instruments of power. But it should attract those who believe, as I 
do, that wiser choices can be made by political leaders if they 
decide to be more systematic in the way they assess U.S. interests 
and policies. I also believe that their task will be easier if we have 
an informed American public that appreciates the need for pri-
orities and is willing to accept the hard choices that policy-makers 
must face. I do not pretend to be the leading authority in this 
process of getting the ends and means of U.S. foreign policy into 
alignment, but I do bring to the debate some forty years of 
experience in government and academia, the last fourteen of 
which have been devoted to finding a more rigorous way of 
getting the priorities right. I hope that this new volume will add to 
my earlier efforts to clarify the issues and that it will stimulate 
others to enter the arena. 
Charlottesville, Virginia 
June 1984 
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1. National Interest 
as a Basis of Foreign 
Policy Formulation 
The term national interest has long been used by statesmen and 
scholars to describe the foreign policy goals of nation-states. 
Although the concept is not new there is ambiguity about its 
meaning, and most scholars have chosen to use their own de-
scriptions rather than follow formulations offered by others. To-
day the student of international relations finds numerous defini-
tions of national interest, most of which are not conducive to 
precision in the making of foreign policy. Before attempting a 
more adequate definition, however, it is useful to review briefly 
what major American writers have said about the nature and 
roots of the nation's interests, particularly those writing after the 
United States became a great power. 
Charles Beard, in The Idea of National Interest, traced the evolu-
tion of the phrase from the first nation-states down to the twen-
tieth century and described the historical interests of the United 
States in essentially economic terms. Beard was concerned with 
what might be called the national economic interest. He argued 
that the founding fathers, particularly Washington and Hamilton, 
had a clear perception of what the new nation's interests had to be 
in order to survive: self-interest rather than sentiment, and a 
deep appreciation of the limited means available to carry out its 
policies. Beard believed that the predominant national interest of 
the United States was economic during the first hundred years of 
its history and that the two major political parties defined this 
interest to suit their own purposes. Commercial groups in the 
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East were primarily concerned with overseas trade and opposed 
to the nation's westward expansion across a vast continent. The 
landed gentry of the South and West, however, favored adding 
vast new lands in the West in order to build the political influence 
of farmers and to reduce the power of eastern commercial groups. 
Hamilton and Jefferson were the initial spokesmen of these two 
forces, which dominated American politics until the Civil War 
and represented the basic cleavage over what America's role in 
the world ought to be. Beard maintained that historically national 
security was not a principal concern of the United States, except 
for a brief period during the War of 1812, because no foreign 
power had the capability of invading the country and forcing it to 
submit. The Monroe Doctrine was a feasible policy because of the 
British Navy's support in the Atlantic. Thus, the new nation's 
interests could afford to emphasize economics rather than mili-
tary power. 1 
A different view of what constitutes the basic interest of the 
United States was provided in the post-World War II period by 
Hans Morgenthau, whose ideas were forcefully set forth in his 
widely read textbook, Politics Among Nations. Both in this volume 
and in his shorter treatise, In Defense of the National Interest, Mor-
genthau argued that power, primarily industrial and military 
power, was the means by which nations survived in an essentially 
competitive world, and that nations neglecting self-interest and 
national power succumbed to the influence and intimidation of 
other states which emphasized them. Morgenthau deplored what 
he termed the "utopian" view of the world held by the "idealists" 
and favored instead a "realistic" outlook based on national self-
interest. Like Charles Beard, he claimed that the realism of the 
founding fathers enabled the new nation to chart a wise policy 
that avoided entanglements with the great powers of Europe and 
permitted American commerce to prosper. The difficulties en-
countered by the United States in its international relations dur-
ing the twentieth century, he asserted, resulted from the moral-
ism and utopianism of leaders such as Woodrow Wilson; they 
subordinated the self-interest of the United States to universal 
principles that were often unattainable and therefore proved to be 
deeply frustrating to the nation. 2 
1. Charles A. Beard, The Idea of National Interest (Chicago, 1934). 
2. Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest (New York, 1951). 
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George Kennan, a professional diplomat turned scholar, 
shared Morgenthau's view of the world and the need for realistic 
thinking as the basis of foreign policy formulation. He too crit-
icized the utopianism of those who shared Wilson's outlook. Such 
views, he argued, led to serious errors in judgment about the real 
nature of international politics and the best way for the United 
States to advance its basic national interests. Morgenthau and 
Kennan were strong advocates of the balance-of-power principle 
of international relations in which great powers seek to maintain 
international stability and relative peace through the balancing of 
military and economic power, and in which no single nation 
could become so powerful as to threaten the security of others. 
Kennan became associated with the so-called elitist view of for-
eign policy-making, arguing that the general public neither ap-
preciated nor cared about the intricacies of foreign affairs and that 
skilled statesmen and diplomats should be given wide latitude in 
determining U.S. national interests and the policies most likely to 
advance them. 3 
The theologian-scholar Reinhold Niebuhr, who began pub-
lishing his ideas on the nature of international politics during the 
pre-World War II period, was interested in finding a place for 
both idealism and realism in the formulation of United States 
interests. He was deeply disturbed, as were many of his contem-
poraries, by the shattering impact of World War I on the interna-
tional order and on the idealism that had characterized the west-
ern intellectual community. Moral Man and Immoral Society, 
published in 1932, reflected a new sense of realism in Niebuhr's 
thinking about the behavior of states in their international rela-
tions, and he reluctantly concluded that the role of power could 
not be ignored as a major element controlling the relations of 
states. In 1953, his widely read volume entitled The Irony of Amer-
ican History elaborated the view that both moral values and power 
must be considered in the formulation of national interests and in 
the pursuit of international peace.4 
Probably the most thorough postwar research effort on U.S. 
national interests was conducted by Robert Osgood, whose com-
prehensive Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations was 
published in 1953. Osgood's view was that egoism and idealism 
3. George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago, 1951). 
4. See also Niebuhr's Structure of Nations and Empires (New York, 1959). 
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had been competing concepts in determining U.S. foreign policy 
since the turn of the twentieth century, when acquisition of the 
Philippines in the Pacific and Cuba in the Caribbean resulted in 
an imperialistic trend in U.S. foreign policy. The most notable 
proponents of this viewpoint were Theodore Roosevelt and Al-
fred T. Mahan. Osgood traced the development of the two dis-
tinct viewpoints-egoism and idealism-into separate foreign 
policies, with the Republican party adopting the former and the 
Democrats tending toward the latter. He described the two points 
of view as follows: "National self-interest is understood to mean a 
state of affairs valued solely for its benefit to the nation .... An 
ideal is a standard of conduct or a state of affairs worthy of 
achievement by virtue of its universal moral value."5 He went on 
to argue that nations, like individuals, seldom act out of either 
purely selfish motives or pure idealism, that most actions and 
policies are a blending of the two. The degree to which a nation 
acts out of self-interest or from idealistic motives is the key to 
discovering the basis of its national interest, he observed. 
Another scholar who wrote extensively on national interest 
was Arnold Wolfers, one of a group of scholars who sought to 
bridge the gap between idealists and realists. Wolfers noted that 
the term national interest had become, in the post-World War II 
period, practically synonymous with a formula for national se-
curity and that, unless they explicitly deny it, those who empha-
size national interest as the basis of foreign policy may be as-
sumed to mean that "priority shall be given to measures of 
security." Wolfers believed that among scholars and statesmen 
there was a preoccupation with national security and military 
power, which he said was not surprising during the 1950s when 
there was a major concern in the United States about building up 
strategic military power; but, he argued, one did not have to be 
obsessed with national security in order to be realistic about the 
goals and interests of the United States in the world. 6 
The trend in the 1950s to associate national interest solely with 
national security was unfortunate because it gave a distorted view 
of what U.S. interests consist of and made it more difficult to use 
5. Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations (Chi-
cago, 1953), 4. 
6. Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol," Political 
Science Quarterly 67, no. 4 (Dec. 1952): 481-502. 
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the term in a broader context. A more comprehensive view of 
national interest was described by Paul Seabury in his volume 
Power, Freedom, and Diplomacy: "We might thus conceive of the 
national interest as a kaleidoscopic process by which forces latent 
in American society seek to express certain political and economic 
aspirations in world politics through the highest organs of state. 
To comprehend this process, we must not merely understand 
something of the formal governmental processes by which for-
eign policy is made, but also penetrate into the depth of the 
nation itself to discern the wellsprings of thought, ideology, and 
smaller interests that feed into the mainstreams of American 
policy abroad."7 
Some scholars, however, do not believe that national interest is 
a useful way to analyze the foreign policy objectives of states. One 
of the most prominent skeptics is James Rosenau, who thinks that 
neither the "objectivists" nor the "subjectivists," as he calls repre-
sentatives of the contending viewpoints, offer an effective ra-
tionale for using the concept as a research tool. In The Scientific 
Study of Foreign Policy, Rosenau argues that "despite the claims 
made for the concept and notwithstanding its apparent utility, 
the national interest has never fulfilled its early promise as an 
analytic tool. Attempts by both objectivists and subjectivists to 
use and apply it have proven fruitless or misleading, with the 
result that, while textbooks on international politics continue to 
assert that nations act to protect and realize their national inter-
ests, the research literature of the field has not been increased and 
enriched by monographs which give central prominence to the 
concept." Rosenau gives as another reason for doubting the util-
ity of national interest the declining importance of the nation-
state in international politics: "The ever greater interdependence 
of nations and the emergence of increasing numbers of suprana-
tional actors is also bound to diminish reliance on the concept. 
Increasingly, decision makers act on behalf of clusters of nations 
as well as their own."8 Roseanau is typical of many scholars 
writing in the late 1960s and early 1970s who were convinced that 
the nation-state was declining in importance. I believe that events 
7. Paul A. Seabury, Power, Freedom and Diplomacy (New York, 1963), 87. 
8. James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York, 1971 ), 243, 
248. 
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of the past decade have proved them wrong and that the concept 
of national interest remains relevant to today's world. 
From this brief review of some of the principal writings on the 
subject, it is apparent that there is no general agreement among 
scholars on how to define the term national interest or what 
policies should flow from its definition. In fact, there is no com-
mon conceptual framework in which serious discussion can take 
place. It is desirable, therefore, that this study of U.S. national 
interests begin with an effort to provide such a framework, for if 
we can be more precise about definition, especially about degrees 
of interest that should guide policy formulation, we may find 
greater utility in the term than has been the case during the past 
forty years. 
Definitions of Interest 
For purposes of defintion, it is well to draw a distinction 
between the nature of national interest and public interest. The public 
interest may be viewed as the well-being of the American people 
and American enterprise within the territorial boundaries of the 
United States; the national interest, on the other hand, is con-
cerned with the well-being of American citizens and enterprise 
operating outside the United States and thus beyond the admin-
istrative jurisdiction of the U.S. government. This is especially 
important when the rights of Americans are endangered by the 
policies of nations that are antagonistic to those of the United 
States. Obviously, the public interest and the national interest are 
not mutually exclusive. Indeed, the public interest is heavily 
influenced by the nature of the international environment in 
which the United States interacts, particularly when there is a 
threat of war; similarly, the national interest is strongly influenced 
by the degree of social stability and political unity prevailing 
within the country at any specific time. For purposes of this 
discussion, it is useful to think of the public interest as the 
concern of federal, state, and local government-with the Presi-
dent sharing his authority with Congress, the courts, and the fifty 
states--and the national interest as the concern only of the federal 
government, with the President exercising the principal authority 
and responsibility for the nation's international welfare. 9 
9. The President's primary role in setting U.S. foreign policy objectives has 
Foreign Policy Formulation 7 
Strategic interests are second-order interests and derive from a 
clear perception of national interests. They are concerned with 
the political, economic, and military means of protecting the 
nation against military threats and are defined to a large degree 
by geography, availability of scarce resources, military tech-
nology, and the limitation of damage which could be inflicted on 
American territory or that of key allies. Occasionally, strategic 
interests tend to determine national interests, rather than the 
reverse, and in such cases confusion and overemphasis on mili-
tary security often result. Private interests are the activities of U.S. 
groups and companies operating abroad whose business is not of 
major concern to the entire United States. 
The national interests of the United States may therefore be 
defined as follows: "The country's perceived needs and aspira-
tions in relation to other sovereign states constituting its external 
environment." U.S. national interests are the product of a politi-
cal process in which the country's elected national leadership 
arrives at decisions about the importance of specific external 
events that affect the nation's political and economic well-being.10 
Clearly, the determination of national interests is influenced, 
especially in a representative democracy, by the needs and aspira-
tions of interest groups, bureaucratic structures, and various 
political factions; but ultimately the President has to make a 
judgment about the extent to which the national interest is in-
volved in a specific international issue or crisis. On important 
issues, the President has to persuade a majority of members of 
Congress, particularly the Senate, that his view of the national 
interest is correct and should have their support in the form of 
policies that he believes are needed in order to defend it. An 
excellent illustration of this check-and-balance relationship in 
determining a national interest was the congressional controver-
sy over President Ronald Reagan's policies in Central America 
during 1983 and 1984. 
The United States, like most great powers, has both changing 
and unchanging national interests, some of which it has pursued 
been well established by precedent and decisions of the courts. See Edwin 
Corwin, The Presidency: Office and Powers (New York, 1957). 
10. This definition of U.S. national interests was first used in my article 
entitled "The Concept of 'National Interest': A Time for New Approaches, in Orbis 
(Spring 1979): 73-92. 
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consistently-although with varying degrees of intensity-over 
long periods of time, and others which it has pursued for short 
periods and then altered because of changing world conditions, 
or domestic political considerations. The United States has four 
basic, relatively unchanging, national interests, and all of its 
interests and foreign policies can be fitted into these four catego-
ries: defense, trade and commerce, the building of a stable world 
order, and the promotion of American values abroad. These long-
term interests are defined as follows: 
1. Defense of Homeland: Protection of the people, territory, and 
institutions of the United States against potential foreign dan-
gers. This is usually referred to as the national defense interest, 
and it has been pursued with varying degrees of intensity 
throughout American history as the U.S. government has per-
ceived foreign dangers arising and threatening the people, bor-
ders, and internal security of the country. 
2. Economic Well-being: Promotion of U.S. international trade 
and investment, including protection of private interests in for-
eign countries. This may be called the national economic interest. 
It was historically the most important interest of this country 
because geography made it possible for the nation to concentrate 
its energies on trade and commerce rather than defense of its 
territory. 
3. Favorable World Order (international security): Establishment 
of a peaceful international environment in which disputes be-
tween nations can be resolved without resort to war and in which 
collective security rather than unilateral action is employed to 
deter or cope with aggression. This is also referred to as the 
international security interest, and it came to prominence after 
the United States achieved great power status early in this cen-
tury. This interest is also concerned with questions of alliance 
systems and world balance of power. 
4. Promotion of Values (ideology): Promulgation of a set of 
values that U.S. leaders believe to be universally good and 
worthy of emulation by other countries. The emphasis given by 
Congress and the President to "human rights" in U.S. foreign 
policy during the 1970s and 1980s underlines the enduring role of 
this basic interest, even though it received less attention from the 
U.S. government in the early post-World War II period than other 
interests cited above. 
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The problem of correctly defining U.S. national interests lies 
not primarily in identifying these broad enduring interests, but 
rather in assessing the intensity of the interest-or stake-at dif-
ferent moments in history, and the desirability of using influence 
and pressure to defend or enhance certain national interests in 
preference to others, and at the expense of other nations. For 
example, the United States has long had an interest in freedom of 
the seas, for both economic and defense reasons, but the 
willingness of the government to use military force to protect that 
interest has changed over time as its perception of defense and 
economic interests has altered. 
In sum, we are concerned with the intensity of interest the 
United States feels in specific issues relating to its four basic 
national interests, and with the basis for determining which 
threats are so important to its defense, economic, world-order, 
and ideological interests that it would contemplate the use of 
economic and military sanctions to prevent encroachment by a 
foreign power. It is the intensity of concern about any basic 
interest at a given period of time that forms the basis of policy-
making in foreign affairs. These intensities, or degrees of inter-
est, constitute a different category that we will call "transitory," 
because they are subject to change depending on the govern-
ment's perception of their urgency at any given time. 
The term transitory, as used here, does not imply that an 
interest is present at one period of time and not at another; rather, 
it suggests that certain specific issues falling under any of the 
basic interests may receive more attention from policy-makers at 
some times than at others. The degree of interest involved usually 
depends on the President's perception of the international en-
vironment within which the United States conducts foreign pol-
icy and on his judgment of the political climate in the United 
States. Looking at transitory interests in this light, we can visu-
alize a four-tiered scale of priorities as a basis for defining more 
precisely the amount of value the nation, acting through its 
government, attaches to specific foreign policy issues. This scale 
of priorities may be defined as follows: (1) survival interests, 
where the very existence of the nation is in peril; (2) vital inter-
ests, where probable serious harm to the security and well-being 
of the nation will result if strong measures, including military 
ones, are not taken by the government within a short period of 
10 Foreign Policy Formulation 
time; (3) major interests, where potential serious harm could 
come to the nation if no action is taken to counter an unfavorable 
trend abroad; and (4) peripheral (minor) interests, where little if 
any harm to the entire nation will result if a "wait and see" policy 
is adopted. Another way to measure the intensity of an interest is 
to use a time dimension: survival interests require the immediate 
attention of the President; vital interests require urgent planning 
in the executive branch; major interests require serious study; 
and peripheral ones suggest "watchful waiting." It is the job of the 
President and his principal advisers to decide when an interna-
tional issue is at the vita/level, especially if it is likely to approach 
the survival level. The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 is an example. 
A survival interest exists when there is an imminent, credible 
threat of massive destruction to the homeland if another state's 
demands are not quickly met. Such crises are easy to detect 
because they are dramatic and involve an armed attack, or threat 
of attack, by one country on another's territory. Hilter's invasion 
of Poland in September 1939, Japan's bombing of Pearl Harbor in 
1941, North Korea's attack on South Korea in 1950, and the Soviet 
Union's intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 are examples of a 
survival interest for the states being attacked. Except for the 
bombing of Pearl Harbor and possibly the raid by Pancho Villa 
into New Mexico in 1916, the United States has not had its own 
territory invaded or bombarded since British forces entered 
Washington, D.C., in 1814. All other major powers that entered 
World War II were either invaded or (like Great Britain) heavily 
bombed. Thus, the United States alone among the major powers 
has not experienced having its homeland destroyed. But the 
threat of massive destruction on the United States has existed 
since the introduction of long-range bombers in the 1950s and the 
development of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles and sub-
marine-launched missiles in the 1960s and the 1970s. 
The Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 was the most dramatic 
example of the United States having a near-survival interest at 
sake. This occurred when U.S. reconnaissance planes discovered 
that Soviet medium-range missiles were being installed in Cuba 
and appeared to carry the threat to the United States of massive 
destruction even though the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, 
did not specifically threaten to use them. Today, every major city 
and military installation in the United States is a target of Soviet 
Foreign Policy Formulation 11 
missiles, and the survival interest of the United States is poten-
tially at stake if there should occur a military confrontation be-
tween U.S. and Soviet military forces anywhere in the world. 
Survival interests usually are limited to the defense of a nation's 
homeland. 
A vital interest differs from a survival one principally in the 
amount of time that a country has to decide how it will respond to 
an external threat. Vital interests involve economic, world-order, 
and ideological issues as well as defense of the homeland ones 
and may ultimately be as crucial to a country as direct threats to its 
independence. But threats to vital interests are potential rather 
than imminent dangers to a country's well-being, and they there-
fore provide policy-makers with time to consult allies, bargain 
with the adversary, employ political and economic measures to 
change a trend, and engage in a show of military force to con-
vince an adversary that its course of action could be extremely 
costly. 
In the final analysis, a vital interest is at stake when an issue 
becomes so important to a nation's well-being that its leadership 
will refuse to compromise beyond the point that it considers to be 
tolerable. If political leaders decide they cannot compromise an 
issue beyond what has already been done and are willing instead 
to risk economic and military sanctions, the issue is probably 
vital. Examples are President Harry Truman's decision in June 
1950 to confront North Korea over its invasion of South Korea; 
President Dwight Eisenhower's decision in 1958 not to accept 
Syrian domination of Lebanon; President John Kennedy's deci-
sion not to accept Soviet missiles in Cuba or elsewhere in the 
Caribbean; President Richard Nixon's decision to take the United 
States off the gold standard in August 1971 and force its trading 
partners to accept a devaluation of the dollar; President Nixon's 
decision in October 1973 to alert U.S. forces when the Soviet 
Union threatened to send paratroopers to Egypt; and President 
Jimmy Carter's ill-fated decision to try a rescue mission of Amer-
ican hostages in Iran in 1980. Although ideological interests usu-
ally do not reach the vital interest level, they nevertheless provide 
an undergirding for other interests and occasionally may reach 
that level in their own right. The Reagan administration's policies 
in Central America during 1983 were couched in strong ide-
ological terms, but the real issue was President Reagan's belief 
12 Foreign Policy Formulation 
that a vital world-order interest was at stake in preventing Com-
munist-sponsored revolution from taking over all of Central 
America. 
In sum, vital interests include defense, economic, world-
order, and occasionally ideological issues in U.S. foreign and 
national security policy. 
It is important to emphasize here that a vital interest is not 
defined by the kind of policy actions a president takes in a crisis or 
serious international dispute; the actions are only symptomatic of 
the intensity of the interest. Sometimes a leadership may con-
clude that an issue is vital (that is, has reached the intolerable 
point) but that no dramatic action is warranted-or possible. The 
fall of the Shah of Iran is an example of President Carter's dilem-
ma. Conversely, there may be cases where force is used even 
though the issue involved is not viewed as intolerable; this may 
result from a calculation that the risks of using force are low and 
the benefits will be considerable. This was probably the situation 
when President Reagan decided to invade the island of Grenada 
in October 1983. A vital interest is reached when a country's 
leadership becomes convinced that serious harm threatens the 
country and that it needs to act quickly to relieve the pressure 
applied by another state to have its way in an international dis-
pute. The policy action taken, or not taken, to defend the interest 
is a separate issue and is discussed in Chapter 2. 
A major interest is one that a country considers to be important 
but not crucial to its well-being. These are issues or trends that can 
be negotiated with an adversary-whether they are economic, 
political, or ideological. Such issues can cause serious concern 
and even harm to U.S. interests and policies abroad, but policy-
makers usually come to the conclusion that negotiation and com-
promise, rather than confrontation, are desirable-even though 
the results can be painful. Examples of major interests for the 
United States are the Arab oil embargo in 1973 and the decision of 
OPEC to greatly increase the world price of crude oil; the Sand-
inista revolution in Nicaragua in 1979; the Siberian gas pipeline 
to Western Europe, which became a serious political and eco-
nomic issue within NATO in 1982; and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979. Each of these cases presented a potentially 
serious challenge to U.S. national interests, but in each one the 
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President decided that he could live with the outcome even 
though it entailed considerable pain. 
Ultimately, the difference between a major and a vital interest 
comes down to what is tolerable: if the President and his National 
Security Council believe they can accommodate to an adverse 
situation, the issue probably is a major interest; if the situation 
becomes so distressing that they are ultimately unwilling to com-
promise, then the issue is probably vital. In the case of American 
diplomats held hostage by Iran in 1980, President Jimmy Carter 
decided that a continuation of the situation was intolerable, and 
he authorized a rescue mission. When the mission was aborted, 
however, Mr. Carter did not follow up with additional military 
pressure on Iran but instead continued the negotiation track-
suggesting that for him the hostage issue was not firmly at the 
vital interest level. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's resignation 
over this issue is a rare example of a key policy-maker's deciding 
to leave office when his view of the national interest was rejected 
by the President. In this case, President Carter moved toward the 
view of his National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who 
considered the hostage issue to be a vital interest to American 
worldwide prestige and therefore requiring strong action. The 
hostage issue also highlights the importance of context in decid-
ing the level of interest. President Carter had always to consider 
that the use of U.S. forces in Iran might result in a Soviet counter-
move in northern Iran and a potential U.S.-Soviet military con-
frontation. President Lyndon Johnson faced a similar dilemma in 
Vietnam: his decision not to invade North Vietnam was motivated 
by his unwillingness to risk China's intervening in that war-as it 
had done in Korea in late 1950 when U.S. forces approached the 
Yalu River-China's border. 
A peripheral interest is one which does not seriously affect the 
well-being of the United States as a whole, even though it may be 
detrimental to the private interests of Americans conducting 
business abroad. These are issues that bear watching by the State 
Department and other government agencies, but they are a lower 
order of political, economic, or ideological magnitude. Examples 
are the imprisonment of American citizens on drug charges, 
isolated cases of infringement on U.S. business interests, the 
harassment of local political figures who are friendly to the Unit-
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ed States, and the expropriation of U.S. private property with 
compensation. Although the detention of a political opponent by 
a friendly government would usually be viewed as a peripheral 
U.S. interest, the imprisonment or assassination of opposition 
leaders is clearly of greater concern. The murder of Benigno 
Aquino in the Philippines in 1983 was viewed as a major ide-
ological interest by the Reagan administration and was responsi-
ble for the cancellation of a presidential visit to Manila. 
Use of the National Interest Matrix 
The heart of this conceptual framework for assessing national 
interests is the matrix shown in Figure 1. The national interest 
matrix comprises the four basic interests of nation-states on the 
vertical plane and the four intensities of interest on the horizontal 
one.l1 The policy-maker's task is to decide how large a stake the 
United States has in a specific international issue or crisis affect-
ing its four basic national interests. Then he should estimate the 
intensity of interest that other countries have in the same issue, 
for each basic interest. Comparing the levels of interest at stake 
for the principal countries involved, a calculation can be made as 
to whether the issue is likely to be negotiable or whether it will 
probably lead to an armed confrontation. These calculations 
about the intentions of other countries are, of course, subjective 
judgments made by diplomats, intelligence specialists, scholars, 
and journalists who have detailed knowledge of the countries 
involved. Policy-makers, however, especially the President and 
his National Security Council, need to calculate carefully the 
degree of the U.S. interest at stake and decide whether it is 
desirable to negotiate an issue even though U.S. defenses, eco-
nomic well-being, alliances with other countries, or sense of 
values may be seriously affected. 
An illustration of how the national interest matrix may be 
employed as a decision-making tool is the Falkland Islands (Mal-
vinas) controversy in the spring of 1982, in which Argentina and 
Great Britain went to war. In this case, the principals were Argen-
11. This national interest matrix was developed in a previous volume: Donald 
E. Nuechterlein, National Interests and Presidential Leadership: The Setting of Priorities 
(Boulder, Colo., 1978), 11-18. 
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Fig. 1. National Interest Matrix 
Basic Interest at Stake 
Defense of Homeland 
Economic Well-Being 
Favorable World Order 
Promotion of Values 
Survival 




tina, which claimed sovereignty over the Malvinas, and Britain, 
which occupied the islands in the last century and retained 
control over them for 150 years. The United States had important 
interests in the crisis because of its close ties to the antagonists, 
and Venezuela had strong views because it is a Latin American 
state and has a border dispute with neighboring Guyana, a for-
mer British colony. Figure 2 is an approximation of the stakes that 
these four countries had in the Falkland Islands crisis in 1982. 
Fig. 2. The Falkland Islands War, 1982 
Basic Interest at Stake Intensity of Interest 
Survival Vital Major Peripheral 
Defense of Homeland Argentina Britain Venezuela 
United 
States 
Economic Well-Being Britain Argentina 
United Venezuela 
States 
Favorable World Order United Argentina 
States 
Britain Venezuela 
Promotion of Values Britain United 
States 
Argentina Venezuela 
These countries' interests may be summarized as follows. De-
fense-of-homeland interests: Argentina was convinced it had a vital 
defense interest because the Falklands were claimed as Argentine 
sovereign territory. Britain's defense interest was at a somewhat 
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lower level because of the islands' distance from the homeland. 
Neither the United States nor Venezuela (one of Argentina's most 
vigorous supporters) had important defense interests at stake in 
the South Atlantic. Economic interests: Britain and the United 
States had major economic interests in the conflict because of 
investments and trade with Argentina that could be jeopardized 
by war. However, neither Argentina nor Venezuela believed that 
its economic well-being would be affected by Argentina's seizure 
of the islands. World-order interests: The United States concluded 
that it had a vital world-order interest at stake because of its strong 
ties to Great Britain in the NATO context and because of its 
displeasure with Argentina's blatant use of force. Argentina had a 
lesser world-order interest, however, and was willing to risk the 
displeasure of the United States and the world community by 
violating the United Nations Charter. Venezuela's world-order 
interest was influenced primarily by its own dispute with Guyana 
and its antipathy to colonialism. Britain's was at the vital level 
because it could not tolerate the loss of prestige that would have 
resulted from capitulation to Argentina's demands. Ideological 
interests: Both Britain and Argentina had vital ideological interests 
in this controversy: Britain wanted to defend the right of 1,700 
islanders to remain British citizens, and it was determined not to 
be humiliated by a country it considered to have been pro-Nazi 
during World War II; Argentina had a strong historical need to 
repossess the Malvinas, which it charged were illegally taken by 
the British in the 1830s. The United States and Venezuela, sup-
porting opposite sides in the conflict, had lesser ideological inter-
ests at stake. 
Nearly all of these considerations about the interests of Britain, 
Argentina, the United States, and Venezuela in the Falklands 
crisis were predictable in April1982 when Argentina invaded the 
islands. The only factor that was not entirely clear in advance was 
whether the Thatcher government would view the Falklands as a 
crucial (vital) world-order interest. If it did not, the Buenos Aires 
regime would have been correct to conclude that a quick seizure 
of the islands would convince London to negotiate the transfer of 
sovereignty rather than undertake a risky military effort and the 
expenditure of substantial funds to retake the islands, even 
though it might wish to uphold the principle of self-determina-
tion. In addition to miscalculating British interests, Argentina 
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was wrong in thinking that the United States would have only a 
modest interest in this crisis and that it would reluctantly accept 
Argentina's seizure of the islands if that move were quick and 
decisive. The Falkland Islands War also demonstrated how se-
rious the consequences can be of miscalculation of national inter-
ests in an international dispute. Argentina clearly underesti-
mated the world-order interests not only of Britain but of the 
United States, and consequently suffered defeat and a great loss 
of prestige. The United States also may have miscalculated Ar-
gentina's intensity of interest by not appreciating the risks the 
Galtieri government was willing to take to achieve a vital interest. 
A rule of thumb for analyzing the placement of countries on 
the national interest matrix is that if any country that is party to an 
international dispute has a survival or vital defense interest at 
stake, that country may well go to war rather than submit to 
political, economic, and military pressure. If the defense of one's 
homeland is not at issue, however, but there are vital economic, 
world-order, or ideological interests at stake, armed conflict may 
still be expected, especially if any participant has two basic inter-
ests ranked at the vital level. If one country's interest is vital and 
the opposing country's interest is less than that, it is probable that 
a negotiated settlement can be worked out between the parties. 
However, if two countries to a dispute each have a vital interest in 
the outcome, there is a strong possibility that hostilities will result 
unless outside influence is brought to bear on the parties to 
negotiate rather than fight. 
Distinguishing between Vital and Major National Interests 
In assessing the national interests of sovereign states, a crucial 
factor is appreciating the difference between a vital interest and a 
major interest. The policy implications of choosing between them 
are enormous because a country must be prepared for an armed 
confrontation, if all other measures fail, when its leaders decide 
that the issue at stake is vital. Policy-makers normally do not have 
difficulty identifying a survival interest, because these are cases 
where there is an imminent danger of attack on the homeland and 
a crisis atmosphere has already occurred. The Cuban missile 
crisis in October 1962 is an example. Similarly, policy-makers have 
little difficulty sensing what issues are at the peripheral level, and 
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they put them aside for further study. The real decision is 
whether a foreign policy problem is vital; that is, whether the 
stakes are sufficiently high that the policy-maker does not believe 
the basic issue can be compromised significantly. If the President 
and his national security advisers believe that compromise will 
prove to be intolerable for the country's well-being, the issue is 
probably a vital one. 
Clearly, the term vital interest is used so loosely by many policy-
makers, military planners, and politicians that it has often be-
come confusing--even dangerous--when applied to specific is-
sues. Too often a military or political leader will call something 
vital if he thinks it is very important, without regard to the 
consequences. That is why it is essential that policy-makers and 
scholars consider specific criteria when they decide whether a 
national interest-be it defense, economic, world-order, or ide-
ological-is indeed at the vital level. 
The following definition and list of criteria represent my effort 
to promote greater precision in the use of the term. An interest is 
vital when the highest policy-makers in a sovereign state conclude that the 
issue at stake is so fundamental to the political, economic, and social well-
being of their country that it should not be compromised-even if this 
may result in the use of economic and military sanctions.12 In arriving 
at such a judgment, national leaders base their assessment on 
many factors, including hunches. But a much more rigorous 
standard is required if the United States is to avoid the kind of 
miscalculations that occurred during the Vietnam War, and in the 
Lebanon peacekeeping operation in 1982-83. Listed in Figure 3 are 
sixteen criteria for assessing whether or not an issue is vital to the 
United States. Eight of these are value factors and eight are cost/ 
risk factors, which too often are underestimated or overlooked 
altogether in crucial policy deliberations. This listing does not 
suggest any priority or relative importance. 
Proximity of the Danger. Americans still think in geographical 
terms when assessing the importance of a foreign threat to the 
national interest. Despite the fact that intercontinental bombers 
and ICBMs can fly thousands of miles to reach a target, public 
opinion views a threat from a neighboring country as more dan-
12. Orbis, 85. 
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Fig. 3. Criteria for Determining Vital Interests 
Value Factors 
Proximity of the danger 
Nature of the threat 
Economic stake 
Sentimental attachment 
Type of government and human rights 
Effect on the balance of power 
National prestige at stake 
Support of allies 
Cost/Risk Factors 
Economic costs of hostilities 
Estimated casualties 
Risk of protracted conflict 
Risk of enlarged conflict 
Cost of defeat or stalemate 
Risk of public opposition 
Risk of United Nations opposition 
Risk of congressional opposition 
gerous than one from a more distant country. Americans reacted 
strongly to Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962 even though 
the Soviet Union had a limited ICBM capability that could threat-
en several U.S. cities from silos in the U.S.S.R. The proximity of 
danger is a criterion that applies primarily to defense and world-
order interests. The United States and the Soviet Union, for 
example, are clearly more concerned with dangers in their imme-
diate neighborhoods--as far as defense interests are concerned-
than with those in distant areas. Eastern Europe is to the Soviet 
Union what Central America, Mexico and Canada are to the 
United States; these are areas where the superpowers view their 
defense to be at least at the vital level. 
Nature of the Threat. Under this category an international issue 
may involve any of the four basic interests. For the United States, 
the danger could be a Soviet and Cuban military threat to a 
Caribbean or Central American country (defense), an Arab oil 
embargo (economic), the toppling of a friendly South American 
government by Marxist groups (world-order), or a flagrant dis-
regard for human rights by an ally, such as the Philippines 
(ideological). It is rare, however, that an ideological interest 
would be so threatened that the United States would feel com-
pelled to use great pressure to change another government's 
human rights policy. "Nature of the threat" becomes ambiguous 
for policy planners in dealing with the world-order category 
because the American public distinguishes between overt acts of 
aggression (such as the Korean case in 1950) and conflicts that are 
essentially internal (such as Vietnam, Angola, and Iran). Much 
public dissatisfaction with President Lyndon Johnson's definition 
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of the U.S. interest in Vietnam stemmed from his inability to 
demonstrate overt aggression by North Vietnam, or that its Com-
munist ideology was a threat to the United States. Similarly, the 
nature of the struggle for power in El Salvador in 1983-84 made it 
difficult for President Reagan to convince Congress that the Unit-
ed States should support that country militarily. 
Economic Stake. Investments, trade, and commerce are impor-
tant factors conditioning the level of interest the United States has 
in other states. Worldwide investments and trade carried on by 
U.S. firms and the effect this has on various segments of U.S. 
society make economic factors highly important considerations 
for policy planners. Rarely, however, have economic factors alone 
caused the United States to resort to war. The economic stake 
clearly affects two of the basic U.S. national interests: economic 
well-being and world-order. For example, a vital economic inter-
est seemed to be at stake for the Nixon administration in August 
1971 when the United States took strong economic measures 
against its trading partners, who thereafter referred to Nixon's 
"shocks." Middle East oil has always been vital to the economies 
of Western Europe; but only in the 1970s, because of the decline in 
U.S. oil production, did it appear to be vital also to the United 
States. Had the Arab oil embargo continued a few more months 
into 1974, and had Europe been more cooperative in forging a 
joint policy, it is likely that strong economic countermeasures 
would have been taken against Saudi Arabia and other Persian 
Gulf states. 
Sentimental Attachment. The United States, more than most 
states, is influenced in its attitude toward other countries by the 
sentiments of the immigrants who came to the United States 
before and after World War II. The "ethnic vote" seems to exert 
more influence on Congress and on policy-makers than the num-
bers of voters involved. Historically, many Americans have felt a 
sentimental attachment to Great Britain because the two countries 
share similar values and institutions. The small Jewish minority 
in the United States has had an overriding influence on U.S. 
policy in the Middle East. Similarly, in 1975 the Greek lobby 
brought very strong pressure to bear on Congress to cut off all aid 
to Turkey, because Turkey had sent troops to Cyprus to protect 
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the Turkish minority. Conversely, lack of sentimental attachment 
to the Vietnamese made it difficult for President Johnson to obtain 
a commitment from the American people to defend South Viet-
nam. Although some scholars and statesmen argue that senti-
ment should have no place in the determination of national inter-
ests, democracies find it difficult to ignore this factor because their 
peoples have a strong voice in influencing foreign policy. Senti-
ment is important in determining U.S. national interests in the 
Middle East, and it has also influenced U.S. policy toward South-
ern Africa. The rapidly growing Hispanic population in the Unit-
ed States insures that it will exert a strong influence on U.S. 
interests and policies in Latin America. 
Type of Government and Human Rights. This factor is linked to 
sentimental attachment and flows from the ideological underpin-
nings of American society: namely, belief in representative gov-
ernment, individual rights, religious freedom, and so forth. This 
factor poses a dilemma for U.S. policy-makers: they have to trade 
off world-order and economic interests, on the one hand, and 
ideological interests on the other. Military assistance and eco-
nomic aid to authoritarian regimes, for example, have been justi-
fied on the grounds that U.S. support is essential to the con-
tainment of Communism. Since the Vietnam War, there has been 
increasing sentiment in Congress and among the public for the 
executive branch to give greater attention to the type of govern-
ment and its record on human rights when committing U.S. aid 
funds and making defense commitments to other countries. Pres-
ident Carter's human rights policy won wide acceptance from the 
American public, even though its implementation was criticized, 
and the Reagan administration has continued this policy by quiet-
er means. 
Effect on the Balance of Power. This factor should be viewed on 
two levels: the strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the 
United States (defense interest), and the regional balance of polit-
ical forces in any part of the world (world-order interest). On the 
strategic level, the superpowers are constantly assessing the 
effectiveness of their nuclear missile forces in order to decide 
whether the other side has gained, or will gain, an advantage and 
thus will be in a position to pressure the other to make political 
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concessions. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, which began in 
1969, were motivated in part by each side's need to avoid mis-
calculations that could lead to war, and to keep a close watch on 
the other's technological developments. A regional balance of 
power is more difficult to assess, however. Unlike the strategic 
balance, which depends largely on the superpowers' decisions to 
produce or limit the weapons that maintain a strategic balance 
and thus deterrence, a regional political balance depends on the 
willingness of countries to cooperate with one another and with 
the superpowers to insure that no single country will dominate 
the politics of a whole region. The regional balance resembles the 
classical balance of power politics practiced by European states-
men in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The degree of 
political change in any part of the world and the affect this has on 
the feeling of security, economic well-being, and ideological aspi-
rations of the superpowers conditions the amount of attention 
they give to a specific region. After the Vietnam War, the focus of 
U.S. world-order interests shifted from the Far East to the Middle 
East, largely because Middle Eastern oil, Iran's revolution, and 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan suddenly made this area ap-
pear to be a U.S. vital interest for balance of power reasons. 
National Prestige at Stake. All states are interested in the image 
they project to other states in the international arena, but national 
prestige is more important to major powers and superpowers 
than to small states. President Charles de Gaulle talked about the 
grandeur of France, and former Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
referred to the credibility of U.S. commitments abroad. Both were 
concerned with the respect showed to their countries by others, 
and the esteem that France and the United States were accorded 
in international relations. This factor is no less true for Commu-
nist powers: Soviet leaders have gone to great lengths to gain 
respectability in international organizations and are extremely 
sensitive to charges that the U.S.S.R. has broken international 
agreements. Prestige is difficult to measure because it has to do 
with perceptions and subjective judgments. For example, does a 
country use its power wisely? Does it respect the legal rights of 
other states? Does it aid its allies when they need help? Is it 
realistic in the pursuit of goals? Nations lose prestige when they 
take a stand on an international issue but do not carry through to 
Foreign Policy Formulation 23 
a successful outcome-for example, Britain's humiliation in the 
Suez crisis of 1956, the Soviet Union's retreat in the Cuban missile 
crisis of 1962, the ouster of the United States from Vietnam in 
1975. On the other hand, nations usually gain international pres-
tige when they win wars, bring peace to a troubled area, or 
achieve significant gains from diplomatic negotiations. 
Support of Allies. Most major powers have allies whose loyalty is 
valued and whose views are usually considered before a decision 
is made to take strong action against a third state. This factor is 
particularly relevant when an economic or world-order interest is 
at stake. When the Nixon administration was formulating a policy 
to deal with the Arab oil embargo in 1973-74, the unwillingness of 
NATO countries to go along with strong retaliatory measures was 
a factor in moving U.S. policy toward compromise rather than 
confrontation. Similarly, when President Reagan sought Euro-
pean support for his economic sanctions against Poland and the 
Soviet Union in 1982, European leaders exerted a moderating 
influence on his policies. When President Carter wanted NATO 
support for his Persian Gulf policy in 1980, the allies were reluc-
tant to take a strong stand. This was because the European NATO 
countries' national interests differ from those of the United States 
in many economic and world-order issues. On the defense of 
Western Europe, however, European and American interests 
remain essentially convergent. Superpowers probably have less 
need of support from other countries because they have indepen-
dent sources of power to bolster their policies; however, in the 
1980s, the United States seems to desire the support of allies to 
legitimate many of its actions abroad. The Lebanon crisis of 
1982-83 is an example. 
Economic Costs of Hostilities. If an economic or world-order 
issue is so important that hostilities could occur, such a confronta-
tion may take several forms--including a trade embargo, eco-
nomic sanctions, and limited armed combat. In all such in-
stances, the state taking the measures will incur economic costs. 
When the United States imposed a trade embargo on Cuba, it 
affected U.S. business interests and shut off the supply of Cuban 
sugar to U.S. markets. The economic costs of armed intervention 
in Korea were predicted with reasonable accuracy, and President 
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Truman asked Congress to raise taxes and impose controls on the 
economy; in the Vietnam case, however, President Johnson great-
ly underestimated the costs of the war, and this led to huge 
budget deficits and inflation by the end of the decade. In the Arab 
oil embargo of 1973, the economic consequences of a trade war 
and military intervention appeared to be very great for all West-
ern countries. The probable costs of armed intervention or em-
bargoes on trade must be carefully calculated by policy-makers 
before a determination is reached that the issue at hand is vital. 
Estimated Casualties. If armed intervention is considered to be a 
likely consequence of a political confrontation, policy-makers 
should be reasonably clear about the manpower needs of a lim-
ited war, the level of hostilities expected, and the probable casu-
alties. In advising the President what the manpower needs would 
be for armed intervention in Vietnam, Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara grossly underestimated the size of the force 
needed to contain North Vietnamese-sponsored warfare in 
South Vietnam. In a free society, the size of the military force and 
the potential casualties need to be calculated with reasonable 
accuracy because these factors are crucial in predicting public 
reaction. If a local conflict involves the possibility of direct con-
frontation between the superpowers, policy-makers would also 
have to estimate the U.S. civilian casualties that might result if 
limited war should escalate into general war. This could occur 
today in the event of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation in the Persian 
Gulf or in Central Europe. At a lower level of risk, President 
Reagan, in deciding to put U.S. Marines into Lebanon in 1982, 
was keenly aware that the potential for casualties was a serious 
question for many members of Congress. Reaction to the bomb-
ing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in November 1983 demon-
strated this. 
Risk of Protracted Conflict. If a country is not fighting for its own 
homeland (defense interest), it is generally reluctant to use mili-
tary force for world-order or economic interests unless the con-
flict is expected to be of short duration. This is even more true for 
free societies than for totalitarian or authoritarian states, because 
public opinion is likely to play a larger part in determining how 
long the country's armed forces should fight. It is generally true 
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that any government believing it can accomplish its objectives 
through the limited use of force over a short period of time is 
more likely to undertake such action than if it knows in advance 
that the conflict will be long and costly. Both President Truman 
and President Johnson were initially supported by the American 
people when they intervened in Korea and Vietnam, respec-
tively; had these conflicts ended satisfactorily within six months 
to a year, both presidents would have been acclaimed. As it was, 
neither could end the war before leaving office, and each saw his 
party defeated in the ensuing general election. 
Risk of Enlarged Conflict. When the deployment of a limited 
military force in a combat zone is contemplated, the risk of an 
enlarged conflict is often underestimated. For the most part, 
avoiding such situations requires good intelligence in order to 
clearly appreciate the intentions of other countries that will be 
affected by an intervention. Had Josef Stalin known in June 1950 
that Harry Truman would use U.S. forces to repel a North Korean 
attack on South Korea, would he have given his blessing to North 
Korea's plan? Conversely, had Truman known that China would 
intervene in that war if U.S. forces were permitted to move to the 
Yalu River, would he have given General MacArthur the authority 
to cross the 38th Parallel? Many military leaders and some politi-
cans have charged that the Vietnam War could have been won in 
the first six months had President Johnson been willing to use 
sufficient force-including the mining of Haiphong Harbor-to 
cripple the North Vietnamese economy. This thesis is debatable, 
however; such massive U.S. intervention in North Vietnam in 
1965 would most likely have triggered a Chinese intervention, 
and President Johnson wanted no repeat of the mistake in 
Korea. 
Cost of Defeat or Stalemate. This factor is linked to the discussion 
above but adds another element: even if the issue at hand is 
deemed to be vital, will the limited use of conventional force 
bring about the desired result? This is a very difficult question. 
The value attached to an issue may be high, but the potential level 
of warfare may also be high, thus raising the question whether 
the objective is important enough to risk war. It is clear that if the 
basic interest involved is defense-of-homeland, the likelihood of 
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taking that risk is higher than it would be for a world-order inter-
est of aiding a friendly country far removed from one's home-
land. In the case of Vietnam, it is unlikely that President Johnson 
would have ordered half a million U.S. troops to that country had 
he known in 1965 that the war would end in stalemate rather than 
in a negotiated victory for the United States. Similar calculation 
difficulties plagued President Reagan in 1983 and 1984 in deciding 
how to deal with the internal political problems of Lebanon. 
Risk of Public Opposition. An open democratic society must 
always calculate this cost, because even though public opinion 
may support a limited war when it starts, it quickly loses patience 
if the conflict is not brought to a speedy conclusion. Although 
public opinion does not generally operate as a brake in Commu-
nist or other totalitarian states, the leadership of a Communist 
government must take into account the views of party members, 
even though the party is tightly controlled. In the 1980s, risk of 
public opposition assumes large proportions for major Western 
countries, including the United States, and it is likely to be 
exploited by the Soviet Union. The United States was so bruised 
emotionally by the Vietnam experience that Congress blocked 
President Ford from sending any kind of aid to non-Communist 
factions in Angola in 1975. Opinion polls show that the American 
public would not currently favor defending any country in the 
Middle East and that many Americans even question defending 
Western Europe. The debate in Congress in early 1984 over U.S. 
aid to El Salvador is indicative of opposition by powerful seg-
ments of opinion even on vexing problems close to U.S. borders. 
Risk of United Nations Opposition. Condemnation by other 
states, particularly if the issue is taken to the United Nations 
Security Council, is a cost that decision-makers must calculate 
when contemplating whether an issue is vital. Major powers and 
superpowers often ignore international opinion, but they do 
want the approval of allies and friends. When President Carter 
tried to deal with the American hostage issue in Iran, he sought to 
enlist the international community in those efforts. When 
Moscow found itself condemned by the United Nations for its 
intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, it also sought support from 
friendly countries such as India. The consistent opposition of 
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Third World countries in the United Nations to policies that 
Washington feels are in the U.S. interest has greatly reduced the 
esteem Americans hold for this international organization. 
Risk of Congressional Opposition. The "bottom line" for any 
president contemplating the use of force to defend a vital interest 
is whether Congress will vote against the action, either in a joint 
resolution or a cutoff of funding. Traditionally, Congress has gone 
along with the President's judgment on what is in the national 
interest, even when it had serious doubts about the wisdom of 
a policy. The Vietnam War was a watershed in this regard, and 
since then Congress has become bolder in advising the President 
when it disagrees with his judgment. The War Powers Act of 1973, 
passed over President Nixon's veto, was a dramatic curtailment of 
presidential authority to define vital interests without congres-
sional interference; subsequently, presidents have consulted 
more closely with congressional leaders when an international 
issue approached the vital level, particularly when it was possible 
that U.S. forces might be engaged in combat. In the 1980s it is clear 
that no president will be able to send forces into dangerous 
situations abroad without first exploring with congressional lead-
ers the conditions under which they will be used if war should 
result. Congressional authorization in 1983 for President Reagan 
to keep Marines in Lebanon is an example. Although some con-
stitutional lawyers think that the War Powers Act is an uncon-
stitutional infringement on the President's authority in foreign 
affairs, there is little likelihood that this legislation will be re-
pealed in the foreseeable future. 
The value and cost/risk factors described above may be evalu-
ated by policy-makers in a number of different ways in order to 
ascertain whether foreign policy and national security issues are 
vital national interests. A simple way to do this is to rate each 
factor as high, medium, or low. If the sum of the value factors 
is high and the sum of the cost/risk factors is low or medium, the 
level of interest is likely to be closer to vital than to major. Another 
way is to attach numerical scores to the sixteen factors and com-
pare the totals of the value and the cost/risk categories. Some 
factors may be more important than others, and weights would 
have to be added to those which are considered to be of overrid-
ing importance. For example, during the Vietnam policy debates 
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within the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, American 
prestige/credibility was accorded an extremely high value by 
some policy-makers, while the nature of the threat was given 
lesser value. Conversely, in weighing the pros and cons of U.S. 
intervention in Iran to secure the release of fifty-two Embassy 
hostages in 1980, the Carter administration apparently gave great-
er weight to the risks involved and less to American prestige. 
An important qualifier should be added to this discussion 
in order to reduce misunderstanding about the utility of the 
national interest matrix as a tool of analysis. I do not claim this to 
be a scientific formula to assist policy-makers to arrive at "correct" 
decisions about foreign policy. The value of this conceptual 
framework is that it provides for systematic analysis of specific 
foreign policy issues; it should therefore lead to better judgments 
about levels of interest for the United States and its antagonists 
and, one would hope, to wiser policies than would otherwise be 
the case. This framework will not eliminate mistakes in judgment 
by policy-makers, but it will provide them with a better meth-
odology for deciding whether an international issue is so crucial 
to the United States that the nation must be prepared to take 
strong action. A careful use of this framework will most likely 
result in greater use of diplomacy and in less propensity to 
employ force to deal with issues that are borderline between 
major and vital interests. 
Summing Up 
A number of conclusions may be drawn about considerations 
that American policy-makers ought to take into account when 
assessing the degree of national interest that the country has in 
specific foreign policy and national security issues. 
First, although all nation-states have four basic national inter-
ests that guide their decisions and policies, the two that are most 
likely to determine whether a country will engage in war are 
military threats to its homeland (defense) and serious dangers to 
its external environment (world-order). Nations today rarely go 
to war primarily for economic or ideological reasons. States do 
join alliances and defense arrangements in order to enhance their 
feeling of security against a common threat and/or to obtain 
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military facilities and economic resources that they cannot 
provide themselves. The United States joined the North Atlantic 
Pact and sent forces to Europe in order to build a balance of power 
there that would contain Soviet ambitions and create a more 
favorable world order (international security). Defending West-
ern Europe continues to be a vital U.S. interest. 
Second, correctly assessing what are vital national interests is 
the key to wise statecraft and requires the best thinking of a 
nation's political leadership. There is no substitute for careful 
analysis and wise judgment in ascertaining the true value and 
likely costs involved in a specific foreign policy issue. A U.S. 
president must be certain that an issue is truly vital before he 
commits hfs country to a course of action that might involve the 
use of force. Furthermore, the process of deciding on a course of 
action should take into account not only one's own national 
interests but also a clear appreciation of the interests of other 
states having a stake in the outcome of a dispute. Failure to 
appreciate the intensity of an antagonist's interest, or an ally's 
stake, can lead to blunders in foreign policy and disasters in war. 
Examples are Britain's invasion of Egypt in 1956, America's inter-
vention in Vietnam in 1965, and Argentina's seizure of the 
Falkland Islands in 1982. 
Third, no country, especially one with a freely elected govern-
ment, should risk taking responsibility for defending another 
country unless there is a strong likelihood that its own electorate 
will support the use of armed forces, if that should be required. 
No one doubts the United States commitment to defend West 
Germany or France; but the Vietnam case is a dramatic example of 
U.S. political leaders deciding that an issue was a vital interest 
and failing to appreciate that the public and Congress would 
think otherwise. Lebanon in 1983-84 is another, less dramatic, 
case. 
Finally, the number of vital interests that the United States is 
willing to sustain in the 1980s and 1990s may well decline as the 
costs of defending them increase and the value of doing so 
decreases. The same may be true for the Soviet Union because of 
the growing risk that nuclear confrontation could result from 
local conflicts getting out of hand. Wars by proxy may be a way of 
reducing the risk while sustaining the value, but this type of 
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warfare requires a clear understanding by the superpowers of the 
limits of national interests. In 1983, the superpowers were grop-
ing for a new understanding of how broadly each side defined its 
vital world-order interests in this post-Vietnam period and post-
Brezhnev era. The uncertainty of the answers made the interna-
tional environment a more contentious arena. 
2. Instruments of 
Foreign and National 
Security Policy 
Defining the nature and intensity of the national interest in 
specific cases is a crucial first step in formulating foreign and 
national security policies. The national interest matrix described 
in Chapter 1 provides a framework for doing so. The next task of 
the policy-maker is to select the instruments of policy that are 
appropriate to the level of interest at stake and to resist using 
instruments solely because they are available. Taking no action is 
also a policy, and it may be useful in certain circumstances. 
Occasionally, a country's interest may be high, but its govern-
ment lacks the means of defending it appropriately. If this occurs 
regularly, a nation may lose its independence or simply be ig-
nored by other states. Alliances are born of such needs and 
vulnerabilities, as the North Atlantic Pact in 1949 proved in the 
case of the West European governments. 
Major powers, especially superpowers, have a large variety of 
political, economic, and military measures that they may employ 
to influence the leaders of adversary states. These range from 
diplomatic recognition of a new government to preparation for 
and warning about the imminence of nuclear war. Since this 
study deals with U.S. national interests, the twenty policies 
described in this chapter are instruments available to the Presi-
dent and his National Security Council. They are listed (Figure 4) 
in ascending order of influence and pressure that may be brought 
to bear on another country's foreign policy decisions. The first 
eleven may be classified as political/economic instruments of 
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Fig. 4. Instruments of Foreign and National Security Policy 
1. Diplomatic relations 
2. Scientific and cultural exchanges 
3. Humanitarian assistance 
4. Technical assistance 
5. Information and propaganda 
6. Economic and financial assistance 
7. Economic and trade policy 
8. Military assistance 
9. Covert actions 
10. U.N. Security Council debate 
11. Trade embargo and economic sanctions 
12. Military show of strength 
13. Increased military surveillance 
14. Suspension of/break in diplomatic relations 
15. Quarantine/blockade/mining of ports 
16. Local use of conventional forces 
17. Partial mobilization/evacuation 
18. Local use of tactical nuclear weapons 
19. Threatened use of strategic nuclear weapons 
20. Limited use of strategic nuclear weapons 
policy; the last nine are military instruments. Each will be dis-
cussed briefly, and thereafter an attempt will be made to illustrate 
how policy tools may be correlated with the degrees of U.S. 
national interests described in Chapter 1,1 
Political and Economic Instruments 
Diplomatic Relations. The granting of diplomatic recognition to 
another government and the inauguration of diplomatic relations 
gives one country a means of influencing the decisions of another 
by opening a direct communications channel with its top officials. 
1. This discussion is not intended as an exhaustive survey of a President's 
policy options for influencing the decisions of the leaders of other countries. Nor 
is it intended as an analysis of the literature on this subject. Rather, these twenty 
policy tools are described briefly to show the kinds of influence or pressure that 
can be brought to bear in dealing with a foreign policy or national security issue, 
and the correlation that should exist between the instruments used and the 
intensity of interests at stake. Whether a President should take any action in a 
specific case is a different consideration and is discussed in Chapter 9. 
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A government's interests and policies may then be explained 
formally and any displeasure noted over the policies pursued by 
the other state. Once diplomatic relations are established, a coun-
try may send a large number of its personnel to carry out not only 
the normal diplomatic functions of an embassy but also the vari-
ous programs which accompany the other instruments of policy 
described below. The withholding of diplomatic recognition from 
a new government is a strong form of pressure, equivalent to a 
break or suspension of relations. The United States used this 
policy from 1949 until 1972 to pressure the People's Republic of 
China to alter its unacceptable policies. The U.S. constitution 
gives the President the exclusive authority to decide when diplo-
matic recognition will be accorded another state and the accep-
tance of another country's ambassador. A President must, how-
ever, obtain Senate confirmation of his ambassadors to other 
countries. The Department of State and the Foreign Service are 
the formal institutions by which the United States carries on 
diplomatic relations with other countries. 
Scientific and Cultural Exchanges. Following the establishment 
of diplomatic relations, the United States and other countries 
inaugurate exchange agreements under which scientists, aca-
demics, students, and cultural leaders are sent abroad for con-
ferences, performances, lecturing, and research. This constitutes 
a modest level of political influence because the purpose of the 
programs is to demonstrate the capabilities of the United States in 
many nonpolitical areas. The Olympic Games fit this category 
because prestige is gained by countries whose athletes win 
medals. For the United States, sending of scholars and scientists 
abroad and accepting other countries' students and cultural lead-
ers has been an important part of diplomacy since the Fulbright-
Hays Act was implemented in the early post-World War II period. 
That legislation, which has permitted thousands of students to 
study in the United States (and abroad), was supplemented by 
other congressional actions that also enable many cultural groups 
and individual performers to go abroad. The United States Infor-
mation Agency and its U .5. Information Service posts abroad run 
these officially sponsored programs, and they facilitate scientific 
exchanges and conferences as well. These exchanges promote a 
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better appreciation abroad of the United States and its intellectual 
and scientific achievements, and they provide a greater recep-
tivity for U.S. policies among foreign elites. 
Humanitarian Assistance. Another important, relatively non-
political program that the President uses to further U.S. interests 
is humanitarian aid for the victims of such natural disasters as 
floods, earthquakes, and famines. These are usually short-term 
relief programs to aid the victims of disasters occurring in foreign 
countries. This aid is offered on a nonpolitical basis to countries 
that need short-term help and does not entail a large outlay of 
funds. Humanitarian aid is administered by the Agency for Inter-
national Development (AID) in cooperation with the Depart-
ments of State and Defense. 
Technical Assistance. This program, begun by President Truman 
and known originally as the Point Four program, sends American 
experts in various fields to underdeveloped countries to help 
them improve their education, agriculture, transportation, medi-
cal, and other facilities in order to improve living standards and 
promote modernization. Like scientific and cultural exchanges, 
this program emphasizes human resources rather than financial 
assistance and brings Americans directly into contact with coun-
terparts in many fields of assistance. The U.S. technical spe-
cialists are recruited from federal and state government agencies, 
as well as universities and private organizations. They live for 
varying lengths of time in a foreign country and, although they 
are not officially part of the U.S. diplomatic mission, they func-
tion under general policy guidelines issued by the U.S. ambas-
sador. Peace Corps volunteers are part of this category. Although 
the purpose of having American specialists reside in foreign 
countries is to provide technical assistance, the granting or denial 
of such assistance is a modest form of political influence. The 
Agency for International Development also administers most of 
these programs. 
Information and Propaganda. Unlike humanitarian and tech-
nical assistance, U.S. information programs-sometimes called 
propaganda because they promote appreciation of U.S. foreign 
policy-are clearly political in nature and designed to influence 
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the opinion of foreign leadership groups. This is done in many 
ways, through speeches by U.S. officials, books, television clips, 
movies, and conferences on political subjects, and through 
broadcasts of the Voice of America. American USIS libraries in 
other countries are informational and cultural, but specific books 
and articles that are translated and distributed to foreign nation-
als through the libraries fit the propaganda category if they are 
essentially political in content. The Voice of America, whose 
programs are beamed primarily to countries that restrict the free 
flow of information to their citizens, is both political and cultural 
in its content. Recently there has been controversy within the 
U.S. Information Agency, which controls the Voice of America, 
over the amount of political news to be carried in broadcasts to 
Communist countries. Careerists in the agency prefer that the 
Voice not be a propaganda tool of the U.S. government, while 
political appointees of the Reagan administration have sought to 
make the Voice of America, as well as other segments of USIA, 
more responsive to the ideological objectives of the administra-
tion. The debate centers on the assertion that since the Voice of 
America is a U.S. government operation, it should not try to 
compete with commercial and nonpolitical news outlets, but 
instead serve the foreign policy interests of the United States. 
Economic and Financial Assistance. As tools of policy, financial 
assistance and economic aid to another country carry the as-
sumption that the recipient state is sufficiently important to the 
United States to be assisted by a considerable commitment of 
U.S. economic resources. Most countries that received large U.S. 
economic assistance in the past were allied with the United States 
in mutual security pacts and thus were important to its world-
order interests. Others, among them Nigeria and Indonesia, 
have not concluded mutual security treaties with the United 
States but are nevertheless considered to be strategically impor-
tant and therefore worthy of assistance to help them maintain 
non-Communist regimes. 
It is naive to view an economic assistance agreement between 
the United States and a foreign country as having no political 
strings attached. If there were no political objectives that Wash-
ington and the recipient country could agree upon, it is not likely 
that Congress would approve the funds. Nonpolitical aid is more 
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likely to be channeled through international organizations, such 
as U.N. agencies and the World Bank, or private corporations. 
One reason that the American public and Congress have become 
disenchanted with large economic and financial assistance pro-
grams is that there is too little correlation between U.S. aid and 
the progress of many recipients toward democratic government. 
That is why "human rights" amendments were attached to for-
eign aid legislation in the 1970s and why Congress required the 
State Department to include human rights considerations in the 
aid programs that are currently in progress. It is no longer suffi-
cient that the recipient country be a good ally of the United States. 
Although economic assistance programs are administered by 
the Agency for International Development, the Department of 
Agriculture is also involved through the PL 480 Food for Peace 
program, and the Treasury Department is instrumental in arrang-
ing for credits and low-interest loans to countries that are ap-
proved for economic assistance. 
Economic and Trade Policy. This instrument of policy has to do 
with making it easy or difficult for another country to trade with 
the United States and to obtain international financing for eco-
nomic development. Whereas U.S. economic and financial as-
sistance, cited above, is provided to allied countries that do not 
have the resources to build substantial military forces of their 
own, economic and trade policy involves decisions affecting both 
developed and developing countries that depend on the U.S. 
market for trade and on U.S. financial institutions for credits. 
Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and a few European countries are 
examples. In addition, the United States maintains import quotas 
on many foreign products: for example, sugar, coffee, oil, meat, 
and dairy products. How these quotas are employed to protect 
domestic producers can have a great effect on the economies of 
certain countries that depend on these commodities for their 
economic well-being. Although the United States officially fol-
lows free trade policies in industrial goods, many exceptions have 
been made-notably in steel, automobiles, and machinery-in 
order to protect domestic industries hard hit by the economic 
recession of the early 1980s. Another area of economic policy that 
has generated resentment from European allies is the overvalued 
dollar, which remains the primary currency of international ex-
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change. U.S. monetary and fiscal policies that affect the value of 
the dollar and harm other currencies can have serious repercus-
sions on relations with many countries. The inability of their 
leaders to persuade President Reagan to reduce the huge U.S. 
budget deficits in 1983 and 1984 was a source of serious political 
concern to the British, French, and West German governments. 
Perhaps the most dramatic example of the use of economic policy 
by a U.S. President was the so-called "Nixon shocks" of August 
1971, when President Nixon suddenly announced that the United 
States would no longer convert dollars into gold and would adopt 
floating exchange rates. That action signaled to all U.S. trading 
partners that the U.S. economic interest had moved near the vital 
level and that strong action was required to preserve the nation's 
economic health. President Reagan's Caribbean Basin economic 
plan, which became law in 1983, is another example of trade 
policy used for political purposes-in this case to help friendly 
neighbors to the south by facilitating their trade with the United 
States. 
Economic and trade policy is decided in the State, Commerce, 
and Treasury Departments and is normally coordinated with the 
White House. 
Military Assistance. This category of action covers all forms of 
military assistance, including advisers, training teams, grant-aid 
equipment as well as the military aircraft, ships, tanks, and other 
hardware that the United States sells to other countries. The 
decision to give or sell military equipment abroad is based on a 
decision by the President that doing so is in the national interest, 
and it must be approved by Congress. The key consideration is 
that the recipient country is so important to the U.S. national 
interest that its military forces should be provided with U.S. 
military equipment and, if necessary, U.S. advisers. Normally 
the United States does not give or sell military hardware to 
another country unless that country is an ally, or unless the U.S. 
government is convinced that its security is a major national 
interest to this country. For example, neither Saudi Arabia nor 
Egypt is a formal U.S. ally, but President Reagan decided to sell 
AWACS planes to the Saudis and advanced fighter planes to the 
Egyptians because they are friendly to the United States and are 
willing to assist in the defense of the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia is 
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rich enough that it can buy whatever U.S. military equipment it 
needs; the issue for Washington is whether the sale is politically 
desirable. In the case of Egypt and most other underdeveloped 
countries receiving U.S. military aid, the question is not only 
whether granting the aid is desirable, but also how much the 
United States should pay. 
The problem with military assistance as an instrument of pol-
icy is not with allies but with many Third World countries that 
desire U.S.. equipment and advisers to help them defend against 
hostile neighbors. Sudan is an example. This country has little to 
offer the United States in terms of bases, or armed forces that 
could be used abroad; but Sudan is a close friend of Egypt, and it 
feels threatened by Libya and Ethiopia-both of which are friend-
ly to the Soviet Union and receive large amounts of Soviet mili-
tary aid. But should that make Sudan a very important country 
for the United States? El Salvador and other Central American 
countries are examples of states close to the U.S. border that have 
not previously been given much U.S. military assistance. How-
ever, with Nicaragua being armed by the Soviet Union and Cuba, 
and providing significant aid to Salvadoran guerrillas, the Reagan 
administration had to decide how deeply U.S. interests were 
involved and to what extent U.S. military forces should assist the 
Salvadoran government to cope with its insurgency. Clearly, 
military assistance has a large potential for escalating the degree 
of U.S. interest, and policy-makers therefore have an obligation 
to limit military aid to the level of interest and not permit the 
interest to be driven by a desire to save an investment. 
Determining which countries should be given or sold U.S. 
military equipment and the amount and nature of the material is 
the responsibility of the State Department, which determines the 
policy, and the Department of Defense, which administers the 
programs. On major arms sales, the President and the respective 
committees of Congress are involved. 
Covert Actions. Covert actions or operations should be dis-
tinguished from intelligence-gathering activities in that they are 
policy actions, decided at the highest level of the U.S. govern-
ment, intended to influence the decisions of another country. But 
they are actions for which the U.S. does not wish to take official 
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responsibility, and government leaders normally do not com-
ment on them. In the spring of 1983, for example, it was widely 
reported that the United States was covertly aiding Nicaraguan 
guerrilla forces operating from Honduras, but Washington was 
officially silent in response to questions on this issue. All major 
powers engage to some extent in covert actions, and the Soviet 
Union's KGB reportedly has the largest such operation in the 
world. For the United States, the Central Intelligence Agency was 
given responsibility by the National Security Act of 1947 for 
carrying out covert actions, and presidents have issued executive 
orders and other instructions spelling out the controls they want 
placed on these highly sensitive actions. In the late 1970s Con-
gress decided to place oversight of covert operations in the hands 
of the Senate and House Select Intelligence Committees. They 
regularly review proposals approved by the President, after he 
and the National Security Council decide that a specific covert 
action is important to the national interest. These special congres-
sional committees have strict security rules and command access 
to all classified information; they are in a position to veto pro-
posed operations if they feel strongly that they are too risky. The 
key element in covert actions, from a policy standpoint, is 
whether their objective is so politically important to U.S. national 
interests that the U.S. government should risk the embarrass-
ment of having the operation exposed-particularly if it fails. 
When a covert operation is unsuccessful, as was the Bay of Pigs 
invasion of Cuba in 1961, the repercussions can be very humiliat-
ing. The famous U-2 flight that was shot down over the Soviet 
Union in 1960 was a bizarre example because President 
Eisenhower at first denied that the CIA plane was on a spy 
mission, even though the Kremlin had downed the plane and 
captured its pilot. In 1984, U.S. covert aid to the Nicaraguan 
"contras" was so openly discussed in the American press and 
Congress that "covert" lost much of its meaning. One advantage 
of a successful covert action is that it may avoid the necessity for 
the U.S. government to take stronger, more open, more dan-
gerous actions in foreign countries. 
A prime question for U.S. policy-makers is whether the use of 
covert action should be restricted to vital national interests or 
whether they should occasionally be employed also for major 
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interests. That usually depends on the risk involved, and recent 
presidents have tended to limit such activities to only the most 
important national interests. 
U.N. Security Council Debate on a Threat to Peace. Although the 
United Nations is not held in high esteem by most Americans and 
has not in recent years been significant in furthering U.S. inter-
ests abroad, it nevertheless serves as an important forum when 
the U.S. government decides that a vital interest may be at stake 
in an international dispute. Taking an issue to the U.N. Security 
Council and asking for a debate on a "threat to peace" is a dramatic 
way of signaling to the world that a vital interest may be at stake 
and that strong action may be employed to defend an interest. 
President Kennedy's decision to release aerial intelligence pho-
tographs of Cuba, during the 1962 United Nations debate on the 
missile crisis, was a way of dramatizing to the world his reasons 
for preparing for war. Another example was President Reagan's 
decision to release tapes at the United Nations during the debate 
on the Soviet downing of a Korean airliner in September 1983. 
The United States has utilized the U.N. mechanism on many 
occasions to demonstrate its concern about international events. 
Other countries have used the Security Council as a forum to 
attack U.S. policy: for example, Panama's decision in 1964 to 
appeal to the U.N. after rioting and bloodshed broke out in the 
Canal Zone. Taking a dispute or crisis to the U.N. Security 
Council does not commit a country to follow up with military 
action, but it does signal to an antagonist that the level of national 
interest is approaching the vital level and that armed forces might 
be used if an acceptable solution to the problem is not found 
through negotiations. In this sense, a U.N. debate becomes a 
dramatic diplomatic signal by the country bringing the com-
plaint. 
Trade Embargo and Economic Sanctions. The institution of a 
trade embargo and/or economic sanctions is a powerful tool of 
foreign policy because it imposes an economic hardship on an-
other state. This condition prevailed in 1983 between the United 
States and Iran, Cuba, Libya, Vietnam, and several other coun-
tries the United States considers to be hostile. President Reagan's 
economic sanctions on Poland following the impositionof martial 
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law there in 1981 made it extremely difficult for the Warsaw 
government to obtain assistance from Western banks and all but 
closed American markets to Polish exports. These sanctions were 
eased somewhat in 1983. Suspension of trade with Cuba during 
the early 1960s shut off the important U.S. sugar market to Cuban 
exports and had a serious effect on that country's economy. A 
similar measure was adopted regarding Nicaragua's sugar quota 
to the United States in 1983. A trade embargo is not usually 
imposed unless the President concludes that the government of 
another state has flagrantly violated U.S. laws or international 
agreements and is considered to have committed an unfriendly 
act. The Reagan administration's decision in 1982 to ban the sale of 
equipment for building the Siberian gas pipeline from the Soviet 
Union to Western Europe was an economic sanction that proved 
adverse to U.S. interests among its NATO partners, and the 
decision was modified later that year. Economic sanctions may 
affect important domestic interests and prove to be politically 
embarrassing. President Carter's decision to ban the sale of addi-
tional grain to the Soviet Union, following the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, was highly unpopular with American farmers, and 
candidate Ronald Reagan exploited this fact in his 1980 presiden-
tial election campaign. 
Economic sanctions and a trade embargo are decided by the 
President and his National Security Council, and the decisions 
are implemented by the State, Commerce and Treasury Depart-
ments. 
Military Instruments 
Military show of strength. When a president wants to demon-
strate deep concern about an international issue that might be-
come a crisis, he can order U.S. naval forces to proceed to the 
troubled area, alert U.S. Air Force units, and place the Army's 
airborne divisions in a higher state of readiness. These actions 
show possible intent to use these forces but do not commit a 
president to do so. When Richard Nixon alerted U.S. forces in 
October 1973, following receipt of a threatening message from 
Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev, the implication was clear: if 
Moscow moved airborne troops into Egypt, the United States 
might counter that airlift with its aircraft and thus risk a war with 
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the Soviet Union. The crisis passed when Washington persuaded 
Israel to accept a cease-fire. Similarly, in early 1983, American 
AWACS planes were sent to Egypt and a carrier task force was 
ordered to the Gulf of Sidra when intelligence information 
showed that Libya might try to invade Sudan or support an 
insurrection there-in an effort to topple the pro-Western gov-
ernment. In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
December 1979, the United States expanded its Indian Ocean 
forces and concentrated additional naval power in the region of 
the Persian Gulf-in anticipation that Moscow might try to de-
stabilize Iran and establish its influence in this vital oil region. 
The Soviet move also prompted President Jimmy Carter to de-
clare a few weeks later that the Persian Gulf was a "vital" Amer-
ican interest. 
A military show of strength, particularly if there is a strong 
possibility of armed clashes, lies at the threshhold of war and 
should not be used as a tool of policy unless an interest is clearly 
vital. To use it as a bluff can be dangerous if an adversary chal-
lenges it. This happened in Laos in March 1961 when President 
John Kennedy dramatically warned the Soviet Union to restrain 
Laotian Communist forces from approaching the Mekong River. 
After alerting U.S. Far Eastern naval and air units to be prepared 
for war, the President backed off this bellicose line, and the Pathet 
Lao continued their advance-to the dismay of all the countries in 
Southeast Asia. 
When a President decides on a military show of strength, it is 
carried out by the Department of Defense. The Navy is most often 
initially called upon for these missions because warships can be 
deployed easily in many parts of the world, and they convey an 
important political message without arousing the tensions that 
accompany the deployment of troops. 
Expanded military surveillance. This policy action is often, but 
not always, part of a military show of strength; it heightens the 
tensions and signals an antagonist that its military moves are 
being closely monitored. Like a show of strength, it dramatizes 
concern and suggests intent to use force without committing a 
country to do so. President Kennedy's use of U-2 flights during 
the Cuban missile crisis was a clear warning to the Soviet lead-
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ership that he knew what military preparations they were con-
ducting in Cuba and that he was preparing to use force. After the 
Iran-Iraq war erupted in 1980, the President dispatched AWACS 
planes to Saudi Arabia as a warning to the Iranian government 
that the United States would act if Iran invaded Saudi air space or 
interfered with tanker traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. During the 
Falkland Islands crisis, U.S. reconnaisance planes patrolled the 
British air and sea routes in the South Atlantic to warn against 
possible Soviet efforts to interfere with the British war effort. 
Although the Defense Department carries out military sur-
veillance operations, the Central Intelligence Agency is also in-
volved in keeping Soviet and other hostile forces under increased 
surveillance during times of crisis. 
Suspension/Break in Diplomatic Relations. A suspension or 
break in relations is the strongest diplomatic measure available to 
a government to show displeasure with the actions of another 
state. Traditionally, it was the final action taken before declaring 
war. Since World War II, this has occurred occasionally even 
though the action no longer usually leads to hostilities. Most 
Arab states, for example, broke diplomatic relations with the 
United States during the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973, to 
show displeasure over President Nixon's decision to resupply 
Israeli military forces. The United States broke diplomatic rela-
tions with Libya in 1981 to show its displeasure over that country's 
support for international terrorists. Diplomatic relations were 
broken between Iran and the United States after the Teheran 
Government condoned the capture of the U.S. Embassy in 1979 
and approved the capture of fifty-two U.S. diplomats. Even 
though a rupture in diplomatic relations does not suggest that war 
is imminent, it does mean that hostile policies and perhaps lim-
ited conflict could occur. After the United States broke relations 
with Libya, an aircraft carrier of the U.S. 6th Fleet was ordered 
into the Gulf of Sidra to demonstrate that the United States 
considered it to be international waters. The fact that U.S. planes 
shot down two Libyan aircraft that had launched an attack was 
clear evidence that breaking diplomatic relations was a prelude to 
a more forceful military policy. 
A suspension or break in relations is carried out by the State 
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Department after the President decides that tensions with an-
other country have reached a dangerous level. Such a break is 
usually accompanied by a decision to instruct private American 
citizens to leave the country in question because their safety 
cannot be insured. 
Blockade/Quarantine. A blockade is an act of war under interna-
tional law, and nations therefore rarely impose one unless they 
are ready for armed conflict. During the Cuban misile crisis in 
1962, the United States imposed a selective blockade on ships 
entering Cuba's harbors and called it a "quarantine" in order to 
avoid the legal ramifications of a blockade. President Kennedy 
stated that the quarantine was to prevent war materials from 
entering Cuba and to prevent the Soviet Union from completing 
its missile bases on the island. Although the United States 
claimed that it intended to prevent only military goods from 
reaching Cuba, the Soviet Union protested that this was a hostile 
act; yet it did not order its ships to run the naval barrier that the 
U.S. established. The quarantine brought on the most serious 
crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations that has occurred since World War 
II. The mining of Haiphong Harbor by U.S. forces in the spring of 
1972 was an equally daring action by President Nixon, who was 
convinced that only strong military action would cause the Hanoi 
government to negotiate seriously about ending the Vietnam 
War. A blockade or quarantine does not necessarily mean that 
hostilities will commence; but the flash point has been reached, 
and the contending parties know that hostilities could occur at 
any time. 
The Navy is the instrument by which a quarantine or blockade 
is implemented, after the President determines that very strong 
action is required to demonstrate that a vital interest is at stake. 
Localized Use of Conventional Forces. When a government de-
cides to send its military forces to another country, it must plan 
for the probability that they will be engaged in hostilities even 
though they may initially be sent to serve in a peacekeeping role 
designed to prevent hostilities. The decision to introduce forces 
into another country is an act of war unless the host government 
requests them and supports their presence on its soil. Most U.S. 
Instruments of Policy 45 
interventions since World War II have been at the request of other 
countries: President Truman's decision to send U.S. forces to aid 
South Korea in June 1950; President Eisenhower's dispatch of U.S. 
Marines to Lebanon in 1958; President Kennedy's sending of 
combat teams to Vietnam in 1962; President Johnson's use of U.S. 
forces in the Dominican Republic in 1965; and President Carter's 
dispatch of peacekeeping forces to the Sinai in 1979. Except for 
Truman's decision in 1950 and Kennedy's in 1962, these deploy-
ments of U.S. military forces abroad were essentially peacekeep-
ing actions. The same was true of President Reagan's decision in 
August 1982 to send U.S. Marines to Beirut; their purpose was to 
prevent further bloodshed in Lebanon's civil war and to facilitate 
the withdrawal of Israeli, Syrian, and PLO forces from Lebanon. 
The Soviet Union used its forces in Hungary in 1956 and in 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 to install a new political leadership in two 
Warsaw Pact countries. In neither case did the Soviet Union claim 
that it sent forces at the request of the host government. In 
December 1979, the Soviet Union sent its forces into Afghanistan 
to rid the country of a leadership that had refused to cooperate 
with Moscow. The sending of combat forces to another country is 
usually a sign that a vital interest is at stake, but the deployment 
of peacekeeping troops to a trouble spot does not necessarily 
mean that the defense of that specific country is a vital interest. 
Lebanon, for example, is not a U.S. ally and is not a vital interest, 
either; however, peace in the Middle East and the defense of Israel 
are U.S. vital interests, and President Reagan's decision to send 
Marines there in 1982 was a signal that he believed the continuing 
war in Lebanon could endanger the peace of the whole area. 
Armed intervention usually is accomplished by U.S. Marines, 
the U.S. Army, or both. The U.S. intervention on a large scale in 
Vietnam in 1965 began with the dispatch of Marines and was 
followed a few months later by large contingents of the Army. 
Although the Navy and Air Force usually support armed inter-
ventions, they do not by themselves undertake them. 
Partial Mobilization and Nuclear Alert. If conventional military 
forces are introduced into a region and there is a strong possibil-
ity that they will be fighting against the troops of another major 
power, a President would have to adopt many precautionary 
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measures. One of these is to call up reserve units; another is to 
place controls on the U.S. economy and allocate scarce materials; 
still another would be to request increases in the defense budget 
and a renewal of conscription. The President would also put all 
U.S. forces in a state of readiness appropriate to the increased 
tensions and the possibility of a larger war. All these measures are 
precautionary, but they convey a significant message to other 
powers: a vital interest of the United States is engaged and its 
government will use whatever force is required to insure that the 
interest is protected. These measures do not preclude diplomatic 
negotiations to try to resolve the crisis before war occurs, but they 
clearly show that the United States is deadly serious. President 
Truman's actions following the outbreak of war in Korea in June 
1950 are a classic example of the use of this policy tool. President 
Kennedy's response to the Berlin crisis in 1961 and his bold actions 
during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 also fit this category. 
President Johnson, however, did not choose to take many of these 
actions when he escalated the Vietnam conflict in 1965, largely 
because he did not wish to provoke China's intervention-as 
President Truman had done in Korea in 1950 by authorizing 
General MacArthur to take his troops to the Yalu River. President 
Nixon alerted U.S. forces during the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1973, 
but the fighting stopped before Soviet or U.S. forces were de-
ployed. 
Since the United States abolished military conscription during 
the Nixon administration, a President can no longer on his own 
authority induct additional recruits into the Armed Forces in time 
of danger. Furthermore, he must obtain from Congress the au-
thority to declare a national emergency in order that the economic 
policies contained in this category can be implemented. Finally, 
Congress ~an monitor presidential actions under the 1973 War 
Powers Act and may terminate a military action after sixty days. 
Mobilization would be carried out by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Defense, 
with control being exercised by the White House through the 
National Security Council. 
Localized Use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons. There is much de-
bate today about whether the use of tactical (battlefield) nuclear 
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weapons is a viable military action. So long as the United States 
had a near-monopoly on these kinds of weapons, they could be 
justified as contributing to NATO's nuclear deterrence of the 
Soviet Union. The basing of substantial numbers of U.S. tactical 
nuclear weapons in Europe (about 6,000 in 1983) made it possible 
over the years for NATO to compensate for the large superiority 
in conventional forces enjoyed by the Warsaw Pact. Even though 
the Soviet Union now has substantial numbers of these weapons, 
and could retaliate in kind if they were used first by NATO forces, 
tactical nuclear weapons have not lost deterrent value; Moscow 
cannot assume that NATO would refrain from using them if the 
Soviets launched a massive conventional attack on Western Eu-
rope and threatened to push to the English Channel. That would 
quickly become a survival interest for NATO. President Brezhnev 
sought to exploit this point in 1982 by pledging never to use 
nuclear weapons first and asking NATO to do the same. So long 
as NATO conventional forces are substantially smaller than those 
of the Warsaw Pact, however, a mutual pledge against "first use" 
would increase the danger to West European security. 
Obviously, no American president and no European prime 
minister would seriously consider using any of these nuclear 
weapons unless a "survival interest" were at stake in Europe. 
This means that West German and American leaders would have 
to make an agonizing decision, probably within forty-eight hours 
of the outbreak of a conventional war, either to be conquered by 
Soviet armies or to grant NATO military commanders authority 
to use battlefield nuclear weapons. The only other places where 
tactical nuclear weapons might be used by the United States 
would be in the Persian Gulf, to stop a Soviet-led attack on the 
Strait of Hormuz, or in Korea if the Soviet Union aided in an attack 
there. President Carter and his Secretary of Defense, Harold 
Brown, warned Moscow in 1980 that the use of U.S. nuclear 
weapons could not be ruled out if Kremlin leaders decided to take 
advantage of turmoil in Iran to try to gain control of the oil-rich 
Persian Gulf. 
In the mid-1980s no U.S. president can contemplate the actual 
use of tactical nuclear weapons, either in Europe or from aircraft 
carriers operating in the Indian Ocean, without taking into ac-
count the strong possibility that even the limited use of tactical 
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nuclear weapons could quickly escalate into an intercontinental 
nuclear war. Therefore, nuclear weapons of any kind should not 
be threatened or used for anything less than a survival interest. 
Threatened Use of Strategic Nuclear Weapons. Many argue that 
employing this policy option is either suicidal or pure bluff. Yet 
strategic deterrent strategy has long been based on threatened 
nuclear retaliation on Soviet territory if Moscow attacks Europe 
with conventional forces. The real question is whether this is a 
rational policy option in the 1980s, when Moscow enjoys at least 
parity in strategic nuclear weapons with the United States, in-
cluding a reliable second-strike capability that could devastate 
significant parts of the United States. On the one side, it is argued 
that war between the United States and the Soviet Union has been 
averted for nearly forty years because of the fear of nuclear 
weapons being used if the superpowers engage in conventional 
war. On the other side, critics charge that it is insanity for Moscow 
or Washington to threaten the other because both will be de-
stroyed if the threat is carried out. 
Whether one believes that a threat to use strategic nuclear 
forces against the homeland of a superpower is a rational or a 
lunatic option, the fact remains that both U.S. and Soviet military 
strategy envisages conditions under which such weapons would 
be used and calculates the devastation that would result. The 
difference in these views is that until the Reagan administration 
assumed power in 1981, Soviet leaders believed that their home-
land could survive a nuclear attack, while most American plan-
ners were never persuaded that either side could sustain a nu-
clear exchange and have its institutions and much of its pop-
ulation survive. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger's strategic 
guidance to the military services, beginning in 1982, envisioned 
the likelihood that the United States not only could survive but 
indeed prevail in a nuclear war, a calculation that is challenged by 
many U.S. civilian as well as military leaders. 
For West Europeans, the crucial issue in 1983 was whether they 
should proceed with plans to deploy medium-range nuclear mis-
siles capable of itting targets in the Soviet Union-to balance 
Soviet medium-range SS-20 nuclear missiles already deployed in 
Eastern Europe and capable of striking every major city in West-
ern Europe. American Pershing II missiles, which were deployed 
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in West Germany late in 1983, are viewed by the Kremlin as first-
strike weapons because the warning time from launch to impact is 
about seven minutes. U.S. cruise missiles, scheduled for deploy-
ment in Italy, Britain, Belgium, and Holland, are slower and 
therefore are not perceived as quite so threatening to the Soviet 
Union. President Reagan offered in November 1981 to cancel 
deployment of both weapons if Moscow dismantled its more than 
300 SS-20 missiles already aimed at Western Europe. Britain and 
France each have an independent nuclear capability, primarily in 
submarines; so the introduction of Pershing II and cruise missiles 
would extend a nuclear retaliatory capability to West Germany 
and other NATO states-although the U.S. President would con-
trol their use. Clearly, no European or American leader would 
contemplate threatening to use these weapons unless a survival 
interest were at stake. 
Limited Use of Strategic Nuclear Weapons. The final awesome 
step a president could take before all-out nuclear .war occurs is a 
limited demonstration of intention to engage in nuclear war-in 
order to convince an enemy that the United States will not capitu-
late. Former Secretary of State Alexander Haig-in trying to 
clarify an alarming remark by President Reagan in 1981 to the 
effect that the United States might be prepared to fight a nuclear 
war (which many Europeans concluded would be fought in Eu-
rope rather than in the United States and the Soviet Union)-
stated that NATO planners had long considered a warning nu-
clear shot as a way to convince Moscow not to assume that a 
conventional attack on Western Europe would go unanswered if 
NATO forces were losing. One reason that President Reagan 
wants the B-1 bomber in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, despite its 
enormous cost, is that it is a strategic weapon which can be 
controlled after launch, whereas an ICBM or submarine-launched 
missile cannot under current technology be destroyed or diverted 
from its target, once fired. The intercontinental bomber is a 
means of demonstrating U.S. capability and intent to use nuclear 
weapons without actually dropping them. Carrier-based bomb-
ers stationed in the Indian Ocean or the Mediterranean have a 
similar capability; they can fly near Soviet territory and drop a 
small nuclear bomb at sea or in a desert to demonstrate that the 
United States is at the survival level of interest and that the two 
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sides must stop the confrontation before they are destroyed. The 
"hot-line" established between the White House and the Kremlin 
following the Cuban missile crisis presumably would be in reg-
ular use during such a confrontation. 
Summing Up: Correlation of Interests and Instruments 
This discussion leads to a number of conclusions about the 
significance of policy tools in support of national interests. First of 
all, none of the first eleven policy instruments entails the use of 
force or threatened use of force. They are political, economic, and 
psychological measures that can be used to persuade the leaders 
of another country to do what the U.S. government desires, but 
they do not employ or threaten to use American military power. 
In general, these eleven instruments of policy are employed to 
support major interests of the United States abroad, although the 
last several may signal that the issue is approaching the vital level. 
The last nine policy tools clearly entail an escalating use of U.S. 
military pressure to achieve a desired result in relations with an 
adversary state. They are employed to defend or enhance vital 
and survival interests. We may therefore conclude that the thresh-
hold between a major and a vital interest rests somewhere near 
options 11 and 12: a trade embargo and a military show of 
strength. 
If a vital interest is defined as an international issue that cannot 
be negotiated beyond a certain point because the consequences 
would be intolerable to a country's well-being, a show of military 
power might then be used to demonstrate determination not to 
compromise. Whether a military show of force and increased 
military surveillance are measures a President should take when 
he does not consider the issue to be vital, and does not plan to use 
force, is a crucial matter; for unless a President engages in bluff, 
one must conclude that these steps are demonstrations of intent 
to use force. President Reagan's decision to send a carrier task 
force into the Gulf of Sidra in 1981 was a military show of strength 
that was backed up with military action. A military show of force 
as bluff, however, is dangerous because an unintended war may 
result if the bluff is called by an adversary. 
Figure 5 is an attempt to establish a correlation between the 
twenty instruments of policy and the degree of national interest at 
Fig. 5. National Interests and Instruments of Policy 
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stake. The implication of this juxtaposition of interests and policy 
tools is that policy planners and decision-makers should employ 
only those measures of influence, pressure, and force that are 
commensurate with the level of national interest involved in a 
specific foreign policy or national security issue. To overreact in 
the use of economic or military pressure may make a crisis worse 
than intended and result in an unwanted war; to underreact to 
provocation or external pressure may lead an opponent to con-
clude that your national interest is not high, or that you lack the 
will to defend it. President John Kennedy cited this problem after 
his meeting with Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961: the 
Soviet leader did not believe the American President would use 
force in Berlin, Laos, or Cuba. 
Matching the intensities of interest in foreign policy issues 
with the instruments of policy available to a President is an 
essential way of thinking through the problem of how the United 
States ought to react to serious issues and crises. The process 
should entail three steps, as suggested in Figure 5: first, an 
assessment of which basic interests are most affected; second, a 
determination of the intensity of interests, especially if any of 
them is at or near the vital level; third, a selection of the appropri-
ate policy tools. The horizontal lines suggest the instruments of 
policy that are appropriate for each basic interest, with defense-
of-homeland embracing all of them. The chart suggests that the 
first eleven instruments of policy are appropriate responses when 
any basic interest is affected at the major level. If the interest in 
question is U.S. values (ideology)-for example, the Soviet shoot-
ing-down of a Korean commercial airliner in September 1983--
the U.S. government is justified in using any policy tools up to 
and including a trade embargo to show displeasure. If the interest 
at stake is economic well-being and the intensity is believed to be 
vital, the policy instruments employed could include any of the 
first thirteen, including increased surveillance and a show of 
strength. If the interest involved is world order and a decision is 
reached that the intensity is vital, appropriate policy tools could 
include suspension of diplomatic relations, a quarantine or block-
ade of ports, and local use of U.S. conventional forces to convince 
an opponent that things have reached the intolerable point and 
force will be used. The Reagan administration's policy toward 
Nicaragua in the summer of 1983 suggested it had decided on this 
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level of intensity; U.S. military forces were then introduced into 
Honduras, and the U.S. Navy sent aircraft carriers and other 
warships to the waters off Nicaragua. 
Figure 5 also suggests that a partial mobilization of U.S. re-
serves, evacuation of policy-makers to command posts, and 
threats to use nuclear weapons should be limited to the survival 
level of interest. This means that these instruments of policy 
should not be employed unless there is a direct threat to the U.S. 
homeland, not simply to U.S. forces stationed abroad. Mobiliza-
tion of reserves and preparation to use nuclear weapons, there-
fore, is the threshhold between a vital and a survival interest and 
must be calculated with extreme care. The Cuban missile crisis 
was instructive in this regard because President Kennedy wanted 
to demonstrate to Chairman Khrushchev that the Soviet leader 
had seriously miscalculated in thinking that the United States 
would accept Soviet missiles so close to U.S. territory. Through 
his actions Kennedy signaled that he believed the provocation to 
be near the survival level and that he would go to war to force the 
Kremlin to dismantle the missiles. No other crisis-Berlin, Mid-
dle East, Taiwan, Vietnam-reached this level of intensity be-
cause no other threat directly affected the U.S. or the Soviet 
homeland. 
As the United States decides what its national interests are 
during the coming decade and builds its economic and military 
strength to defend them, it is essential that political leaders 
clearly understand for what ends this growing power should be 
used. A clear lesson of the 1960s is that U.S. military and econom-
ic power should not be squandered on secondary interests, such 
as Southeast Asia, which are not central to the defense and se-
curity of North America and Western Europe. That lesson ought 
not to be relearned in the 1980s. 
3. North America: 
The Neglected Heartland 
Since World War II the United States has been so extensively 
involved in world security that it has lost sight of the crucial 
importance to its defense, economic, world-order and ideological 
interests of the twenty-odd countries that comprise North Amer-
ica. Policy-makers have used the concept of Latin America or the 
Western Hemisphere to describe an area that is considered to be 
of special geographical interest to the United States. Yet, by using 
"Latin America" to describe the countries of this he~isphere, 
Americans totally ignore Canada-our most important< defense 
outpost as well as trading partner-and the English-speaking 
islands of the Caribbean. Even the term "Western Hemisphere" is 
ambiguous because it suggests that all countries in both North 
and South America are roughly equal in terms of U.S. interests. 
Clearly they are not. By no stretch of the imagination is Argen-
tina, Chile, or Brazil as important to the United States as is 
·Canada, Mexico or Venezuela. Nevertheless, the Monroe Doc-
trine legacy with its blanket pledge of protection for all of the 
former Spanish and Portuguese colonies lingers on. This concept 
was reinforced by the Rio Pact of1947, which bound the countries 
of Latin America together with the United States into a Western 
Hemisphere security treaty. Canada is not a member of this 
treaty; instead it joined the North Atlantic Pact in 1949. 
No other major power in the world takes its neighbors so for 
granted as does the United States. This is the product of our 
geography, our huge size and population compared with other 
North American countries and, until recently, our invulnerability 
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to attack from overseas. An added factor is that the U.S. economy 
has been so dynamic and is growing at such a rapid pace that all 
North American countries have become dependent on it for their 
economic well-being. History has played a part. From 1814 on-
ward, the United States was confronted in this continent by no 
other great power, and the country could grow and prosper 
because Great Britain found that its own national interest was 
served by encouraging the ex-colonies to carve out a continental 
nation and eventually to ally itself with Britain against hostile 
European powers. U.S. wars against Mexico in the mid-nine-
teenth century, and against Spain as the century ended, left the 
United States as the overwhelming power in North America. As a 
result, it fought in two world wars without ever having to worry 
that its homeland would be invaded. 
Emerging from World War II as the preeminent world power, 
the U.S. and its leaders set about creating a new world order 
while paying less attention to U.S. interests in North America, 
except for agreements with Canada to create a North American 
defense zone and for continued occupation of the Panama Canal 
Zone. Having secured its defense to the north as well as in the 
Caribbean, American foreign policy gave a low priority to the 
economic and political problems of Latin America, particularly to 
countries on our own doorstep. That remained the case until1960, 
when Fidel Castro turned Cuba into an anti-American Marxist 
state and preached revolution throughout Latin America. To un-
derscore how much Washington took its North American inter-
ests for granted, the State Department's Office of Canadian Af-
fairs is still part of the Bureau of European Affairs, although in 
September 1983 the bureau added Canada to its nomenclature. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon are more realistic: in their 
directorate for defense planning, Canada is part of the Western 
Hemisphere. To date, no department of the U.S. government has 
an Office of North American Affairs. That symbolizes the United 
States' blind spot about the priority of its national interests. 
If one draws a circle around North America that includes 
Hawaii in the West, Canada and Alaska in the North, Greenland 
in the northeast, and Panama, Colombia and Venezuela in the 
South, the area included in the circle constitutes the defense-of-
homeland interest of the United States. Although this circle in-
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eludes two countries in South America (Venezuela and Colom-
bia), their bordering on what President Reagan in 1982 renamed 
the Caribbean Basin and their large trade and cultural ties to 
North America make them a part of this North American com-
munity of interest. It is no coincidence that this circle of countries 
is also the most important U.S. economic interest. Canada is by 
far the largest U.S. trading partner, Mexico is third (behind Jap-
an), and Venezuela is in the top ten. Most of the Central American 
and Caribbean countries have their primary trading relationships 
with the United States. Canadian trade with the Caribbean and 
Mexico is growing significantly, and Canadian tourism in that 
area and in the United States is enormous. The impact of the 
Spanish language and culture on the United States today is 
staggering, and illegal migration of Spanish-speaking people to 
the United States is nearly uncontrollable. 
The obvious conclusion that must be drawn from the history of 
North America during the last twenty years is that not only the 
United States but all of this area is rapidly becoming one huge 
melting pot of language, culture, trade, tourism, and sports. It 
seems inevitable that the economies of North America will be 
further integrated in the coming decade, and the question then 
will be, should a political integration of the North American 
countries follow? Regardless of the answer, this area is the most 
important priority of U.S. interests anywhere in the world and 
will remain so. 
U.S. Interests in North America 
U.S. national interests in two basic categories-defense-of-
homeland and favorable-world-order-are at the vital level or 
higher when viewing the North American continent and adjacent 
areas (see Figure 6). For example, Canadian air space is nearly 
synonymous with U.S. air space in terms of defense against 
Soviet intercontinental missiles and long-range bombers. Any 
threat to Canadian territory by the Soviet Union would be viewed 
as a survival defense interest by U.S.leaders. On the other hand, a 
reduction in U.S.-Canadian trade relations would be viewed as a 
major, not a vital, interest because it would not be shattering to 
the American economy. A case in point was the Trudeau govern-
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Fig. 6. U.S. National Interests in North America 
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ment's decision in 1980 to restrict U.S. private oil companies' 
exploitation of Canada's energy resources. This decision was 
painful for some U.S. commercial interests, and Canada's west-
ern provinces lost considerable U.S. private investment and other 
business as a result; but neither the Canadian nor the U.S. econo-
my was seriously damaged. Nevertheless, if the Canadian gov-
ernment adopted a comprehensive protectionist trade policy 
against U.S. exports, this would quickly escalate into a vital U.S. 
economic interest. To the south, the United States has a vital 
interest in insuring that the security of the Caribbean Islands, 
Central America and Mexico are not upset by revolutionary forces 
aided by Cuba and the Soviet Union. 
The United States is no exception to the rule that all major 
powers have a deep interest in preventing hostile political forces 
from gaining control of countries on their borders. In early 1983, 
for example, Soviet party leader Yuri Andropov commented in an 
interview with the West German magazine Der Spiegel: "Would 
the United States not care what kind of government rules in 
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Nicaragua? Nicaragua is an enormous distance from America. 
We have a common border with Afghanistan, and we are defend-
ing our national interests by helping Afghanistan."1 Mr. An-
dropov drew the analogy to show that his country's national 
interest in a neighboring country is just as legitimate as the U.S. 
concern over what is happening in Central America. Within the 
whole Caribbean Basin area, however, some countries clearly are 
more essential to U.S. security than others. This was the nub of 
the debate within the United States over how to deal with subver-
sion in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and some Caribbean 
island nations. The security of this region was raised to large 
proportions in Washington during 1983 and early 1984. 
In 1978, the Carter administration achieved ratification of the 
new Panama Canal treaties by persuading enough senators that 
the canal was a major U.S. interest, not vital, and that the U.S. 
government should therefore take the risk that Panama would 
itself protect the canal because it was in its own interest to do so. 
Cuban-supported subversion of all of Central America was a 
different matter, however. Even before the Carter administration 
left office in January 1981, it abandoned its belief that Nicaragua 
would become a democratic state, following the revolution 
against the Somoza dictatorship in 1979. The Reagan administra-
tion viewed the new Sandinista government's support for Marxist 
revolutions in El Salvador and elsewhere as a vital U.S. interest, 
but many members of Congress disagreed and believed they had 
as much right to determine the intensity of U.S. interest in that 
region as the State and Defense Departments, and the President 
himself. In sum, during 1981 and 1982, there was no agreement 
within the American government about the level of national 
interest in specific parts of the Caribbean Basin, particularly 
when the issue was social justice within the countries concerned. 
In the absence of a clear Soviet and Cuban military threat, many 
Americans simply doubted that the United States should be 
involved. 
Few Americans doubt that the United States has vital interests, 
even a survival one, in Canada. This commitment goes back to 
1940, when President Franklin Roosevelt held a historic meeting 
1. New York Times, 24 April 1983, p. 10. 
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with Prime Minister Mackenzie King in Ogdensburg, New 
York-following the fall of France to German armies-and con-
cluded an agreement that the two countries would cooperate to 
defend North America against attack by the Axis powers. After 
the war, the two countries continued their close defense rela-
tionship by joining the North Atlantic Pact in 1949 and concluding 
the North American Air Defense Accord of 1958, which estab-
lished a joint military command to provide for the air defense of 
North America. Canada is the largest customer for United States 
exports and is the source of a huge amount of tourism. Private 
U.S. companies have invested nearly $40 billion in Canada. To-
gether, the two countries constitute a zone of 260 million demo-
cratically governed people. American presidents and Canadian 
prime ministers meet frequently on both official and unofficial 
visits, and their foreign and defense ministers are in constant 
contact. Although there are occasional serious policy differences 
in the economic and environmental areas, and occasional dif-
ferences in the way the two countries view events in other parts of 
the world, on defense matters and relations with the Soviet Union 
the two countries have a strong mutuality of interests. Americans 
may be divided on whether and how to use U.S. forces to defend 
distant parts of the world, but there is little doubt among most of 
them that a military threat to any part of Canada would be a threat 
to U.S. territory. This strong bond was reinforced in April1983 
when Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, during a visit to 
Washington, D.C., said Canada would approve the testing of 
cruise missiles on Canadian soil-despite strong public protests 
by peace demonstrators in Canada. The Prime Minister tied this 
pledge to continued efforts by the U.S. government to reach arms 
control agreements with the Soviet Union, on which he said the 
Reagan administration had demonstrated its good intentions. 
In sum, Canada and the United States form one of the strong-
est bonds of friendship on basic defense and foreign policy mat-
ters existing between neighboring countries anywhere in the 
world today. Even though there are strains in economic relations, 
and interest groups in both countries carp at each other for 
exploiting the relationship, the United States and Canada are 
deepening the close strategic relationship that began over forty 
years ago. This is because their defense interests as well as their 
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world-order and ideological interests are in basic harmony and 
will continue to be so in the foreseeable future. 2 
The consensus that exists in the northern part of North 
America does not, however, extend to the southern region-
Mexico, Central America, the islands of the Caribbean, and the 
northern tier of South America. These countries have as one of 
their primary national interests a resistance to U.S. encroach-
ments on their sovereignty; the history of U.S. military interven-
tion in this area since the turn of the century (longer in the case of 
Mexico) makes them suspicious of U.S. intention5-€specially 
since their economies are closely tied to U.S. markets. Whereas 
U.S. defense and world-order interests in Central America are 
rising rapidly, because of Marxist revolutionary inroads made 
with the support of Cuba and the Soviet Union, there is no 
correspondingly strong interest by most of these countries to 
draw closer to the United States. Nevertheless, Latin Americans 
living in the Caribbean Basin have a strong cultural and economic 
attraction to the United States. This ambivalence in their view is 
reflected in the changing ethnic composition of the U.S. popula-
tion-which is becoming increasingly Hispanic. 
Whereas Canadians have memories of U.S. efforts to incorpo-
rate their lands into the United States-dating back to the Revolu-
tionaryWarand the Warof1812-theyknowthatthe U.S. govern-
ment will not send U.S. troops to Canada unless there is an attack 
from outside North America; but this Canadian confidence is not 
shared by the people and governments south of the U.S. border. 
They remember covert U.S. intervention in Guatemala in 1954, 
covert U.S. involvement in the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 
1961, and overt U.S. military intervention in the Dominican Re-
public in 1965. Revelations in the spring of 1983 about covert U.S. 
support of anti-Sandinista groups operating within Marxist Nic-
aragua reinforced the concerns of leaders throughout the region 
that the United States was preparing once again to intervene in 
2. This is not to say that the Canadian government never criticizes the United 
States. For example, the Washington Post carried an article on May 15, 1983, 
entitled, 'Trudeau Criticizes U.S. View of the Soviets," which reported that 
Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau had publicly deplored President Reagan's 
strong criticism of the Soviet Union and its leaders, saying that it "justifies fears 
that he is warlike." 
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Central America to force the ouster of the Sandinista govern-
ment. The U.S. invasion of Grenada in October 1983 further 
heightened these fears. For the United States, the challenge was 
to define accurately the level of U.S. interests in the southern 
sector of North America and then to devise policies that would 
enhance those interests, while at the same time allaying the fears 
and building the confidence of political opinion in the countries 
located in the Caribbean Basin area. 
President Reagan's Definition of U.S. Interests 
in Central America 
On April 27, 1983, President Reagan made an extraordinary 
effort to focus U.S. public attention on these issues by addressing 
a joint session of Congress-a rare occurrence in U.S. political 
history. Because Mr. Reagan's address was so explicit on defining 
the U.S. stake in this region, his arguments are quoted here at 
some length. 
The President began his congressional address by saying that 
in the past, presidents had addressed joint sessions of Congress 
in order to resolve crises, but that he had sought this forum in 
order "that we can prevent one." He said that "too many have 
thought of Central America as a place way down below Mexico 
that can not possibly constitute a threat to our well-being," and 
that he had decided to go before a joint session of Congress 
because "Central America's problems do directly affect the se-
curity and well-being of our own people." Putting U.S. priorities 
in geographical perspective, he said that Central America "is 
much closer to the United States than many of the world trouble 
spots that concern us." Pointing out that El Salvador is closer to 
Texas than Texas is to Massachusetts, the President asserted that 
"nearness on the map does not even begin to tell the strategic 
importance of Central America, bordering as it does on the Carib-
bean-our lifeline to the outside world." He cited the statistic that 
two-thirds of all U.S. foreign trade and petroleum pass through 
the Panama Canal and the Caribbean, and that in a European 
crisis "at least half of our supplies for NATO would go through 
these areas by sea." It was well to remember, he reminded his 
audience, that in World War II, German submarines sank more 
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tonnage in the Caribbean then they did in the entire Atlantic 
Ocean and that "they did this without a single naval base any-
where in the area." Today, the situation is different, he asserted: 
"Cuba is host to a Soviet combat brigade, to a submarine base 
capable of servicing Soviet submarines, and to military air bases 
visited regularly by Soviet military aircraft. Because of its impor-
tance, the Caribbean Basin is a magnet for adventurism," the 
President warned. 
President Reagan underlined his view with this statement: "If 
the Nazis during World War II and the Soviets today could recog-
nize the Caribbean and Central America as vital to our interests, 
should not we also?" The President reassured his country and 
Latin America that he was not contemplating the use of American 
combat forces in Central America, because they were not needed 
and not requested. But he made it clear that economic and mili-
tary assistance was required in far greater quantities if the coun-
tries of the region were to stop the Marxist revolutionary offen-
sive "threatening the governments of every country in Central 
America." He asked rhetorically: "Are democracies required to 
remain passive while threats to their security and prosperity 
accumulate? Must we just accept the destabilization of an entire 
region from the Panama Canal to Mexico on our southern border? 
Must we sit by while independent nations of this hemisphere are 
integrated into the most aggressive empire the modern world has 
seen?" 
In conclusion, Mr. Reagan summed up his belief that the 
United States needed to become very serious about the depth of 
its national interests in the Caribbean and Central America: 
In summation, I say to you that tonight there can be no 
question: The national security of all the Americas is at stake 
in Central America. If we cannot defend ourselves there, we 
cannot expect to prevail elsewhere. Our credibility would 
collapse, our alliances would crumble and the safety of our 
homeland would be put at jeopardy. We have a vital inter-
est, a moral duty and solemn responsibility. This is not a 
partisan issue. It is a question of our meeting our moral 
responsibility to ourselves, our friends and our posterity. It 
is a duty that falls to all of us-the President, the Congress 
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and the people. We must perform it together. Who among 
us would wish to bear responsibility for failing to meet our 
shared obligation?3 
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President Reagan's dramatic enunciation of his conclusion that 
the United States has a vital interest at stake in Central America 
set off a national debate in the United States-as it was designed 
to do-around the issue of what policies the government would 
be permitted to pursue in support of those interests. Congress 
was divided, reflecting divisions in the American public. The 
issue was debated along partisan lines, with Democratic law-
makers-particularly from New England and the eastern sea-
board--<:hallenging the President's definition of U.S. interests 
south of the border, particularly his policies for defending them. 
Congressional Democrats chose Connecticut Senator 
Christopher J. Dodd to reply on national television to President 
Reagan's April 27 address. His view of U.S. interests in Central 
America did not differ significantly from those of the President, 
but his recommended policies to support these interests were 
quite different. Senator Dodd started by agreeing with the Presi-
dent on the fundamental defense and world-order interests of the 
United States in Central America: 
We will oppose the establishment of Marxist states in Cen-
tral America. We will not accept the creation of Soviet mili-
tary bases in Central America. We will not tolerate the 
placement of Soviet offensive missiles in Central America-
or anywhere in this hemisphere. Finally we are fully pre-
pared to defend our security and the security of the Amer-
icas, if necessary, by military means. All patriotic Americans 
share these goals. But many of us in Congress, Democrats 
and Republicans alike, disagree with the President because 
we believe the means he has chosen will not fulfill them. 
Those of us who oppose the President's policy believe that 
he is mistaken in critical ways. To begin with, we believe the 
Administration fundamentally misunderstands the causes 
3. Taken from the text of the President's address as carried by the New York 
Times, 28 April1983, p. Al2. 
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of the conflict in Central America. We cannot afford to found 
so important a policy on ignorance-and the painful truth is 
that many of our highest officials seem to know as little 
about Central America in 1983 as we knew about Indochina 
in 1963.4 
For Senator Dodd and many fellow Democrats, U.S. ide-
ological and world-order interests in Central America called for 
approaches different from those proposed by the Reagan admin-
istration. Dodd argued that "instead of trying to do something 
about the factors which breed revolution, this administration has 
turned to massive military buildups at a cost of hundreds of 
millions of dollars." The Senator denounced the administration's 
"ever-increasing military assistance, endless military training, 
even hiring our own paramilitary guerrillas ... a formula for 
failure." Dodd predicted that "if we continue down that road, if 
we continue to ally ourselves with repression, we will not only 
deny our own most basic values, we will also find ourselves once 
again on the losing side." The Senator's proposed policy was for 
unconditional negotiations to stop the guerrilla fighting in Cen-
tral America: "First, we should use the power and influence of the 
United States to achieve an immediate cessation of hostilities in 
both El Salvador and Nicaragua .... Second, the United States 
should use all its power and influence to work for negotiated 
political settlements in Central America. In El Salvador, the rebels 
have offered to negotiate unconditionally. Let us test their sin-
cerity .... Third we must restore America's role as a source of 
hope and a force for progress in Central America. We must help 
governments only if they will help their own people." Finally, he 
argued, "this approach would permit the United States to move 
with the tide of history rather than stand against it." Senator 
Dodd emphasized the U.S. ideological interest in these terms: 
"Two centuries ago, our nation raised the light of liberty before 
the world-and all of this hemisphere looked to us as an example 
and an inspiration. In this Capitol building, from which I speak 
tonight, men like Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, and Abraham 
Lincoln once spoke of an America leading the way to human 
progress and human rights-and people everywhere listened 
4. Ibid., A13. 
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with hope. There is no greater or larger ideal than the one which 
was forged here in the early days of this Republic. That ideal of 
liberty is our greatest strength as a nation; it is a powerful and 
peaceful weapon against tyranny of any kind anywhere in this 
hemisphere. "5 
The significance of the Dodd critique of Reagan's prescription 
for policy in Central America is that although he and fellow 
Democrats did not quarrel with the President's view that Marxism 
should not be allowed to topple governments there and that 
Soviet and Cuban military influence had to be checked, he did 
differ sharply with the President's view that the problems of 
Central America, and by inference also those of the Caribbean, 
were primarily matters of security rather than essentially social 
and political issues. Dodd also believed that the ideological inter-
est of the United States demanded that the government put more 
emphasis on human rights and social justice than the President 
seemed willing to do. Republicans and some Democrats criticized 
Dodd's rebuttal of the President, particularly because he received 
television time immediately after the President addressed the 
joint session of Congress. Nevertheless, the early part of his 
address made it plain that there was bipartisan support for the 
President's declaration that Central America is a vital interest of 
the United States and that measures should be taken to prevent 
the spread of Castroism in that area. That part of Dodd's speech 
was largely overlooked in the press commentaries that followed. 
Because a clear definition of U.S. interests in the Caribbean 
and Central America was crucial to focusing American public 
attention on this priority area, the President's address served the 
useful purpose of generating much analysis and commentary in 
the press and on television, as well as in Congress. One of the 
reasons President Reagan raised the issue of Communism in 
Central America shortly after taking office in 1981 and then 
promptly put it aside as a foreign policy priority was that Secre-
tary of State Alexander Haig's alarmist rhetoric frightened many 
Americans into thinking the administration was preparing to 
repeat the Vietnam scenario of twenty years earlier. They feared 
he wanted to send large numbers of military advisers and even-
tually deploy American combat troops to "save El Salvador." 
5. Ibid. 
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When it became clear in the spring of 1981 that the public and 
large segments of Congress were against getting into another 
Vietnam-type adventure, Mr. Reagan backed off and agreed to 
limit the number of military advisers there to only fifty-five. By 
1983, however, it was clear that the government of El Salvador 
could not control the guerrillas, who were supported by large 
arms shipments from Nicaragua and Cuba, without increased 
military assistance and large economic grants as well. Despite the 
large turnout for the Salvadoran elections in March 1982, which 
elected a constituent assembly, the internal security situation had 
grown worse. Washington then had to decide whether to make a 
greater effort to curb the guerrillas or accept the likelihood that 
another Central American state would be taken over by Marxist-
Leninists. The President's April27, 1983, speech was designed to 
gain public support for a tougher policy in Central America and 
congressional support for increased economic and military bud-
gets to deal with the problems of that area. 
Within a week of the President's address, the Democrat-con-
trolled Select Intelligence Committee of the House of Represen-
tatives voted to cut off covert assistance to groups fighting against 
the Marxist government of Nicaragua, on the grounds that no 
U.S. aid should be given to any group trying to overthrow the 
Sandinista government. This view did not prevail in the final 
legislation, however. The Reagan administration argued strongly 
that covert assistance was being given to groups that were trying 
to stop Nicaragua's supply of weapons to guerrillas trying to 
overthrow the government of El Salvador. In the Senate, where 
Republicans held the majority in 1983, the Select Committee on 
Intelligence postponed a decision on a cutoff of covert aid to anti-
Sandinista groups until the end of the fiscal year, to give the 
Central Intelligence Agency and the White House a few months 
to come up with detailed proposals to show how covert aid in 
Central America would enhance the national interests of the 
United States. Senator Goldwater, chairman of the committee, 
told the press, "I think it is perfectly plain to the president that we 
want a redefined position on Central America .... We want him 
to tell us in plain language just what it is he wants to do relative to 
Nicaragua and the other countries. "6 In effect, the key commit-
6. Washington Post, 7 May 1983, p. AS. 
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tees of both houses of Congress told the President that they 
wanted a better justification of his interpretation of U.S. interests 
in Central America and clearer policies before approving addi-
tional funding for covert activities. 
The Washington Post was generally favorable to the President's 
call for efforts to prevent the collapse of El Salvador, but it cau-
tioned that the United States should not try to dictate the solu-
tion. "In brief, just as the United States cannot walk away from 
Central America because the region is too important, so it cannot 
take charge and dictate a solution because of the immense weight 
of its past involvement, which Latins remember more keenly than 
Americans do. That leaves the administration with a requirement 
to conduct a continuing policy but a limited one .... No Amer-
ican policy that swims against the Latin current will get very fa.r. 
And as high as the stakes are for the United States, they are 
higher for the Latins whose plain self-interest is to slow down the 
Marxist revolutionary train before it reaches them. "7 
The New York Times, another influential newspaper in official 
Washington, entitled its editorial response to the Reagan speech, 
"The Issue Is Salvador, Not the Alamo." It agreed with the Presi-
dent that the United States has "legitimate, important interests" 
in Central America but asserted that "they do not justify open-
ended commitments." The Times believed that the President had 
overstated the crisis in Central America and wondered why he 
had promised not to use American troops if the stakes were as 
high as he thought. "Washington's political dilemma in Central 
America has been plain. With Cuba and probably Nicaragua lost 
to the Soviet bloc, any President will do his utmost to prevent the 
loss of another country. Yet, after Vietnam, every Congress will 
fear pouring lives and billions into a new quagmire. Both 
branches respond to the same electorate." The Times suggested 
that the Reagan administration's responsibility in these circum-
stances was to teach the American people that "Central America 
is neither the Sudetenland nor South Vietnam: neither the place 
to draw rigid lines against big-power aggression nor the certain 
graveyard of good intentions ... that our concern for who rules 
those backward nations arises naturally from history and geogra-
phy ... that direct intrusions of Soviet power can be met directly 
7. Washington Post, 29 April 1983, p. A28. 
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and by other means but that Marxist-Leninists who would serve 
Soviet purposes are nonetheless unwelcome and worth resist-
ing. "8 In sum, the New York Times supported the President's 
objectives but asked him to tone down his rhetoric, adopt policies 
that would not scare the American people, and strive to achieve 
bipartisan support in Congress. 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff attached great importance to U.S. security in the Carib-
bean and Central America, and these views strongly influenced 
President Reagan's appraisal of U.S. national interests there. In 
his Annual Report to the Congress dated February 1, 1983, the 
Secretary of Defense made this assertion: 
Central America and the Caribbean are now clearly the 
target of a concerted Soviet-inspired penetration effort. We 
recognize, of course, as we did in Europe and Japan just 
after World War II, that we must promote economic and 
social development, which will encourage political stability 
and diminish opportunities for subversion. The President 
has strengthened that effort with his Caribbean Basin ini-
tiative. Nevertheless, we cannot wait for the attainment of 
all possible social and political improvements in each of 
these countries. We must address the fact that many coun-
tries are now under attack by guerrilla forces that the Soviet 
Union sustains either directly or through its intermediaries. 
If the trend of Soviet expansion we have witnessed over the 
last 20 years is permitted to continue, the long-term con-
sequences for the United States would be disastrous. The 
further spread of Soviet military outposts throughout the 
world would increasingly threaten to cut into the lifelines of 
the Western alliance and make it even more difficult and 
costly to defend essential U.S. national interests. 9 
Differentiation among U.S. Interests in North America 
The foregoing discussion of U.S. interests in the southern 
sector of North America suggests that of the four basic national 
8. New York Times, 29 April1983, p. A30. 
9. Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1984, (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983), 28. 
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interests outlined in Chapter 1, little doubt now exists that the 
Caribbean Basin is a vital defense-of-homeland interest. There is 
bipartisan support in Congress for the view that the United States 
should not tolerate the implantation of Soviet military bases or 
Soviet forces in that area. Similarly, there is little debate that 
Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama constitute a 
vital economic interest of the United States. President Reagan's 
Caribbean Basin Plan, which envisages much closer economic 
links between the United States and the countries of the Carib-
bean and Central America-including a free trade zone for many 
commodities produced in these countries-is indicative of the 
growing economic relationships in North America. 
It is the U.S. world-order and ideological interests south of the 
border that are questioned by Congress, the press and intellec-
tual circles in the United States. Concerning ideological interests 
(promotion of values), the issue comes down to one of priority: 
the Reagan administration argued that questions of social justice 
and human rights for the impoverished people of Central Amer-
ica, while important, were not the overriding interest of the 
United States. Congressional Democrats, however, argued that 
without great attention to human rights violations and social and 
economic injustices, there was little likelihood that U.S. policy 
would make headway in curbing Marxist-Leninist influence in 
the region, despite ever increasing amounts of economic and 
military aid. The Democrats generallybelieved that military or-
ganizations in Central America were a principal source of the 
trouble and that granting them additional military assistance 
would more likely drive people into the Communist ranks than 
give them hope of a better life. The Reagan administration be-
lieved, on the other hand, that Soviet-Cuban penetration of Cen-
tral America was so far advanced that only a combination of large 
economic and military assistance to existing governments could 
possibly turn the tide, and that even then it would require years of 
effort. For the Republicans, the ideological issue was Commu-
nism first, and human rights second; for the Democrats, the issue 
was human rights and economic hope first. 
The world-order interests of the United States were equally 
ambiguous. The issue, in a nutshell, was the degree to which it 
was in the U.S. interest to insist that governments in the North 
American region maintain friendly relations with Washington, 
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regardless of their ideological orientation. Although Communist 
governments in Cuba and Nicaragua were the major source of 
this concern, there was also frustration in Washington over the 
policies of the Mexican, Panamanian, and Columbian govern-
ments, which maintain good relations with the United States but 
do not cooperate with Washington on many important economic 
and political issues. Mexico's unwillingness to adopt tougher 
policies on Fidel Castro's support of Salvador's insurgents, Co-
lumbia's unwillingness (or inability) to curb the flow of illegal 
drugs to the United States, Panama's attitude on running the 
canal and providing military facilities to the United States, and 
(prior to October 1983) Grenada's decision to let Cubans enlarge 
an airport to accommodate long-range aircraft-all of these issues 
have little to do with Communism and much to do with nation-
alism in Latin American states. The key questions for the United 
States are the extent to which it should be willing to permit a 
hostile country like Cuba to increase its influence in this region, 
and how important it is to insure that these countries continue to 
be run by governments whose principles are compatible with 
U.S. political and economic interests. This issue also affects Cana-
da; the possible secession of Quebec in 1980 posed a serious 
question for some U.S. policy-makers because it was unclear 
whether an independent Quebec would cooperate with NATO in 
preserving the security of North America and Europe and con-
tinue the close economic ties which the province has fostered 
with the northeastern part of the United States. That problem was 
largely resolved when Quebec voters turned down a referendum 
proposal to give its leaders authority to negotiate independence 
from Canada. 
The Special Case of Cuba 
The most crucial world-order dilemma for the United States is 
the problem of Cuba. This has been so since Fidel Castro gained 
control of that island by force in 1959. The irony is that Cuba was 
"lost to Communism" during the conservative administration of 
President Dwight Eisenhower. Basically, the Eisenhower cabinet 
thought in 1958 that the corrupt Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista, 
had outlived his time and that Cuba was in need of significant 
social reform. This Republican administration, which prided it-
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self on its realistic foreign policy, was persuaded that a charismat-
ic Cuban revolutionary named Dr. Fidel Castro, who had re-
turned from exile in Mexico and set up a guerrilla base in the 
Cuban mountains, could be induced to follow a friendly policy 
toward the United States if the latter acquiesced in his taking 
control of the government. President Eisenhower did not consid-
er Castro a threat to vital U.S. interests in the Caribbean. Once in 
power, the Castro leadership proceeded to confiscate American 
private investments without paying compensation, to round up 
and execute political opponents, and to start an intense anti-
American propaganda campaign while opening up relations with 
Moscow. Within a year, the Eisenhower administration realized it 
had made a serious mistake, and the President ordered planning 
for the covert Bay of Pigs operation to begin, under the direction 
of the Central Intelligence Agency. 
From the time John Kennedy entered the White House in 
January 1961 until Ronald Reagan followed him twenty years later, 
the question of what to do about Cuba has been a key foreign 
policy problem for all U.S. Presidents. In terms of national inter-
ests, the question has always been whether Cuba constituted a 
threat to vital U.S. interests and needed to be contained by 
military force, or whether Castro constituted only a major threat 
to U.S. interests and should be ignored until he decided to seek 
better relations with Washington. Different Presidents have 
viewed Cuba each way: John Kennedy was not willing to use 
American armed forces in support of Cuban exiles who tried at 
the Bay of Pigs to precipitate a national uprising against Castro, 
but he threatened nuclear war with the Soviet Union when it tried 
in 1962 to install nuclear missiles there. In 1970 Richard Nixon 
threatened retaliation if the Soviets built a submarine base 
in Cuba, but otherwise he left Castro alone. When Cubans 
were sent to Angola in 1976 to help a Marxist faction come to 
power, the Ford administration wanted to use covert aid to sup-
port the anti-Communist Angolan factions. Congress banned 
such aid out of fear that Angola might become another Vietnam. 
The Carter administration tried to improve relations with Castro, 
but by 1980 it came to realize that Castro's links with the San-
dinista revolution in Nicaragua and his aid to revolutionaries in El 
Salvador were undermining the U.S. position in Central Amer-
ica. Furthermore, Carter was humiliated in 1980 when he charged 
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that the Soviet Union had established a "brigade" of troops in 
Cuba, only to have Moscow inform him that the troops had been 
there since 1962 to train Cubans to defend their territory. Mr. 
Carter quietly dropped the issue. In sum, the United States 
treated Cuba as a major, not a vital, national interest from 1962 
until1980 because it did not appear to be a military threat to U.S. 
friends in North America. That situation changed when the Rea-
gan administration came to power and concluded that Castro was 
intent on establishing Marxist regimes throughout Central Amer-
ica. This was reinforced by Mr. Reagan's view that the Soviet 
Union was prepared to support Castro's ambitious plans with 
large amounts of military assistance. For the Reagan administra-
tion, Castro constituted a serious threat to U.S. economic and 
world-order interests in the Western Hemisphere, and it was 
therefore a vital U.S. interest to prevent him from expanding his 
revolutionary influence in Central America and in the Caribbean. 
There was little doubt in 1983 that U.S. national interests in 
North America were perceived by the President and Congress as 
vital, particularly as they affected the defense interests of the 
United States and the general security of Canada, Mexico, Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean countries (including the northern 
rim of South America). Indeed, Canada and Mexico are survival 
interests in defense terms because of their long, unmilitarized 
borders with the United States and the relatively free flow of 
persons, both legal and illegal, across the U.S. border. In time of 
national emergency, it would be imperative for the United States 
to have the close cooperation of both countries in order to provide 
for the defense and internal security of the continent. The North 
American area is to the United States what Eastern Europe is to 
the Soviet Union: a vital defense zone which it will not permit to 
be turned into a base of operations by a hostile power. This 
applies also to a surrogate for the Soviet Union (or any other 
hostile world power), particularly Castro's Cuba. 
Policy Tools to Support U.S. Interests 
This analysis of U.S. national interests in North America leads 
to certain conclusions about U.S. policies toward our neighboring 
countries. The United States has such a high degree of interest-
in all categories-in the North American area that Washington 
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should not compromise with military threats to any part of this 
region. It means that the U.S. government should take strong 
actions to insure that the economic, social, and democratic value 
systems enjoyed within the United States are promoted in coun-
tries within North America. This level of interest mandates that 
the United States cannot follow a "benign neglect" attitude in the 
Caribbean Basin area, even if there were no security threat posed 
by Castro's Cuba or the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Just as 
the Soviet Union cannot accept an anti-Moscow regime in Eastern 
Europe, so the United States should not be expected to counte-
nance an anti-American regime in its neighborhood-par-
ticularly if such a regime invites the Soviet Union to establish a 
large military presence. This level of interest has little to do with 
the fact that the United States is an open political system and the 
Soviet Union is not; it has much to do with the reality that any 
great power has the right to expect that its immediate neighbors 
will not become a hostile military base or source of insurgency 
against it. 
The specific policies that the United States ought to follow in 
upholding so high a level of national interest in North America 
are suggested by Figure 5 (in Chapter 2): "National Interests and 
Instruments of Policy." If the level of interest for North America 
under "Defense of Homeland" is judged to be at least vital, the 
United States should be prepared to employ all measures, includ-
ing a blockade and conventional military forces, to prevent a 
hostile outside power from threatening the countries and sea-
lanes in this area. In the case of Canada and Mexico, the United 
States would be justified in undertaking general mobilization and 
employing all measures, including a threat to use nuclear weap-
ons, if either country were threatened with attack. This is because 
their territory, their air space, and the waters off their shores are at 
the survival level of interest to the United States. Those who 
argue as the Catholic Bishops of the United States did in their 
Pastoral Letter adopted in May 1983, that there is no moral justi-
fication for using nuclear weapons even in self-defense, must be 
prepared to concede surrender rather than defend the territory of 
North America in case of a Soviet missile threat. The United States 
is pledged by the North Atlantic Pact and the Rio Pact to protect 
Canada and Mexico in case they are threatened by a Communist 
power, and conventional forces alone may not be capable of 
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deterring or repelling a potential aggressor against North Amer-
ica. President John Kennedy, a Catholic, clearly saw this issue 
during the Cuban missile crisis and was prepared to use U.S. 
nuclear weapons to prevent the Soviet Union from placing its 
own nuclear missiles in Cuba. Would a U.S. president do less 
today if the United States, Canada, or Mexico were similarly 
threatened by the Soviet Union? 
In economic terms, the United States has a vital interest in 
preserving its current trade with the North American countries, 
which constitutes nearly 40 percent of its total foreign trade, and 
its access to the energy resources and raw materials of Canada, 
Jamaica, Mexico, and Venezuela. Mexico in 1983 was the largest 
foreign supplier of crude oil to the United States; Canada 
provided oil, natural gas, and essential minerals and wood prod-
ucts for American industry; and Venezuela provided both oil and 
iron as well as aluminum for the American market. President 
Reagan's decision in August 1982 to launch a crash program to 
save Mexico from financial collapse, following the world-wide 
recession and a decline in world oil prices, was indicative of a U.S. 
vital economic interest at stake in preserving economic stability in 
its southern neighbor. Economic relationships with Canada are 
so closely linked to U.S. economic well-being that any American 
President would assist Canada to avoid economic calamity if that 
situation should arise. In terms of policy tools, President Reagan 
indicated by his Caribbean Basin Plan, which Congress approved 
in 1983, that the United States is prepared to treat the countries of 
Central America and the Caribbean islands as part of the U.S. 
economic area. Congress also gave the President authority to 
continue certain covert support to the non-Communist govern-
ments and anti-Communist guerrilla groups so long as this aid 
was not used for the express purpose of toppling the Nicaraguan 
regime and did not prove highly embarrassing to the United 
States. 
What was more questionable was whether, and under what 
circumstances, the United States should be prepared to use forces 
to defend vital world-order interests in the Caribbean and Central 
America. As the New York Times put it in commenting on Presi-
dent Reagan's April 27, 1983 address to the Congress: "If the 
stakes are as high as he says, why on earth not [send U.S. combat 
troops] instead of assuring the Congress that he had no intention 
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of doing so. "10 Clearly, if Central America is a vital interest for the 
United States, it follows that limited American military action 
should be employed to prevent Cuba and Nicaragua from using 
their forces to bring down the governments of neighboring coun-
tries, such as Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. 
This possibility was raised by the retiring U.S. Commander of the 
Southern Command, Lt. Gen. Wallace Nutting, who told the 
Washington Post that Central America is at war and the United 
States, whether it likes it or not, "is engaged in that war." Nutting 
said the United States may ultimately have to send troops if the 
military aid to El Salvador is not enough. 11 President Reagan 
probably did not believe that Cuba would ever be so reckless as to 
send its own forces to Central America to fight; but if Castro 
should make such a decision, with Soviet support, this action 
would clearly call for U.S. military action, including a blockade of 
Cuba, the prevention of Cuban air shipments to Nicaragua or 
other sites in the area, and the possible threat of direct military 
action against Cuba if it did not stop the armed intervention. 
Short of outright Cuban intervention, however, the use of Amer-
ican military forces in Central America or the Caribbean would be 
counter-productive because it would rekindle old fears of 
"Yankee imperialism" in Latin America and turn moderate Latin 
American opinion against the United States and possibly into 
sympathy with pro-Castro forces. 
In the "Promotion of Values" category, there is no national 
consensus in the United States about how strongly the U.S. 
government should insist that progress on human rights and 
social justice must accompany aid. Supporters of United Nations 
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick argue that it is naive to think that 
Central American countries, which have never known democ-
racy and social justice, can suddenly transform their societies into 
models of American-style democracy. They believe democratiza-
tion will be a slow process and must be built on the progressive 
groups that already are at work, rather than by turning these 
countries over to revolutionaries who would engender more 
hardship than they would eliminate. These self-styled "realists" 
point to the experience of Nicaragua: the Sandinistas came to 
10. New York Times, 29 April1983, p. A30. 
11. Washington Post, 25 May 1983, p. 1. 
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power by promising a more democratic society and then turned 
the country into an increasingly authoritarian system based on 
the Cuban model. Liberal-minded individuals, on the other 
hand, believe as Senator Dodd stated in his reply to President 
Reagan that there is little hope of providing peace and stability in 
Central America unless a dramatic change takes place in the 
political and social systems of the corrupt and unjust societies 
existing there. They argue that the United States has a respon-
sibility-a vital interest-in promoting rapid progress in this 
direction. 
At the beginning of 1984 it seemed likely that the more liberal of 
these viewpoints would prevail in Congress and that the Reagan 
administration (and succeeding ones) would be directed to give a 
high priority to human rights and social justice. There was declin-
ing support, however, for the position that the United States 
should cut off aid to any country that does live up to the American 
definition of what constitutes "progress toward human rights." 
Thus, the U.S. ideological interest in Central America and the 
Caribbean will hover near the vital level. It will never again revert 
to the "benign neglect" that occurred after World War II. 
Summing Up 
The early 1980s convinced most American political leaders that 
North America, long neglected as a priority in U.S. worldwide 
interests, had assumed huge proportions in terms of the four 
basic interests of the United States. Still unresolved was the 
relative priority this heartland area should receive in terms of 
resources and attention of top policymakers, compared with U.S. 
interests and commitments in Western Europe, the Middle East, 
East Asia, and South America. President Reagan signaled his 
view of the national interest in Central America by addressing a 
joint session of Congress in April 1983 and making it clear he 
would not permit the government of El Salvador to be over-
thrown by Communist forces. He also suggested a tougher anti-
Communist policy toward the entire Central American region by 
replacing the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Af-
fairs, Thomas Enders (who reportedly believed that both a mili-
tary option and a political option should be followed) and the 
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U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, Dean Hinton (who had ex-
pressed independent views in public about the duration of the 
struggle there). Yet Congress was slow to act on Mr. Reagan's aid 
requests for the area and was more cautious still about the use of 
either covert operations or military power to uphold U.S. inter-
ests there. The ambiguity of the U.S. view was highlighted by 
action in the House of Representatives in April1983 to substan-
tially increase military and economic aid to Israel-to nearly $3 
billion a year-while limiting aid to El Salvador to less than $100 
million. The growing awareness of U.S. vulnerability to nonmili-
tary security threats from the south was signaled by Congress's 
belated recognition of the need for comprehensive immigration 
legislation to tighten the restrictions on the flow of illegal immi-
grants into the country. There was also new willingness in Wash-
ington to increase efforts to curb the flood of illegal drugs into the 
United States because of the serious effects of the drug trade on 
crime rates and our public health. Senator Alan Simpson, spon-
sor of the Senate's immigration bill, asserted that the legislation 
was needed because "the first duty of a sovereign nation is to 
control its borders--and we don't. "12 
At the end of 1983, there was growing public and congressional 
recognition that the United States could no longer take the coun-
tries of Central America and the Caribbean for granted, that the 
danger of doing nothing was too great. The report of the "Nation-
al Bipartisan Commission on Central America," known also as 
the Kissinger Commission, was published in January 1984 and 
raised public consciousness about the political, economic, social, 
and security dangers in this vital region. Although the report did 
not produce a bipartisan approach in Congress, it did legitimate 
the Reagan administration's determination to pursue a much 
stronger policy to cope with Cuban- and Nicaraguan-supported 
insurgencies in Central America, and it laid the groundwork for 
the next administration to launch a long-term strategy toward the 
area. The fact that Congress was not willing in the early months of 
1984 to deny the administration's aid requests for El Salvador 
suggested that the U.S. public mood was gradually shifting to-
ward action to prevent the further spread of Marxism-Leninism in 
12. New York Times, 19 May 1983, p. 1. 
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Central America. The Reagan decision to send U.S. military 
forces into Grenada in October 1983, following the assassination 
of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, was generally supported by 
the American public and Congress, and it caused Cuba and 
Nicaragua to become more cautious in pushing their ambitions in 
Central America. Long-range policies would have to await the 
outcome of the November 1984 presidential elections, however. 
4. Western Europe: 
Cradle of American 
Civilization 
The United States recognized that Western Europe is an enduring 
vital national interest when France fell to German armies in June 
1940. President Franklin Roosevelt understood that the collapse 
of French forces meant that Hitler held supreme power on the 
continent and that this represented so dramatic a shift in the 
world balance of power that it could prove intolerable to the 
United States. At a commencement address in Charlottesville, 
Virginia, on June 10, 1940, Roosevelt stated: "This perception of 
danger has come to us clearly and overwhelmingly; and we 
perceive the peril in a worldwide arena-an arena that may 
become so narrowed that only the Americans will retain the 
ancient faiths." He called on the country to forsake isolationism 
with this admonition: "Let us not hesitate-all of us-to proclaim 
certain truths. Overwhelmingly we, as a nation-and this applies 
to all the other American nations-are convinced that military 
and naval victory for the gods of force and hate would endanger 
the institutions of democracy in the western world, and that 
equally, therefore, the whole of our sympathies lies with those 
nations that are giving their life blood to combat against these 
forces." 1 The President's policy in support of this U.S. interest 
was to send urgent aid to Great Britain in the hope that that last 
bastion of democracy could hold out against the German 
1. The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. 9, War and Aid to 
Democracies (New York, 1940), 260-61. 
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onslaught. Implicitly, Roosevelt knew that the United States 
eventually would have to enter the war in order to defend a vital 
interest in Europe. Lend-Lease aid to Britain, the transfer of fifty 
American destroyers to the Royal Navy, and the escorting of 
merchant ships bound for Britain were all results of Roosevelt's 
perception that if Britain fell, the United States would have to 
fight Hitler in North America. So strong was Roosevelt's convic-
tion that Nazism was a threat to U.S. vital interests that he 
persuaded the country to extend Lend-Lease aid also to the 
Soviet Union after it was attacked by Germany in June 1941-six 
months before the United States itself entered the war. 
After the war ended in 1945, the American people and Con-
gress demanded the demobilization of U.S. forces and once great 
American armies in Europe were sent home, except for the oc-
cupation forces stationed in West Germany and Italy. Lend-Lease 
was halted, and the United States took little interest in the war-
shattered economies of France, Britain, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Italy, and Germany. However, by 1947 it was clear to 
U.S. policy-makers that unless steps were taken to stimulate the 
economic recovery of Western Europe, the Communist parties in 
those countries would very likely achieve power through the 
electoral process because of the desperation of their populations. 
Thus, the Truman administration decided in early 1947 that the 
United States had a vital interest in bolstering the European 
economies through the Marshall Plan. Then, in 1949, the admin-
istration responded to a proposal of the Europeans to form a 
North Atlantic Pact to defend the Western countries against 
military and political intimidation from the Soviet Union. 
Moscow had not demobilized its forces in Eastern Europe but 
used them to bring to power Communist parties in Poland, 
Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria. The Communist coup in 
Czechoslovakia in February 1948, against a democratically elected 
government, so shocked the Western democracies that President · 
Truman asked Congress to rearm America. Soviet imposition of 
the Berlin Blockade that spring convinced Truman and other 
Western leaders that Party Secretary Josef Stalin would use force 
to expel American, British, and French forces from Germany if he 
thought they could be intimidated. When the Berlin Airlift 
proved the blockade ineffective, Stalin lifted it in 1949. The events 
of 1948-49 insured that the United States would not leave Europe 
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as it had done after World War I, when it reverted to isolationism. 
By 1950, United States national interests were inextricably tied to 
the security and economic well-being of Western Europe. That 
commitment has lasted for thirty-five years, one of the most 
successful multination alliances in history. 
The National Interests of West European Countries 
The decision of ten West European countries and two North 
American ones to conclude the North Atlantic Pact in April19492 
was based on a convergence of their national interests resulting 
from a perceived common threat. Two years later, as a result of the 
Korean War, the signatories deepened their mutual commitment 
by establishing a joint military command, Supreme Headquar-
ters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and asking President 
Truman to name an American as its commander. He brought 
General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower out of retirement to 
become the first NATO Supreme Commander, and the post has 
been held by an American ever since. The convergent national 
interests that made this historic alliance possible can be sum-
marized under the four basic national interests discussed in 
Chapter 1: defense of homeland, economic well-being, security of 
Western Europe and adjacent areas, and preservation of a west-
ern, democratic value system. 
In 1949, there existed a strong convergence, a community of 
interest, on all four of these basic interests among the twelve 
original signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. Regarding de-
fense, there was agreement on the urgent need for the military 
power of the United States to be projected over Western Europe, 
to prevent Soviet encroachment upon and intimidation of its war-
weakened countries. For economic well-being, there was urgent 
need to establish economic cooperation and growth, even though 
the Marshall Plan had laid the groundwork for economic recov-
ery from the war. On building security (world order) around the 
periphery of member states, NATO was in agreement that the 
Baltic and Mediterranean areas, and even the Middle East, 
2. The original signers of the North Atlantic Pact were the United States, 
Canada, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Britain, France, Italy, Portugal, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Greece and Turkey were added in 1951, 
West Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. 
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needed to be protected in order to prevent the Soviet Union from 
endangering Western Europe's flanks. Finally, all treaty signato-
ries believed in 1949 that Western democratic values were serious-
ly endangered by a Soviet Communist ideology that appealed to 
minorities in all West European countries and threatened to upset 
the political stability of some. 3 
This consensus on national interests in 1949 enabled NATO to 
expand its membership, in the 1950s, to include Greece, Turkey, 
and the Federal Republic of Germany. It thus built an alliance 
system that effectively contained Soviet ambitions from the Baltic 
to the eastern Mediterranean. Spain, whose geography was an 
important link in the Western defense chain, was denied NATO 
membership for over thirty years, until1982, because its govern-
ment's value system was incompatible with the ideological inter-
ests shared by member states. 
NATO suffered a severe strain at Suez in 1956 when France and 
Britain, frustrated by Washington's lack of diplomatic support, 
invaded Egypt without consulting the United States. They were 
thereafter humiliated before the world and lost much national 
prestige. The alliance changed significantly as a result: whereas 
Britain and France had until that time been key partners with the 
United States in exerting worldwide influence, the Suez Crisis 
clearly reduced the power and influence of the two European 
powers. From 1956 onward, Washington exerted an increasingly 
dominant role in the alliance, which caused growing resentment 
in parts of Europe against United States policies. During the 
1960s, leaders in Western Europe questioned U.S. military in-
volvement in Southeast Asia, and by 1968 they had serious 
doubts about the wisdom of American foreign policy generally. 
European confidence in American leadership was further shaken 
by the forced resignation of President Nixon and by Washington's 
inability to prevent the Arab oil embargo in 1973. It probably 
reached a low point in 1979 when the Carter administration failed 
to prevent the collapse of a pro-West regime in Iran. 
By 1982, the crisis of confidence within the alliance had reached 
3. The Communist parties of France and Italy, strong and militant in the early 
postwar period, were part of the coalition governments of those countries imme-
diately after the war. By 1949 the Communists had been ousted from power, but 
they had mounted serious campaigns to disrupt the economies of France and Italy 
and to force their way back into the governments. 
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major proportions. A new conservative American President was 
determined to end what he considered to be the military and 
economic weakness of the alliance and to punish the Soviet 
leadership for its role in the suppression of freedom in Poland as 
well as its continued occupation of Afghanistan. Mr. Reagan's 
opposition to the West European legs of the Siberian gas pipeline, 
especially the credits granted by NATO countries for its con-
struction, led in 1982 to his imposing economic sanctions on the 
export of U.S. licensed equipment by European firms, touching 
off a serious rift within the alliance. A worldwide recession con-
tributed to the problem because some European governments 
desired to continue East-West trade in order to avoid even higher 
unemployment at home. The U.S. government's refusal to reflate 
its economy made it unlikely that European economies could 
recover from recession as soon as some countries, particularly 
those governed by social democratic parties, desired. 
In sum, the national interests of Western Europe and the 
United States were clearly divergent in the autumn of 1982, and 
the European leaders were looking for ways to loosen the tightly 
knit organization of the NATO alliance. Furthermore, the clever 
diplomacy of the new Soviet leadership headed by Yuri An-
dropov in exploiting European fears of American military policy 
contributed greatly to the reevaluation by Europeans of NATO's 
value to them. 
Looking at the four basic national interests of the NATO coun-
tries at the end of 1983, one could conclude that divergence 
between Western Europe and the United States was growing and 
that divergence among the European NATO states on economic 
policy was also increasing. 
Regarding defense of Europe, there was serious divergence 
within NATO over how to deal with the Soviet Union. The 
mammoth buildup of Soviet conventional and nuclear forces in 
Eastern Europe during the ten preceding years, particularly the 
deployment of three hundred medium-range SS-20 nuclear mis-
siles aimed at Western European cities, shattered the hopes of 
those Europeans who believed that detente would result in a 
leveling-off of the Soviet arms buildup and in a reduction of 
Soviet control in Eastern Europe. The Soviet military buildup also 
had the unfavorable effect of intimidating some elements of Euro-
pean society and persuading peace groups to campaign against 
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the American counterpart of the SS-20 missiles, even though 
European governments had pressed the United States in 1979 to 
find a counterweight to this new Soviet weapon. A growing 
number of Europeans, especially among the young, believe that 
U.S. arms are as great a threat to their homelands as are Soviet 
forces and that the Reagan administration is not serious about 
arms limitation with the U.S.S.R. Although this sentiment did 
not constitute majority opinion in Western Europe, it did signify 
a serious erosion in the basic underpinnings of the NATO al-
liance-the form of American military protection against Soviet 
power. 
The divergence in interests was also significant in the econom-
ic arena. Whereas West European countries generally followed 
the U.S. lead in economic policy during the 1950s and 1960s, the 
detente policies of the 1970s produced a growing split between 
those governments (particularly the Federal Republic of Ger-
many) that believed trade and financial credits for Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union were good for the economic well-being of 
the West, and those (particularly Britain and the United States) 
that had serious concerns about whether such trade and financial 
assistance would create a Western dependence on Eastern mar-
kets and eventually result in political dependence as well. By 
1983, few Europeans or Americans believed that detente and 
increased trade had any real effect on the Soviet Union's deter-
mination to expand its military machine and to project its power 
and influence outside Moscow's postwar sphere of influence. The 
Soviet role in the suppression of the Solidarity free trade union in 
Poland was the straw that broke the back of pro-detente advocacy 
in the United States and caused President Reagan to respond 
with tough economic sanctions against the East European coun-
tries. The process of finding a new consensus between Europe 
and the United States on trade with the East, as well as on trade 
among NATO countries, was a painful readjustment and threat-
ened to lead to more protectionism among alliance countries. The 
economic summit conference held in Williamsburg, Virginia, in 
May 1983 did little more than paper over these differences. 
Regarding regional security outside the NATO area (world-
order interests), 1983 found similar divergencies among NATO 
members. Middle East oil was the most notable case in point 
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because European countries, with the exception of France, did 
not see any reason to provide military forces to a U.S.-led Middle 
East Rapid Deployment Force whose purpose was to insure that 
oil supplies from the Persian Gulf were not interrupted. As a 
result, there was opposition in the United States to having Amer-
ican ground and air forces added to the U.S. Navy's Indian Ocean 
presence at a time when European NATO countries were far more 
dependent on Middle East oil than was the United States. Only 
France, among the European NATO countries, keeps a signifi-
cant naval presence in the Indian Ocean, although Britain retains 
a military training role in Oman and several patrol ships in the 
Persian Gulf. (In October 1983 the Thatcher government also 
dispatched a carrier to the Indian Ocean.) There was also consid-
erable opposition in the alliance to heavy U.S. support of Israel's 
aggressive actions in Lebanon, as well as the occupied territories, 
and Washington's inability to bring about a comprehensive Mid-
dle East peace. Finally, there was resentment, particularly among 
European socialist parties, against U.S. policies in the Caribbean 
and Central America, which the United States considers to be its 
own sphere of influence. Fundamentally, many Europeans 
doubted that the Reagan administration's confrontation policies 
toward the Soviet Union would lead to greater security either in 
Europe or elsewhere in the world. 
Finally, an ideological gap seemed to be emerging between 
those NATO member states that currently have socialist or social 
democratic governments, and those led by conservative political 
parties. For conservative governments, such as Mrs. Thatcher's in 
Britain and Mr. Reagan's in Washington, trade with the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe ought to be linked to Soviet behavior 
in areas such as Afghanistan and Poland, as well as in the Third 
World. Since October 1982, the conservative-led German govern-
ment in Bonn has generally shared this view. In the absence of 
Soviet moderation on these issues, it is argued, NATO defenses 
must be given priority over social spending at home. For socialist 
governments, however, in France, Greece, and Spain, East-West 
trade is a high priority regardless of Soviet behavior because it 
helps business and employment at home. For the socialist gov-
ernment of Greece, U.S. bases on its soil appear unnecessary; the 
socialist government of Spain questions Spain's membership in 
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NATO, although not U.S. bases. 4 These doubts about NATO 
defense policy are based not on illusions about the Soviet threat to 
Western Europe but rather on a different view of the threat from 
that held in Washington and London. This ideological divergence 
between the conservative governments of northern Europe and 
the socialist governments of southern Europe could be exacer-
bated if economic recovery in 1984-85 does not result in a substan-
tial reduction in unemployment-which remains considerably 
higher than in the United States and Canada. European socialist 
parties are also likely to resist greater spending on defense, which 
will be required if NATO decides to increase its conventional 
forces. 
U.S. Interests in Western Europe 
Figure 7 shows how four principal West European countries 
appear on the matrix of U.S. national interests.Although there 
has been a convergence of interests between Western Europe and 
North America for thirty years, serious questioning has arisen in 
the United States about the importance of the alliance in terms of 
U.S. worldwide commitments, especially the economic and polit-
ical costs of keeping roughly 330,000 American forces based in 
Western Europe. The United States has a vital world order and a 
vital ideological interest in keeping Western Europe from suc-
cumbing to Soviet intimidation, but it is questionable whether 
Europe today is a vital economic interest of the United States. 
Neither West Germany nor France is as important to U.S. strate-
gic and economic interests as is Canada or Mexico, even though 
the latter are smaller in terms of military power and gross national 
product. This is because Canada and Mexico are in North Amer-
ica and are also far more important as trading partners and 
sources of raw materials. To assert this truth is not to denigrate the 
vital role of the European NATO partners but rather to put their 
importance in perspective in terms of overall U.S. interests. The 
4. In the summer of 1983, Greece concluded an agreement with the United 
States giving the latter the right to retain air and naval bases in Greece for another 
five years. Also, the Spanish government decided to put off for a year a proposed 
national referendum on whether Spain should remain a member of NATO. In both 
cases, it appeared that socialist governments found it in their countries' interests 
to retain a defense relationship with the United States. 
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exception is Great Britain, whose strategic location and nuclear 
power status qualify it as a vital U.S. defense interest in the North 
Atlantic. The same may be true of West Germany's economic 
position, the strongest in Europe. Even though the United States 
is not crucially dependent on West European territory and the 
European Common Market for its defense and economic well-
being, the European NATO area constitutes a vital world-order 
interest in terms of U.S. worldwide competition with the Soviet 
Union. Its absorption into the Soviet sphere of influence would 
be an intolerable blow to U.S strategic as well as ideological 
interests, and that is why Washington remains committed to 
Europe's defense. Western Europe's perception of its interests in 
the United States is somewhat different, however, (see figure 8). 
Most Europeans reluctantly agree that in regard to defense of 
their homelands, the United States remains a vital interest be-
cause only it can provide the military power to restrain the Soviet 
Union from intimidating or taking over their countries by force. 
Economically, the United States is also a vital interest of the 
Common Market countries because of the enormous influence 
that the U.S. economy has on their economic well-being. Regard-
ing world-order and promotion-of-values, however, there is am-
biguity in Europe's interests. Most Europeans, conservatives and 
social democrats, do not see their interests heavily involved with 
the United States outside Europe, and they therefore do not feel 
vitally involved in helping the United States protect the Persian 
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Gulf, Southwest Asia, Central America or the North Pacific re-
gion. In terms of ideology, most West Europeans have less in 
common with the Reagan administration's conservative value 
system than with any President since NATO was founded. This is 
because they see his policies as unilateralist and confrontational, 
based on anti-Communism and lacking in appreciation of the 
problems of underdeveloped countries, as well as of the poor and 
unemployed at home. In short, most Europeans had trouble 
identifying with the promotion of values interest of the U.S. 
government in 1983. 
Fig. 8. Western Europe's Interests in the United States 
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An obvious tension therefore results from this imbalance in 
perceptions of national interest between Western Europe and the 
United States. Whereas Europe vitally needs the United States to 
protect its homeland against the Soviet Union, the United States 
does not need Western Europe to an equal extent. Having Amer-
ican military protection may be crucial to the future of the West 
European countries as free societies, but the United States could 
survive economically and politically (albeit with difficulty) 
should Western Europe succumb to Soviet intimidation. That is as 
true today as it was in 1940 and in 1949. But the other side of the 
coin is that the United States needs Europe for balance-of-power 
reasons more than Europe needs or desires the United States. 
This dichotomy of interests is at the heart of U.S.-European 
relations. It explains the strong reaction of West Germany and 
other governments to Ronald Reagan's determination to scuttle 
ten years of detente and tighten up on trade and investments 
with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It explains Europe's 
reluctance to follow the U.S. lead, under Presidents Carter and 
Reagan, in confronting the Soviet Union over Afghanistan and 
Poland, and why Europeans are cool toward accepting a military 
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role in the Middle East except for peacekeeping forces. It also 
explains Europe's alarm about the possibility that the United 
States may send troops to Central America, just as it was alarmed 
about President Johnson's sending troops to Southeast Asia 
twenty years ago. Europe believes that the United States should 
not be diverted from the principal focus of international politics: 
namely, Europe and the need to deter the Soviet Union from 
launching an attack westward or intimidating Western Europe. 
In sum, Europeans have never wanted the United States to be 
preoccupied in other parts of the world because this detracts from 
Washington's attention to alliance relationships. Former German 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's comments to the Washington Post 
in 1983 are indicative of the unease experienced by respon-
sible Europeans on this question: 'A.s chancellor I worked under 
four presidents, and it's quite an experience, I can tell you. 
I've become greatly troubled by your handling of allies and 
friends ... Take the pipeline embargo. There was not the 
slightest consultation; we learned about it from the evening 
news. The grain embargo, the Olympics boycott-all these ac-
tions show enormous neglect for the alliance."5 
The summer and fall of 1983 saw some improvement in U.S. 
relations with the European allies because it was clear to all that 
unless they showed unity on deploying Pershing II and cruise 
missiles, there was the possibility of serious domestic distur-
bances in West Germany, Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands 
by the end of 1983, when U.S. missiles would begin arriving. The 
election victory of the German Conservative Party, led by Chan-
cellor Helmut Kohl, in March 1983 contributed to alliance unity 
on defense matters; but the economic troubles of the French 
Socialist government, headed by President Fran<;ois Mitterrand, 
and his tendency to blame the United States for these difficulties 
was a source of continuing tension in the alliance. The Reagan 
administration appeared satisfied that even though it was forced 
late in 1982 to accept defeat in its efforts to curtail the building of 
the Siberian gas pipeline into Western Europe, it had won con-
cessions from the West European governments that they would 
tighten credit to Eastern Europe and restrict the sale of advanced 
technology to Moscow. The renewed solidarity of the alliance was 
5. Washington Post, 22 May 1983, p. A20. 
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demonstrated at the Williamsburg summit conference in May 
1983, when the leaders of seven industrial nations pledged their 
support to the position of the United States on arms reduc-
tions. 
Potential Crises in the Alliance 
There are six contingencies or crises that could lead to the 
fracture of NATO during the next few years; four of them would 
be inspired by actions of West European governments and two by 
actions of the U.S. government. They are (1) a decision by Euro-
pean NATO countries to reject U.S. cruise or Pershing II missiles 
on their soil; (2) a decision by one or more NATO countries 
(Greece, Spain, Turkey, for example) to dismantle U.S. naval and 
air bases; (3) a significant reduction in defense expenditures by 
several key NATO countries; (4) refusal by NATO members to 
grant the United States landing and/or overflight rights in case of 
a new Middle East war threatening Persian Gulf oil; (5) a decision 
by the U.S. government to cut significantly its troop strength in 
Europe, or its naval presence in the Mediterranean; (6) a 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement to withdraw from East and West Ger-
many, leaving the two German states neutralized. 6 
A West German government decision in 1983 not to accept 
Pershing II missles would have produced a serious rupture in 
Bonn-Washington relations and might have resulted in action by 
Congress to withdraw a substantial number of American troops 
from Germany. This potential crisis passed in December 1983 
when the Bundestag voted decisively to accept the American 
missiles, but Chancellor Helmut Kohl might nevertheless insist 
that President Reagan modify American nuclear policy in order to 
allay the growing fear of war among Germans. A Belgian or Dutch 
decision not to accept cruise missiles would be disappointing to 
the United States, but would not produce the sharp reaction that a 
German or Italian reversal of policy would bring. Britain under a 
Thatcher government will continue with the emplacement of U.S. 
cruise missiles. 
Another threat to the NATO alliance would be posed if any 
6. These six contingencies were first discussed in my article which appeared 
in The World Today entitled "Convergence and Divergence in the North Atlantic 
Relationship" [London, May 1983), pp. 164-170. 
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country asked for the withdrawal of U.S. military forces. When 
France asked the United States to withdraw its forces in 1966, 
there was serious questioning in Washington whether the al-
liance was viable without French military participation. In the 
current political climate, a request by the Greek or Spanish gov-
ernment, for example, for the removal of U.S. military bases 
would undoubtedly produce calls in Congress for the withdrawal 
of alliance protection from these countries. The same would be 
true of Turkey, Portugal, or Iceland. 
At present, NATO governments are pledged to increase their 
defense budgets by 3 percent per year after inflation, but most are 
not making a serious effort to meet that target. If one or more 
decided to reduce their military budgets, in the name of economy 
or otherwise, it could lead to serious questioning by other NATO 
members about whether these states should remain under the 
alliance's protection, and could produce a public reaction in the 
United States demanding the withdrawal of substantial American 
forces from Europe. 
During the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, U.S. Air Force planes were 
denied landing rights and overflight rights by NATO countries, 
thus impeding the flow of military equipment to Israel, which 
was then fighting for its survival against Egypt and Syria. If a new 
Middle East conflict occurs, particularly if it involves a threat to 
Middle East oil, the denial of landing and overflight rights would 
be a serious blow to the alliance and might lead to the early 
withdrawal of U.S. protection and military assistance from the 
countries denying these rights. 
A unilateral decision by the United States to withdraw military 
forces from Europe would also have serious consequences. The 
danger is that a U.S. move to reduce defense expenditures by 
withdrawing military units from NATO would boost the political 
support of those elements in Western Europe that believe their 
security would be best served if the American military presence 
were reduced and eventually eliminated. Rather than forcing the 
European allies to do more to defend their homelands, a uni-
lateral U.S. troop reduction would probably result in their spend-
ing less on defense and gradually accommodating the Warsaw 
Pact countries in some disarmament agreement. In a word, aU. S. 
threat to withdraw troops from Europe is not a credible political 
move. 
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Finally, the age-old fear of Europeans that the superpowers 
will get together and make a deal at Europe's expense is an ever 
present threat to the alliance. Although this fear seems com-
pletely unwarranted at the present time, given Washington's and 
Moscow's Cold War rhetoric, the two superpowers might decide 
that it is in their mutual interest to pull back forces from Central 
Europe and thus reduce the risk of nuclear war between them. 
Even the hint that such a deal might be made between Wash-
ington and Moscow would threaten the NATO alliance because 
West Europeans would be more fearful of each other, particularly 
of West Germany, without the presence of U. S. forces. 
What is the likelihood that any of these six contingencies will 
occur? 
As in 1949 when the NATO alliance was formed, the key to 
its continued cohesiveness is a clearly perceived Soviet military 
threat to Western Europe. That view of the Soviet Union's policies 
is not universally shared today within the alliance; indeed, there 
is a significant body of opinion, mostly on the left of the political 
spectrum, that views the Soviet Union as a political but not a 
military menace to Western Europe's well-being. Thus, detente is 
seen as a means of reducing Soviet political pressure on the West 
by offering trade and financial credits to Moscow and Eastern 
Europe. Critics branded this attitude as "appeasement." By the 
late 1970s, this view was challenged in Britain and the United 
States. First the Thatcher government and then the Reagan ad-
ministration argued that offering Moscow and its satellites trade 
and financial assistance produced not only a larger Soviet military 
buildup in Eastern Europe but also the repression of free trade 
unions in Poland, the tightening of Soviet control over Warsaw 
Pact governments and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
However, what would be the result if the Soviet leadership 
were to adopt a conciliatory line toward the West, particularly if it 
made some concrete concessions on arms reductions and gave 
evidence of lifting its heavy hand in Poland? If Moscow should 
decide to accept more free-market activity in Warsaw Pact coun-
tries and permit more individual freedom in Eastern Europe, the 
Reagan Administration would find it more difficult to persuade 
NATO countries to restrict trade and credits with Eastern Europe. 
Similarly, if Moscow should unilaterally reduce or withdraw its 
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SS-20 missiles in the East, there would be less justification for the 
United States to keep cruise missiles and Pershing lis in Western 
Europe. A Soviet offer on mutual troop reductions in East and 
West Germany would surely increase pressure in the United 
States for significant troop withdrawals. In terms of extra-Euro-
pean affairs, a Soviet decision to reduce troop strength in 
Afghanistan and a declaration that it intended eventually to 
withdraw all its forces would negate much of the basis for the 
buildup of American forces in the Indian Ocean and the Persian 
Gulf area. Such moves on Moscow's part would undoubtedly 
result in political pressure within the United States, as well as in 
Western Europe, to cut defense and re-open trade with Eastern 
Europe. On the other hand, in the absence of significant change 
in Soviet policy in 1984-85, NATO countries will reluctantly move 
closer together on military and economic strategy toward Eastern 
Europe, even though protectionist policies between the Euro-
pean Economic Community and the United States may increase. 
A trend toward convergence on defense policy does not insure 
that Spain under a Socialist government will remain in NATO, or 
that a Greek socialist government will forsake its eventual goal to 
remove U.S. naval and air facilities, but it does increase the 
likelihood that Germany, Italy, and Britain will retain U.S. medi-
um-range missiles and that France will quietly coordinate its 
military plans with other NATO countries. 
In sum, the issue of convergence or divergence in the North 
Atlantic alliance rests on the perception of West Europeans about 
the intentions and policies of the two superpowers. If the Soviet 
leadership appears to be genuinely conciliatory toward Western 
Europe while President Reagan appears to be inflexible in East-
West relations, divergence between Europe and North America 
will increase. If Moscow pursues hard-line policies on Soviet 
arms and on Soviet control in Eastern Europe and Afghanistan 
while Ronald Reagan appears more reasonable about East-West 
relations and arms reductions, Western Europe will accept con-
tinued U. S. leadership of the alliance. A third possibility, that 
both the Soviet Union and the United States will pursue tough, 
uncompromising policies on nuclear weapons and continue their 
intense rivalry in the Third World, raises the likelihood that West 
Germany, Greece, Denmark, and others may move away from 
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other NATO countries-such as Britain, France and Italy-and 
seek some kind of non-aligned status. This is not imminent, but it 
would be foolish for Washington and other NATO capitals to 
dismiss the possibility. 7 
U.S. Long-term Interests in Western Europe 
Although the United States has had vital world-order and 
ideological interests in the preservation of friendly, democratic 
regimes in Western Europe since 1940, the means by which these 
interests have been promoted have varied with time and circum-
stances. There is a serious question among West Europeans to-
day, and a growing questioning also within the United States, as 
to whether the U.S. government needs to station forces totaling 
over 300,000 in Central and Southern Europe. At issue is whether 
the presence of so large an American force is required to deter the 
Soviet Union from launching an attack on West Germany and 
other NATO countries, and whether a large force is necessary to 
reassure Europeans that the United States will indeed defend 
them if the Soviet Union tries to intimidate their countries. No 
doubt both points are valid: the presence of credible American 
military power on the continent of Europe is needed to insure that 
the United States will be immediately engaged in case of armed 
aggression from the East. But how large a force is necessary to 
accomplish this largely political objective? Would it not be feasible 
to provide the nuclear umbrella for NATO defense without hav-
ing to station personnel numbering more than a quarter of a 
million in Central Europe? The argument on the other side is that 
the preponderance of conventional force possessed by Warsaw 
Pact members necessitates a large American contribution to 
NATO. Futhermore, under authority of the American President, 
only American commanders can release U. S. nuclear weapons in 
time of war. The storage and control of these weapons requires a 
sizable number of American personnel. 
7. The freeze in U.S.-Soviet relations resulting from the destruction of a 
Korean airliner by a Soviet fighter plane in September 1983 had the immediate 
effect of drawing the alliance together. The longer-term effect on the alliance 
rested to a large extent on whether the superpowers resumed arms control talks in 
Geneva and on perceived U.S. flexibility in conducting these negotiations. 
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In the mid-1980s, the United States faces the question of where 
to place its increasingly expensive military power to cover its 
worldwide political commitments; hard choices therefore will 
have to be made. President Reagan's escalating defense budgets 
caused much controversy in Congress and among American 
interest groups because of simultaneous cuts in domestic pro-
grams and because of huge budget deficits. Assuming that Con-
gress does not cut domestic spending further, because of public 
resistance, ways will have to be found to limit defense expen-
ditures without curtailing needed modernization of U.S. equip-
ment. The size of the military forces, particularly ground forces, 
will be a target for budget cutters, and the most likely place for 
these cuts to be made is in U.S. forces stationed in Europe. 
Another factor that will increase the pressure for cuts in U.S. 
forces in Europe is the growing requirements of the Rapid De-
ployment Force, renamed the Central Command in 1983. Already 
some forces currently in Europe are earmarked for transfer to the 
Central Command in case of emergency in the Persian Gulf, or 
elsewhere in the Middle East. Unless Congress is willing to 
expand the total size of the armed forces, the number committed 
to the defense of Europe will diminish if there is a serious military 
situation in the Middle East or the Indian Ocean. 
Europeans, especially West Germans, have become more crit-
ical of the large presence of American troops in their midst, 
particularly with the drug-related crime that existed among them 
in the 1970s and early 1980s. Although this situation is being 
remedied, as the Army is able to enlist a higher quality of person-
nel in the 1980s, German nationalistic instincts were brought to 
the fore during the election campaign of March 1983, in which the 
neutralist/anti-nuclear Green Party obtained enough votes to get 
representation in the Bundestag. This anti-American party con-
stantly whipped up resentment against the United States for its 
nuclear policies and against American servicemen because they 
were too visible to Germans. The fact that the West German 
electorate gave the Conservative Party a somewhat larger man-
date in that election largely overshadowed the growing nation-
alistic sentiments that lay below the surface of German public 
opinion-particularly among younger voters. 
The real issue for American policy-makers during the re-
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mainder of the 1980s, however, is not the level of U.S. troops in 
Europe but how important Europe remains in terms of world-
wide U.S. interests and commitments. The events of1983 showed 
that a significant shift was taking place in both official (Reagan 
administration) and public opinion in the direction of according 
greater priority to Central America and the Caribbean-the area 
that Americans were coming to realize had long been neglected. 
The White House was nudging Congress and the public toward 
giving a high priority to U.S. interests and resources in the 
Caribbean-even at the expense of resources to other areas. The 
interesting question is whether the new focus on Central Amer-
ica will be of lasting duration-thus signaling a significant change 
in U.S. worldwide interests-or whether Central America will be 
of momentary importance until Washington is able either to 
topple the Sandinista government of Nicaragua or strike a bar-
gain with it to refrain from destabilizing its neighbors. If the new 
concentration on North America is of short duration and the 
problems of the Caribbean and Central America are reduced in a 
year or two, nothing much is likely to change in interests and 
military resources committed to NATO defenses. If, however, the 
problems of Central America prove to be fundamental and cannot 
easily be resolved by military and economic aid and covert opera-
tions, there is a strong possibility that some U.S. forces now 
assigned to Europe will be redeployed to deal with contingencies 
arising south of the border. For example, if the U.S. government 
decides on a confrontation with Castro's Cuba over its attempted 
. export of revolution, in violation of the 1962 understanding be-
tween President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev that settled 
the Cuban missile crisis, this will require a much greater con-
centration of U.S. naval forces than currently exists in the Carib-
bean. It will require ground forces as well if revolution begins to 
sweep through Central America and into Mexico. The flow of 
hundreds of thousands of refugees northward would strain the 
ability of the United States to protect its borders. In short, grow-
ing U.S. concerns about the security of North America will re-
quire larger military resources and may affect the level of troop 
commitments in Europe, just as they did in the late 1960s when 
President Johnson built up American forces in Southeast Asia 
by redeploying troops from Europe. 
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The West German Issue in NATO 
In the longer term, the United States and other NATO coun-
tries will be obliged to deal with the so-called "German problem" 
which has lain dormant for more than a decade. The issue is the 
reunification of the two Germanies; there is sentiment among 
Germans living on both sides of the current demarcation line that 
the division of their country is not natural and must one day be 
ended. The Soviet Union has tried since the end of World War II to 
construct a united Germany under a form of government that is 
compatible with Soviet national interests. A major reason why 
West Germany was brought into NATO in 1955 was to prevent the 
Soviet plan from succeeding and also to tie West Germany mili-
tarily and economically to the West. That objective was achieved, 
and the Bonn government has been a loyal ally for nearly thirty 
years. But the detente decade of the 1970s and, especially, the 
Helsinki Treaties of 1975 opened up the possibility for Germans 
that their two peoples could resume economic and cultural links 
while deferring political reunification to some future time. By the 
end of the 1970s, when it became clear to many Europeans and 
Americans that detente had provided greater benefits to Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union than it did to the West, the Bonn 
government emerged as the most reluctant of the NATO partners 
to give up the benefits of detente. Indeed, the social democratic 
government headed by Helmut Schmidt could not reconcile the 
dilemma between West Germany's longing for trade and cultural 
links to the East with the growing power and willingness of the 
Soviet Union to deny the political fruits of detente to Poland and 
other East European states. As a result, Schmidt's government 
resigned in October 1982 to make way for a Conservative-led 
coalition which shared the new direction in East-West relations 
held by other NATO countries. Yet no German political leader can 
close the door completely on the desire of West German people 
for improved relations with East Germany and trade with Eastern 
Europe; and the door to those areas lies through Moscow. The 
desire for accommodation with the U.S.S.R. therefore remains 
strong. 
Is a compromise solution to the German problem and to the 
military confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in 
98 Western Europe 
Central Europe possible? To what extent is it in the U.S. national 
interest to promote a compromise? 
In the short term, until 1986 or 1987, the political climate in 
Europe and the United States will not be favorable to such a 
solution. Movement on the German question clearly must result 
from, not be the cause of, an agreement between Washington and 
Moscow to put a cap on nuclear weapons in Europe and begin 
reducing conventional forces there. If Moscow finds it in its 
interest to reduce Soviet forces in East Germany, no doubt the 
American Congress would welcome the opportunity to withdraw 
some American forces as well, regardless of hesitation by the 
President. But it would have to be a significant Soviet redeploy-
ment of troops, not just to Poland or Rumania, but to the Soviet 
Union itself; and it would have to involve an agreement that these 
troops would not return except in case of emergency. Such a 
Soviet offer might persuade NATO governments that a significant 
number of Americans could also be withdrawn to the United 
States, or possibly to Spain, Portugal, and Great Britain. If detente 
between the two Germanies were accompanied by large Soviet 
and American troop reductions-on the order of 150,000 men 
each-this would set in motion renewed efforts by East and West 
Germany to reach a political accommodation that eventually 
could lead to reunification under international guarantees. 
No movement toward troop reductions and an easing of politi-
cal tensions will be possible, however, so long as Moscow believes 
it can woo West Europeans-particularly West Germans-away 
from their dependence on the United States for protection; and 
Moscow will not give up trying to split NATO so long as neutralist 
and anti-American political parties and groups seem to be gain-
ing in public support. If NATO's European governments hold 
together on a common stance toward the East for the next several 
years, Moscow may conclude that the "correlation of forces" is not 
in its favor in the mid-1980s, as it had thought, and that a tempo-
rary accommodation with the West is desirable. A precedent for 
this was the 1954-55 "Spirit of Geneva," when the Kremlin decid-
ed to abandon confrontation with NATO and seek agreements in 
Europe. The Austrian Peace Treaty was one of the fruits of that 
new mood. Thirty years later, as another Kremlin leadership 
struggles to cement its control of the reins of power, it too may 
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decide it is time to compromise with the West and seek significant 
troop reductions in Central Europe. 
The Nuclear Deterrence Debate 
The military strategy for defending Western Europe has been 
increasingly challenged in the 1980s by former U.S. officials who 
believe that the postwar policy of threatening the Soviet Union 
with nuclear retaliation is no longer credible. In an article 
in Foreign Affairs in 1982, four former high officials of the U.S. 
Government-McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, Robert 
McNamara, and Gerard Smith-argued that any use of nuclear 
weapons by NATO against an invading Soviet force in Europe 
would quickly escalate and could lead directly to strategic nuclear 
war. They argued in favor of a "no first use" policy on nuclear 
weapons as a means of deescalating tensions that could lead to a 
preemptive war. They urged the NATO countries to build up their 
onventional forces so that a nuclear response to a conventional 
attack in Europe-if one should occur-would not be a Presi-
dent's sole option except defeat: 
What we dare to hope for is the kind of new and widespread 
consideration of the policy we have outlined that helped us 
15 years ago toward SALT I, 25 years ago toward the Limited 
Test Ban, and 35 years ago toward the Alliance itself. Such 
consideration can be made all the more earnest and hopeful 
by keeping in mind one simple and frequently neglected 
reality: there has been no first use of nuclear weapons since 
1945, and no one in any country regrets that fact. The right 
way to maintain this record is to recognize that in the age of 
massive thermonuclear overkill it no longer makes sense-if 
it ever did-to hold these weapons for any other purpose 
than the prevention of their use. 8 
In a subsequent issue of the same journal, General Bernard W. 
Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and one of the 
8. "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," Foreign Affairs, Spring 1982, 
pp. 767-68. 
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most respected U.S. military thinkers, advocated a "no early use 
of nuclear weapons" to counter a Soviet conventional attack in 
Europe. General Rogers argued that NATO's conventional forces 
could become capable of rebuffing a massive Soviet attack on 
Western Europe if NATO governments increased their defense 
budgets about 4 percent each year rather than the 3 percent they 
had pledged to increase. Rogers's view, shared by many other 
military commanders both in Europe and the United States, was 
that technological improvements in conventional weapons made 
it possible, at modest increases in defense budgets, to stop Soviet 
armies without having to use tactical nuclear weapons, at least 
not at an early stage. 9 
Robert McNamara published a follow-up article in 1983 to the 
one he had coauthored the year before and concluded that there 
was no rational way to justify the use of any nuclear weapons 
except in retaliation to a nuclear attack. McNamara had this to say: 
"Having spent seven years as Secretary of Defense dealing with 
the problems unleashed by the initial nuclear chain reaction 40 
years ago, I do not believe we can avoid serious and unacceptable 
risk of nuclear war until we recognize-and until we base all our 
military plans, defense budgets, weapon deployments, and arms 
negotiations on the recognition-that nuclear weapons serve no 
military purpose whatsoever. They are totally useless--except only to 
deter one's opponent from using them." The former U.S. defense 
secretary went on to say: 
If we are to reach a consensus within the Alliance on the 
military role of nuclear weapons-an issue that is funda-
mental to the peace and security of both the West and the 
East-we must face squarely and answer the following 
questions: Can we conceive of ways to utilize nuclear weap-
ons, in response to Soviet aggression with conventional 
forces, which would be beneficial to NATO? Would any 
U.S. President be likely to authorize such use of nuclear 
weapons? If we cannot conceive of a beneficial use of nu-
clear weapons and if we believe it unlikely that a U.S. 
President would authorize their use in such a situation, 
9. "The Atlantic Alliance: Prescriptions for a Difficult Decade," Foreign Affairs, 
Summer 1982, pp. 1145-56. 
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should we continue to accept the risks associated with bas-
ing NATO's strategy, war plans and nuclear warhead de-
ployment on the assumption that the weapons would be 
used in the early hours of an East-West conflict? 
McNamara clearly believed that the answer to these questions 
was no. 10 
The debate about the defense of Western Europe and the 
usefulness of nuclear weapons has also been growing on the 
other side of the Atlantic. During 1983, Foreign Affairs carried 
articles by two of Britain's leading scholars on foreign and defense 
policy, Professor Michael Howard and Professor Hedley Bull, 
both of Oxford University. Michael Howard, in an article entitled, 
"Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s," 
raised many of the arguments against nuclear deterrence made 
by Robert McNamara but went further to propose that European 
members of NATO stop being so dependent on the U.S. nuclear 
deterrent and instead provide most of their own defense. 
Howard wrote: 
There has been for many years what I can only describe as a 
morally debilitating tendency among European defense 
specialists to argue that if the reassurance provided by the 
American nuclear guarantee were to be in any way dimin-
ished, European morale would collapse. This has always 
seemed to me one of those unfortunate self-fulfilling proph-
ecies, and one that American defense analysts have taken 
altogether too seriously. . . . What is needed today is a re-
versal of that process whereby European governments have 
sought greater security by demanding an ever greater inten-
sification of the American nuclear commitment; demands 
that are as divisive within their own countries as they are 
irritating for the people of the United States. Instead, we 
should be doing all that we can to reduce our dependence 
on American nuclear weapons by enhancing, so far as is 
militarily, socially and economically possible, our capacity 
to defend ourselves.11 
10. "The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions," 
Foreign Affairs, Fall1983, pp. 79-80. 
11. "Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s," Foreign 
Affairs, Winter 1982-83, pp. 321-22. 
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Howard, a strong supporter of NATO and of the U.S. commit-
ment, reflected the growing feeling among European political 
thinkers that Europe needed to stop its near-total reliance for 
defense on American strategic power. 
Hedley Bull carried the argument a step further, calling for a 
"Europeanist alternative" to the "Atlanticist" view. "Underlying 
the peace movement in the West European countries," he wrote, 
"is the correct perception that the risks of alliance with the United 
States on present terms have grown to such an extent that they 
threaten to outweigh the gains. This points to the conclusion that 
the West European countries should seek to assume greater con-
trol of their own security, not by leaving the Atlantic Alliance but 
at least by seeking to change its structure." Bull urged Europe to 
develop, within the context of NATO, "a distinct European strate-
gic pillar of the Alliance that will reduce the old dependence on 
the United States without creating a new dependence on the 
Soviet Union, and sustain the distinct interests and objectives of 
which West European countries are increasingly conscious in 
world affairs. "12 
If Howard's and Bull's thinking about the future of NATO's 
defense structure is a reasonably accurate reflection of moderate 
conservative intellectual thought in Europe, it is time for Amer-
ican policy makers to recognize that U.S. dominance of the Al-
liance may not continue in the old way and that changes are called 
for in the way NATO is run. The key question is whether Euro-
pean governments will accept this challenge and be willing to pay 
for the more independent defense role called for by these schol-
ars. Announcement that the near-defunct Western European 
Union would meet in October 1984 to discuss Europe's defense 
needs was an encouraging sign. 
Summing Up 
Thirty-five years after the formation of the North Atlantic 
Alliance, Western Europe remains a vital world-order and ide-
ological interest of the United States; and the latter remains a vital 
defense of homeland and economic interest for Europeans. This 
12. "European Self-Reliance and The Reform of NATO," Foreign Affairs, Spring 
1983, p. 879. 
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convergence of interests represents perhaps the most enduring 
multinational alliance in history. Nevertheless, the alliance is 
changing, as the United States remains committed to being a 
world power and as Europeans think more narrowly in terms of 
continental interests. How to deal with the continuing Soviet 
security threat in Europe is the nub of the issue for Europeans. 
President Reagan's hard-line policies toward the Soviet Union 
caused serious strains in the Atlantic Alliance during 1981-1982 
and gave impetus to the European peace movement and neu-
tralist sentiment. In 1983, U.S. foreign policy under the direction 
of Secretary of State George Shultz appeared to reassure West 
European governments and policy elites that Washington was not 
determined to act unilaterally in its worldwide competition with 
the Soviet Union and that President Reagan was following pru-
dent policies even though his conservative rhetoric sounded 
menacing. The remarkable convergence among the U.S., British, 
French, and West German governments on defense planning 
during the third year of Mr. Reagan's presidency was indicative of 
his success in healing the wounds that had been caused by his 
policies toward Eastern Europe-highlighted by the Siberian gas 
pipeline controversy. The relationship among French, Italian, 
British, and American peacekeeping forces in Lebanon in Sep-
tember 1983, under very difficult conditions, was further evi-
dence of cooperation among these allies in an important area 
outside the European theater. However, the growing convergence 
of interests was a momentary phenomenon resulting from the 
current makeup of the governments that were in power. The real 
question was whether the NATO governments could devise a 
new alliance strategy-in security and economic affairs-that 
would persuade their opposition parties to continue the strong 
alliance policies that guided them when they were in power. This 
is particularly crucial in the cases of the German Social Demo-
cratic Party and the British Labour Party, both of which adopted 
anti-nuclear policies and tended toward neutralist points of view 
during 1983-84. In the United States, the problem will be to keep a 
frustrated public and. Congress believing strongly that a large 
U.S. military presence is necessary in Europe at a time when the 
European peace movements would have Americans believe that a 
U.S. military presence is no longer needed or wanted. 
Whoever the American President turns out to be in 1985, it will 
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be one of his most important tasks to establish a new relationship 
with the West European allies, one that provides them with 
reassurance that they have a real voice in American strategy on 
how best to protect Western Europe, and at the same time enables 
them to enjoy the economic and political gains that Europeans 
have achieved during the last thirty-five years. There is no reason 
why North Americans and West Europeans should not continue 
to be each other's most important friends and allies. But it will 
require of the President a special effort to coordinate the interests 
and policies of the United States with those of its major European 
partners. 
5. Eastern Mediterranean 
and Persian Gulf: 
Containment of U.S.S.R. 
The U.S. interest in the eastern Mediterranean dates from Presi-
dent Truman's decision in 1947 to provide military and economic 
aid to Greece and Turkey to help them resist the Soviet Union's 
pressures to expand southward. The President's proposal was 
made before a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947, and it 
soon became known as the "Truman Doctrine." In it President 
Truman went beyond a request for aid to Greece and Turkey and 
declared that "it must be the policy of the United States to support 
free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed 
minorities or by outside pressures." The President later wrote, 
"This was, I believe, the turning point in America's foreign policy, 
which now declared that wherever aggression, direct or indirect, 
threatened the peace, the security of the United States was in-
volved. "1 Thus, the United States decided early in 1947, following 
Britain's decision to terminate its aid program in Greece, not only 
to put United States prestige on the line in Greece and Turkey, but 
to go further and announce that the United States would oppose 
Soviet expansionist efforts wherever they were manifested. It is 
noteworthy that Truman's declaration preceded by a few months 
the famous "Mr. X" article written by George Kennan in Foreign 
Affairs, which many observers saw as the intellectual basis for 
subsequent U.S. containment policy toward the Soviet Union. 
1. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, N.J., 1956), 
2:105, 106. 
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In 1947 the issue of security in the eastern Mediterranean was 
related to the economic recovery and military security of West-
ern Europe. Those issues were raised again when the Marshall 
Plan was unveiled and in subsequent years when the North 
Atlantic Pact was concluded. Although Greece and Turkey were 
not original members of the North Atlantic Pact, they were admit-
ted to membership in 1951 and the U.S. bilateral defense commit-
ment thus was expanded into a multilateral one. 
It is clear that U.S. national interests in Greece and Turkey were 
from the beginning based on world-order considerations, not on 
defense of the U.S. homeland, or on economic benefits to the 
United States, or e~en on ideological grounds, although prevent-
ing Communist insurgents from taking control of the Greek 
government was an objective advanced by President Truman. 
The issue in 1947 was fundamentally an expansion of U.S. world-
order interests to include two countries close to Soviet borders 
where the United States previously had not perceived a deep 
interest. This area had been a British sphere of influence after 
World War I; when a nearly bankrupt Britain decided early in 1946 
that it could no longer carry the economic and military burden of 
defending this area, the United States decided it must do so in 
order to contain Soviet expansionist designs. The impulse giving 
rise to the Truman Doctrine was applied in other parts of Asia 
during the 1950s when the Eisenhower administration made de-
fense agreements with Iraq, Iran and Pakistan-in addition to 
Turkey-to build a network of friendly states around the periph-
ery of the Soviet Union in furtherance of the containment policy. 
Unlike Western Europe, where the United States had deep his-
torical, ideological, and cultural ties, these Asian states had little 
in common with the United States except their willingness to 
resist Soviet efforts to expand its influence in the direction of the 
Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. 
The Persian Gulf was a key area for the United States and 
Britain because of its oil reserves and the growing need of West-
ern economies for its low-cost oil. Although Persian Gulf oil had 
not yet assumed the crucial importance it acquired during the 
1970s (because the United States was an oil exporter and could 
supply Europe with its oil needs if necessary, as it did during the 
Suez crisis of 1956 and the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967), the 
Eisenhower administration nevertheless helped to topple the 
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Mossadegh government in Iran in 1953 and restore the Shah to 
power. 
The question today is, does the United States have vital inter-
ests in the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf that 
require it to go to war, if necessary, to defend those areas? Greece 
and Turkey are covered by the North Atlantic Treaty and the 
United States is pledged to come to their aid if either is attacked by 
the Soviet Union. Other than these two countries, however, there 
are no treaties by which the United States is bound to any country 
in the Middle East or South Asia. 2 
Another state in the eastern Mediterranean that obviously 
deserves to be called a vital U.S. interest is Israel. The Jewish state 
came into being in 1948 with the help of the United States, and 
every American President since then has affirmed his support for 
its survival and well-being. Strong U.S. backing for Israel cost 
Washington the support of many Arab countries in the period 
after 1948, most notably Egypt under Carnal Abdel Nasser during 
the 1950s and 1960s, Syria, and Iraq (after a revolution there in 
1958). Following Nasser's death in 1970, his successor, Anwar 
Sadat, decided to oust the Soviet advisers and make peace with 
Israel at Camp David in 1979. Since then, the United States has 
become the primary supplier of Egypt's economic and military 
aid, and Egypt has become a vital world-order interest of the 
United States. Unlike Egypt, however, Israel is a vital ideological as 
well as world-order interest because of its democratic institutions, 
the strong cultural attachment that many Americans feel for the 
Jewish people, and its support of the U.S. ideological point of 
view on most international issues. This is true despite the serious 
policy differences that existed between the government of Prime 
Minister Menachem Begin and two American presidents, Jimmy 
Carter and Ronald Reagan, over disposition of Israeli-occupied 
territories and Israel's aggressive policies in Lebanon in 1979 and 
1982. 
In sum, in 1983, there were four countries in the eastern 
Mediterranean that could reasonably be called U.S. vital inter-
ests: Greece and Turkey, where the U.S. interest dated from 1947; 
2. Pakistan withdrew from the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization early in the 
1970s, and the United States never had a formal defense treaty with Iran, even 
though it maintained a close military relationship with the Shah's government 
until his ouster in 1979. 
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Israel, where it was a major interest in 1948 but became a vital one 
following Israel's successful war against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria 
in 1967; and Egypt, which moved from the peripheral to the major 
level in the 1950s and became a vital world-order interest in the 
late 1970s when President Sadat made peace with Israel and 
entered into a defense agreement with the United States. Al-
though Sadat was assassinated in 1981, his successor, Hosni 
Mubarak, has continued the policy of collaboration with the 
United States. His attitude toward Israel remained cool, however, 
because of the Begin government's unwillingness to deal serious-
ly with the Palestinian homeland issue, also covered by the Camp 
David Accords of 1979. Evidence that the United States now 
considers these four eastern Mediterranean countries vital inter-
ests is the fact that the preponderance of U.S. military and eco-
nomic aid goes to them in the form of grants and loans on 
concessional terms. U.S. military units are based in Greece and 
Turkey, as part of the NATO commitment, and the United States 
has access to facilities in Israel and Egypt, although it does not 
currently have military bases in either. 
Israel's Invasion of Lebanon 
and U.S. Interests 
The Lebanon war of 1982, precipitated by an Israeli invasion in 
June, was a momentous event in recent Middle East history. It 
had the effect of bringing U.S. peacekeeping troops into Lebanon 
for the second time in twenty-four years, and it set the stage for a 
potential partition of that state between Israel and Syria. The war 
greatly strained U.S.-Israeli relations and called into question 
how deep the U.S. commitment to Israel should be. Since Presi-
dent Reagan was personally involved in seeking a settlement that 
would deal with the Palestinian homeland issue as well as the 
withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon, a more detailed 
discussion of events and the U.S. reaction from June to Sep-
tember 1982 is in order. 
The timing of Israel's invasion of Lebanon was remarkable. 
President Reagan and Secretary of State Alexander Haig were in 
Paris for an economic summit conference with six other heads of 
government. News of the Israeli invasion, which arrived during 
the meeting at Versailles, annoyed the President because he had 
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hoped to achieve a diplomatic success on this, his first, visit to 
Europe as the President. While still in Washington and before the 
invasion commenced, Mr. Reagan had sent Prime Minister Begin 
several messages urging him not to overreact to the attempted 
assassination of the Israeli ambassador to Britain, which Israel 
blamed (mistakenly) on the Palestine Liberation Organization. 
However, since Israel had been preparing for months to invade 
southern Lebanon in order to rout PLO forces, which had ter-
rorized the northern border of Israel, Mr. Begin was not to be 
dissuaded from launching the drive into Lebanon-which he 
dubbed "peace for Galilee." The invasion started on June 6, and 
President Reagan immediately summoned his Middle East en-
voy, Philip Habib, to Paris for consultation. He then dispatched 
Habib to the Middle East to try to arrange a cease-fire. 
Israel's military advance into Lebanon was so swift that by the 
time the first cease-fire became effective in mid-June, its forces 
were approaching Lebanon's capital, Beirut. This was in contra-
diction to assurances that Israel's ambassador to the United 
States, Moshe Arens, had given publicly in Washington: namely, 
that Israel intended to clear out PLO forces in a 25-mile area of 
southern Lebanon and that it had no plan to remain in Lebanon 
and no claim to "one single square inch of Lebanese territory." 
Meanwhile, President Reagan was visiting several other Euro-
pean capitals, and the Israeli advance into Lebanon undercut his 
efforts to be seen as a world leader--causing European leaders to 
question whether he had any influence over the Begin govern-
ment's use of American military equipment. Israel's use of U.S. 
"cluster bombs" in Lebanon became known early in the war. One 
reason for White House reticence in speaking out strongly 
against Israel was its misunderstanding of Israel's military objec-
tives. The President was told that Israel would advance only 
twenty-five miles into Lebanon in order to oust the PLO from 
areas within artillery range of Israeli territory. However, Israeli 
Defense Minister Ariel Sharon had no such limitation in mind. 
His forces bombed Syrian positions well beyond this line, and he 
sent armored columns up the coast to the outskirts of Beirut. 
When the White House became aware of Israel's real objectives, it 
tried to exert diplomatic pressure on the Begin government but 
met with only limited success. 
During the President's European trip, Secretary of State Haig 
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became embroiled in conflict with other members of the Reagan 
administration, and he resigned on June 25. Haig was a strong 
supporter of Israel's position and had instructed the U.S. perma-
nent representative to the United Nations to vote against a Se-
curity Council resolution on June 8 calling for sanctions against 
Israel. The United States was opposed by all other Security Coun-
cil members and incurred criticism in Europe and elsewhere for 
its unyielding support of the Begin government. At the end of 
June the President replaced Haig as Secretary of State with 
George P. Shultz, a former cabinet officer in the Nixon admin-
istration who reportedly was less sympathetic than Haig to Isra-
el's Middle East objectives. The dramatic change in leadership at 
the State Department was interpreted by many observers as a 
shift in U.S. Middle East policy-away from unquestioning sup-
port of Israel and toward a more evenhanded policy with regard 
to the Arab states. 
In his news conference on June 30, the first after Israel's invas-
ion of Lebanon, the President was asked this question: "Mr. 
President, there are some who say that by failing to condemn the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon and refusing to cut off arms to the 
invading armies, the United States and Israeli policies have be-
come-and the goals have become-identical. If there's a dif-
ference, what is it?" President Reagan responded: "There's no 
question but that we had hoped for a diplomatic settlement in the 
Middle East, in that situation. We were not warned or notified of 
the invasion that was going to take place. On the other hand, 
there had been a breaking of the cease-fire, which had held for 
about 11 months in that area ... We have a situation in Lebanon in 
which there was a force, the PLO, literally a government within a 
government and with its own army. And they had pursued 
aggression themselves across a border by way of rocket firing and 
artillery barrages." The President listed three U.S. goals in 
Lebanon: (1) to get the various factions together to form a central 
government and "control their own country and have a single 
Lebanese army;" (2) to guarantee Lebanon's southern border 
with Israel so that the PLO could no longer "create acts of terror 
across that border;" and (3) "to get all the foreign forces-Syrians, 
Israelis, and the armed PLO-out of Lebanon."3 In response to a 
3. Presidential Documents 18, no. 26 (5 July 1982): 850-51. 
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subsequent question about displaced Palestinians in Lebanon, 
the President added another: "It's been our goal for quite some 
time-and that is, once and for all, when these other things are 
accomplished-{)nce and for all, to deal with the problem of the 
Palestinians and settle that problem within the proposals and the 
suggestions that were made in the Camp David accords."4 This 
goal set the stage for the President's subsequent policy regarding 
the disposition of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
During July and August 1982, the United States sought to 
implement the first three of these presidential goals in Lebanon, 
with only partial success. The Begin government seemed intent 
on occupying all of Beirut and physically ousting the PLO from its 
strongholds in the western sector of that city. President Reagan 
advised Prime Minister Begin that if the Israelis did so, there 
would be serious repercussions in terms of O.S. economic and 
perhaps military aid. In late August the President agreed to send 
800 Marines to Beirut as part of an international peacekeeping 
force to supervise the evacuation of seven thousand PLO guer-
rillas, with the understanding that their families who remained in 
West Beirut would not be attacked. The President suspended the 
shipment of cluster bombs to Israel after he received evidence 
that these antipersonnel weapons had been used against civilian 
targets in violation of U.S. law. Israel's massive bombing of West 
Beirut in August brought outrage from the U.S. allies in Europe, 
from segments of Congress, and from much of the American 
press. The President then wrote a stern letter to Begin reminding 
him that U.S. weapons given to Israel were to be used only for 
defensive purposes. The implicit warning of a weapons cutoff did 
not escape the Israeli prime minister, who reportedly exploded: 
"Nobody, nobody is going to bring Israel to her knees. You must 
have forgotten that Jews do not kneel but to God .... Nobody is 
going to preach to us humanitarianism. "5 
The sending of 800 Marines to Beirut in a peacekeeping role 
was part of Mr. Reagan's strategy to prevent Israel from using 
force against the PLO trapped in West Beirut and to encourage 
PLO leader Yasser Arafat to agree to the evacuation of his forces. 
The larger goal was to arrange a political settlement within 
4. Ibid., 851. 
5. Time, 16 Aug. 1982, p. 12. 
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Lebanon that would encourage the Syrians and Israelis to leave 
the country and permit the Lebanese the opportunity, for the first 
time since 1976, to govern themselves without foreign inter-
ference. But that goal was inextricably tied up with another goal 
that President Reagan had expressed in his June 30 press con-
ference: to reach a solution of the Palestinian problem in accor-
dance with the Camp David Accords, negotiated by President 
Carter in 1979. The President was persuaded by his advisers, 
reportedly including Secretary of State George Shultz, that no 
lasting solution to the Lebanon fighting was likely without a 
solution of the Palestinian homeland issue, which had plagued 
both the Carter and Reagan administrations. There were strong 
hints that the Israeli government's objective in Lebanon was to 
annihilate the PLO so that it would no longer be a threat to Begin's 
plan to annex the West Bank and Gaza Strip after settling a large 
number of Israeli citizens there. Defense Minister Sharon made 
no secret that he thought the Palestinians should set up their 
homeland in Jordan, with or without King Hussein's agreement, 
and that Israel should forever control "Samaria and Judea." The 
Begin government knew it could not get the Carter administra-
tion to acquiesce in this bold plan to scrap the Camp David 
Accords and United Nations Resolution 242, which called for 
Israel's withdrawal from occupied lands. But Ronald Reagan had 
campaigned as a staunch advocate of Israel's strategic importance 
to the United States, and he had asserted that Israeli settlements 
on the West Bank were not illegal, as claimed by most other 
countries and the Carter administration. By agreeing to com-
pletely evacuate the Sinai Peninsula in April 1982, Mr. Begin 
thought he had shown his good faith and that the Reagan White 
House should not stand in Israel's way if it gradually extended its 
sovereignty over the West Bank-as it had already done in East 
Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Washington's mild reaction in 
December 1981 when Israel annexed the Golan area may have led 
Mr. Begin to conclude that President Reagan could be induced to 
trade Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon for tacit support of Israel's 
"creeping annexation" of the West Bank and Gaza. If Israel's 
government had such hopes, they were dashed on September 1, 
1982, by a major U.S. policy statement made by President Reagan. 
The setting for Mr. Reagan's television address to the nation 
was unusual. He was at his ranch in California instead of at the 
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White House, where he had expected to make the address later in 
the week after Arab leaders and the Begin government had been 
briefed on its contents. However, the initial reaction in Jerusalem 
was so negative that White House aides feared Begin would leak 
the contents and try to embarrass the President before he could 
announce his new Middle East peace plan. The address was 
therefore made from a Hollywood film studio. His remarks are 
quoted in some detail here because they laid out in reasonably 
clear terms the President's view of U.S. interests in the Arab-
Israeli controversy over occupied territories and of U.S. objec-
tives for peace in the Middle East. 
In his introduction, President Reagan outlined the extent of 
U.S. national interests in the Middle East: "Our involvement in 
the search for Mideast peace is not a matter of preference; it's a 
moral imperative. The strategic importance of the region to the 
United States is well known, but our policy is motivated by more 
than strategic interests. We also have an irreversible commitment 
to the survival and territorial integrity of friendly states. Nor can 
we ignore the fact that the well-being of much of the world's 
economy is tied to stability in the strife-torn Middle East. Finally, 
our traditional humanitarian concerns dictate a continuing effort 
to peacefully resolve conflicts." The President said he fully sup-
ported the Camp David Accords, and complimented Egypt and 
Israel for completing the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the 
Sinai. But he called attention to the "unfinished business" of 
arranging for autonomy talks for Palestinians living on the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip--which also were agreed to at Camp David. 
Observing that the Lebanon war, though tragic, had left the 
United States with a new opportunity for Middle East peace, the 
President asserted that "we must seize it [the opportunity] now 
and bring peace to this troubled area so vital to world stability 
while there is still time." Mr. Reagan asserted that the question 
was how to reconcile Israel's legitimate security concerns with the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinians and concluded that this could 
be done only if both sides were willing to compromise. He called 
on Israel to "make clear that the security for which she yearns can 
only be achieved through genuine peace, a peace requiring mag-
nanimity, vision and courage." The Palestinians, he said, should 
"recognize that their own political aspirations are inextricably 
bound to recognition of Israel's right to a secure future." As for 
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the Arab States, the President asked them "to accept the reality of 
Israel-and the reality that peace and justice are to be gained only 
through hard, fair, direct negotiations."6 
Recalling that the United States had not been willing to offer 
its own peace plan because it had hoped the parties themselves 
would see it to be in their own interests to negotiate a settlement, 
he now concluded that there needed to be a clearer sense of the 
U.S. position in order "to encourage wider support for the peace 
process." He then reaffirmed the Camp David call for a five-year 
period of local autonomy for the Palestinians to run their own 
affairs, and he called for the cessation of new Israeli settlements 
on the West Bank. The President voiced his opposition to the 
creation of an independent Palestinian state at the end of the five-
year transitional period, but he also made clear that he would 
oppose Israel's annexation or control of the West Bank and Gaza. 
He asserted: "It is the firm view of the United States that self-
government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in 
association with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable, just 
and lasting peace. We base our approach squarely on the princi-
ple that the Arab-Israeli conflict should be resolved through 
negotiations involving an exchange of territory for peace." Mr. 
Reagan also said the United States believed that Jerusalem must 
remain an undivided city but that its final status should be decid-
ed through negotiation. In case American Jews or Israelis had any 
doubt that he had diminished his support of Israel's security, the 
President added that '1'\merica's commitment to the security of 
Israel is ironclad and, I might add, so is mine."7 
The Begin government, as expected, totally rejected Mr. Rea-
gan's plan and expressed displeasure that he had launched it so 
dramatically and without consultation. The Arab countries did 
not reject it but began a round of talks among their leaders to 
determine whether and under what conditions they might be 
prepared to support part of the U.S. initiative. Although it was 
clear to U.S. policy-makers that a breakthrough on the Palestinian 
autonomy question was some time off-perhaps after Menachem 
Begin had given up power in Israel-it was also clear that the 
Reagan administration had made a significant break with its own 
6. Presidential Documents 18, no. 35 (6 Sept. 1982): 1082. 
7. Ibid., 1085. 
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past views and had decided that true peace in the Middle East 
could not be achieved unless Israel withdrew from occupied 
territories. It was a major affirmation of U.S. national interests in 
the eastern Mediterranean area. 
Events since September 1, 1982, show that President Reagan's 
effort to deal not only with the issue of troop withdrawal from 
Lebanon but also the larger issue of the future of the West Bank 
and Gaza territories has not been successful in bringing the key 
parties into agreement. The Begin government dismissed the 
President's plan and showed its disdain by refusing to enter 
serious negotiations about troop withdrawal from Lebanon until 
early in 1983. Meanwhile, the State Department sought to bring 
King Hussein of Jordan into negotiations with Israel and Wash-
ington on the Palestinian issue, but the king failed in April1983 to 
persuade PLO leader Yasser Arafat to give him authority to nego-
tiate for the Palestinians. With the PLO as well as Israel rejecting 
President Reagan's peace plan, his bold September 1 initiative 
seemed all but dead. What remained was the other U.S. goal, to 
get a troop withdrawal agreement on Lebanon. For this Secretary 
of State Shultz used shuttle diplomacy in April and May 1983 and 
finally achieved an agreement between the Israeli government 
and the Lebanese government of Amin Gemayel. Israel was to 
evacuate all its troops as part of a similar withdrawal of Syrian and 
PLO forces from eastern and northern Lebanon. However, Syria 
refused to accept the Israeli-Lebanon deal and vowed to resist 
withdrawal of its troops from Lebanon until Israel had made 
further concessions. By mid-1983, therefore, Lebanon remained 
occupied by Israeli and Syrian troops while the United States, 
Italy, France, and Great Britain kept peacekeeping troops in and 
around Beirut to prevent a resumption of Lebanon's civil war. The 
likelihood of de facto partition of Lebanon between Israel and 
Syria loomed large, unless the United States could persuade Syria 
to change its policy. 
U.S. involvement as peacemaker between Israel and Lebanon 
and the reinforcement of the Marine battalion in Beirut as a 
peacekeeping force showed that Lebanon had become a very 
important U.S. interest in 1982-83. But was the U.S. interest vital, 
requiring it to remain in Lebanon indefinitely? Although the 
United States could not compel Syria to withdraw its roughly 
40,000 troops from Lebanon or prevent it from inviting Soviet 
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technicians to help defend its territory, the United States and its 
European allies had the capability to prevent the disintegration of 
the Lebanese state and/or its absorption into a Syrian and per-
haps Soviet sphere of influence. So long as U.S. troops remained 
in Beirut and U.S. diplomacy supported the weak Gemayel gov-
ernment in its effort to assert authority over the country, U.S. 
interest and influence in Lebanon were considerable. 
Secretary of State George Shultz, in testimony before the Sen-
ate and House Foreign Affairs committees in September 1983, 
summed up the Reagan administration's view of U.S. interests in 
Lebanon at that time: "The crisis in Lebanon cannot be isolated 
from the larger Middle East crisis. It involves many of the same 
issues of Middle East peace. It involves similar questions of se-
curity, respect for sovereignty, and peaceful settlement of dis-
putes." He ended his presentation with this assertion: ''At stake 
also are some concerns that affect our national interest and the 
security of our friends and allies. If American efforts for peaceful 
solutions are overwhelmed by brute force, our role is that much 
weakened everywhere. Friends who rely on us will be disheart-
ened. Moderates in the Arab World whom we are encouraging to 
take risks for peace will feel it far from safe. The Soviet Union's 
efforts to disrupt our diplomacy will have scored a victory; radical 
and rejectionist elements will be strengthened. The cause of 
peace and justice will have suffered a setback."8 Shultz believed 
that Lebanon was a key test of U.S. prestige in the Middle East, 
but his view was not shared by Congress, whose members 
brought increasing pressure on the Reagan administration to 
withdraw U.S. Marines. Early in 1984, the chaotic political situa-
tion in Lebanon persuaded President Reagan that a further peace-
keeping role was impossible, and he withdrew the Marines. It 
may therefore be concluded that the U.S. interest in Lebanon 
never went above the major level. If it had done so in 1983- 84, the 
President should have sent combat troops to Lebanon and forced 
the Syrians and their Lebanese allies to stop their attacks on the 
Gemayel government. 
Conclusions about U.S. national interests in the eastern Medi-
terranean may be summarized on the interest matrix as seen in 
8. "Excerpts from a Statement by George P. Shultz," New York Times, 22 Sept. 
1983, p. A12. 
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Fig. 9. U.S. National Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean 
Basic Interest at Stake Intensity of Interest 
Survival Vital Major Peripheral 
Defense of Homeland Israel Lebanon 
Egypt 
Economic Well-Being Israel Egypt 
Lebanon 
Favorable World Order Israel Lebanon 
Egypt 
Promotion of Values Israel Egypt Lebanon 
Figure 9. This shows that neither the defense of the United States 
nor its economic well-being is vitally affected by what happens to 
Egypt, Israel, or Lebanon; nor, in fact, are U.S. ideological inter-
ests (values), except in the case of Israel. But the U.S. world-order 
interest in this area would be vitally affected were Israel or Egypt 
to be subverted from within or attacked by a hostile power. 
Dealing with internal subversion is a more difficult problem than 
a foreign attack; for example, defending a military government in 
Egypt against internal subversion would be difficult for an Amer-
ican government to justify. Nevertheless, this arc of countries 
along the eastern Mediterranean constitutes a vital part of U.S. 
containment strategy, and a President would be justified in using 
U.S. forces, if necessary, to defend all of them against a Soviet or 
Soviet-supported attack. This would apply also to Lebanon if it 
were threatened with a Soviet takeover. 
The question of U.S. obligations to Israel is more complex. The 
key question is whether the United States has a vital interest in 
defending Israel regardless of the policies that country's govern-
ment pursues toward its neighbors. Should the United States be 
committed to the security of Israel if its policies are so extreme 
that they turn the Arab world against Israel and the United 
States? I think not. The U.S. interest in Israel, even though it is 
deeper because of the ideological aspect than in any other country 
in the eastern Mediterranean, is not absolute: the level of interest 
ought to be contingent on Israel's being reasonable about dealing 
with its neighbors, including more than one million Palestinians 
who live under Israeli occupation. This means that Israel should 
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not assume that an extreme view of its national aspirations will be 
supported by the United States. Even though President Reagan's 
peace proposals of September 1, 1982, were not accepted either by 
the Arabs or by Israel, they nevertheless set forth a reasonable 
resolution to the Palestinian problem, one which Israel will con-
tinue to ignore at the risk of further difficulties with the United 
States. In this respect, President Reagan's public definition of 
U.S. national interests in the region was an important step in 
defining U.S. goals for the future, goals that ought to become 
bipartisan in the U.S. political context. 
U.S. Interests in Turkey and Greece 
Turkey is the most important U.S. ally, from a strategic point of 
view, in the entire Mediterranean area. It controls the gateway for 
Soviet shipping between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, 
and it has a long border with the Soviet Union. As one of the two 
countries directly affected by the Truman Doctrine of 1947, suc-
cessive Turkish governments provided the United States with 
extremely valuable military and intelligence facilities from which 
to monitor Soviet weapons tests and gather other sensitive infor-
mation. Since joining NATO in 1951, Turkey has been among the 
staunchest members of the alliance and has maintained strong 
defense forces. After the fall of the Shah in Iran in 1979 and the 
revolutionary regime's decision to close U.S. military facilities 
there, Turkey has become even more important to the United 
States as a monitoring post of Soviet missile testing. For this 
reason, Turkey is the only country in the Middle East that is near 
the vital level of U.S. defense-of-homeland interest. The loss of 
U.S. military and intelligence facilities in Turkey would directly 
affect the defense of North America, and Turkey is therefore an 
extremely important asset for United States defenses. Although 
Turkey is a member of NATO and a key factor in helping to protect 
NATO's southern flank, it constitutes a special case because it is 
the only member of NATO that is not Christian in religion and 
Western in culture; furthermore, it is not a fully democratic 
country. Severe security problems occurred in the late 1970s and 
caused the military to step into the government in order to 
prevent a civil war. The United States probably has only a pe-
ripheral ideological interest in Turkey. 
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Fig. 10. U.S. National Interests in Turkey and Greece 
Basic Interest at Stake Intensity of Interest 
Survival Vital Major Peripheral 
Defense of Homeland Turkey Greece 
Economic Well-Being Greece Turkey 
Favorable World Order Turkey 
Greece 
Promotion of Values Greece Turkey 
The national interest matrix applied to Turkey and Greece is 
seen in Figure 10. The difficulty for American foreign policy in 
assigning Turkey so high a priority is that this conflicts with U.S. 
interests in Greece, another NATO ally, but one which believes 
that Turkey is a greater threat to its security than is the Soviet 
Union. Greece's antipathy for Turkey is rooted in a long history 
and need not concern us here; it is enough to say that all Greek 
governments, particularly the one headed by Dr. Andreas Pa-
pandreou in 1983, have found it politically prudent to protest 
large amounts of U.S. military and economic assistance to Tur-
key, even though both Turkey and the other NATO countries 
understand that this assistance is to bolster Turkish defenses 
against the Soviet Union. What gives Greek governments a 
powerful voice in Washington, particularly in Congress, is the 
same factor that gives Israel so much respect there: Greece can 
count on a powerful lobby of Greek Americans to argue against 
military aid to Turkey, in spite of the fact that such aid is essential 
in persuading Turkey to give the U.S. government permission to 
use its soil for vital operations related to U.S. defense interests. 
This competition is nowhere better illustrated than in the 
congressional reaction to Turkey's decision in 1974 to send an 
invasion force to protect the Turkish minority population living in 
Cyprus. Since the majority of Cypriots are Greek by nationality, 
the Cyprus government coordinated its foreign policies closely 
with those of Athens and some Cypriot elements pressed for 
union with Greece-a totally unacceptable idea to Turkey, whose 
southern coast could then be threatened by a potentially hostile 
government in Athens. Finally, the Turkish population in Cyprus 
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was being persecuted in 1974 to the point where the situation was 
intolerable for the Turkish government, that is, it became a vital 
interest. 
The near-disaster for U.S. defense interests arose from the 
decision of Congress in 1975 to bar military aid to Turkey until it 
withdrew its troops from Cyprus-something Turkey flatly re-
fused to do. As a result, the Turkish government closed U.S. 
military facilities in that country, and the state of readiness of its 
armed forces deteriorated measurably in the absence of U.S. aid; 
not even spare parts for previously purchased equipment were 
made available. Other NATO allies, notably West Germany, 
stepped in partially to fill the assistance gap. Yet the Congression-
al ban on aid to Turkey constituted a far more significant blow to 
U.S. interests in the eastern Mediterranean than another con-
gressional prohibition on all aid to Angola which occurred the 
same year. In both cases, Congress prevailed in imposing its view 
of the national interest on the President. By 1979, with Iran 
eliminated as a strategic U.S. outpost on the Soviet border, Con-
gress changed its view and again voted for military assistance to 
Turkey. However, the amount of aid is still subject to sharp debate 
in Congress because the Greek government protests regularly 
that an imbalance is developing in its military readiness, given 
Turkey's growing strength. The issue of aid to Greece in 1983 was 
closely tied to that government's decision on whether to permit 
the continuation of four U.S. air and naval facilities in the country, 
and on what conditions. The United States felt a greater obliga-
tion to provide large-scale aid to Turkey in return for use of its 
strategic territory than it did to a leftist Greek government, whose 
declared policy was to terminate U.S. military operations on its 
soil. In the summer of 1983, however, Greece agreed to an exten-
sion of U.S. base rights for another five years. 
The Persian Gulf Region in U.S. National Interests 
The Persian Gulf, in my view, is not as important to U.S. 
national interests as the eastern Mediterranean; and it is clearly 
not as important as Western Europe. The declarations of Presi-
dent Jimmy Carter in 1980 and of President Ronald Reagan in 1981 
that the Persian Gulf is a vital area of interest to the United States 
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are open to serious challenge when the basis of that claim is 
assessed against the national interest framework. 
The U.S. interest arose originally during World War II when 
some 30,000 American troops were stationed in western Iran. 
Their purpose was to protect the Lend-Lease lifeline from the 
United States to the Soviet Union and thus to help the latter 
remain in the war against Nazi Germany. Similarly, the United 
States had forces stationed in Saudi Arabia to protect the Persian 
Gulf region against the Axis powers. A large airbase at Daharan 
was built by the U.S. Army as a communications link to British 
forces in India as well as U.S. forces in Iran. President Roosevelt 
met with King Ibn Saud in 1945, as part of his journey to the 
summit conference in Yalta with Prime Minister Churchill and 
Soviet Party Secretary Josef Stalin. After the war the United States 
established cordial relations with both the Saudi and the Iranian 
monarchies, and the Shah of Iran became one of the region's best 
friends to the U.S., remaining so until he was deposed in 1979. 
The United States was instrumental in saving the Shah's throne in 
1953 when it helped to oust Mossadegh from power after he 
declared Iran's intention to nationalize its oil resources. Iraq, the 
third important Persian Gulf state, was friendly with the United 
States until a violent revolution took place in 1958, overturning 
the monarchy in favor of a leftist government. The new regime 
was anti-American, and it established close relations with the 
Soviet Union. 
The Eisenhower administration believed that the Persian Gulf 
region was important to the United States as part of the world-
wide containment policy established by President Truman. 
Eisenhower and Dulles supported a British-sponsored Middle 
East defense arrangement called the Baghdad Pact, linking Tur-
key, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan with Britain and the United States in 
a security chain designed to enable them to resist Soviet political 
and military pressure. The United States never formally joined 
this pact because Secretary of State John Foster Dulles ascertained 
that he could not obtain Senate ratification of a treaty. Therefore, 
the United States accepted associate membership status and 
provided considerable military and economic assistance to the 
members, as well as political support to the pact's objectives. In 
1958, as a result of the revolution in Iraq and Baghdad's with-
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drawal from the pact, the organization changed its name to the 
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). It then continued to func-
tion into the 1970s, when it ceased to exist because of Pakistan's 
withdrawal and Turkey's disenchantment with U.S. policy. Syria 
and Egypt, however, formed an alliance and accepted arms from 
the Soviet Union. Iraq also accepted Soviet aid after 1958. CENTO 
therefore became the umbrella under which the United States 
provided military assistance to Iran and Pakistan-both of which 
continued to support U.S. containment objectives in the Middle 
East. Pakistan's unsuccessful war with India in 1971, during which 
Washington stopped military aid, caused its government to re-
view relations with the United States; it came to the conclusion 
that a military pact with Washington was no longer in its interest. 
It then withdrew from the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization as 
well as from CENTO. 
In sum, the military containment policy started in the Truman 
administration and broadened in the Eisenhower administration 
was not successful in uniting the Arab countries, Iran, and 
Pakistan into a bloc of Middle East states, actively working in 
concert to resist Soviet political influence. By 1979, when Iran 
underwent a revolution, the United States had lost the support of 
all the Asian members of the original Baghdad Pact-Iraq, Iran, 
Pakistan, and even Turkey. By any measurement, this repre-
sented a serious reversal of twenty-five years of American diplo-
macy in the Middle East. The decision of Iran's Revolutionary 
Government to hold fifty-two American diplomatic personnel as 
hostages for fifteen months in 1979 and 1980 was a dramatic 
demonstration that the United States had seriously miscalculated 
its ability to pursue ambitious policies in this area of the world, or 
even to protect its own citizens. It was the nadir for U.S. postwar 
policy in the Middle East. 
Current U.S. policy to defend the Persian Gulf region with 
U.S. forces is not based on any treaty commitments but rather on 
a declaration made by President Carter in his State of the Union 
address to Congress in January 1980, and reiterated by President 
Ronald Reagan early in 1981. The basis for Mr. Carter's astonish-
ing extension of U.S. vital interests into the Persian Gulf region 
was his fear that the Soviet Union, which had sent an invasion 
force into Afghanistan only three weeks earlier, was then posi-
tioning itself for military moves into Iran and Pakistan. "The 
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invasion of Afghanistan," the former President wrote in his 
memoirs, "was direct aggression by the Soviet armed forces 
against a freedom-loving people, whose leaders had been strug-
gling to retain a modicum of independence from their huge 
neighbor .... The brutality of the act was bad enough, but the 
threat of this Soviet invasion to the rest of the region was very 
clear-and had grim consequences. A successful take-over of 
Afghanistan would give the Soviets a deep penetration between 
Iran and Pakistan, and pose a threat to the rich oil fields of the 
Persian Gulf area and to the crucial waterways through which so 
much of the world's energy supplies had to pass." Mr. Carter 
recalled that "I sent Brezhnev on the hot line the sharpest mes-
sage of my Presidency, telling him that the invasion of 
Afghanistan was 'a clear threat to the peace' and could mark a 
fundamental and long-lasting turning point in our relations."9 
The bold statement on the Persian Gulf that President Carter 
included in his State of the Union message on January 23, 1980, 
read as follows: "Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt 
by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will 
be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States 
of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means 
necessary, including military force." The President explained 
later that "this statement was not lightly made, and I was resolved 
to use the full power of the United States to back it up ... The fact 
was that mine was a carefully considered statement, which would 
have been backed by concerted action, not necessarily confined to 
any small invaded area or to tactics or terrain of the Soviets' 
choosing. We simply could not afford to let them extend their 
domination to adjacent areas around the Persian Gulf which were 
so important to us and to other nations of the world."10 
The astonishing aspect of this declaration of U.S. willingness 
to engage in war in the Persian Gulf region was that it was not 
given sanction in any congressional resolution, such as the 
Tonkin Gulf Resolution which President Lyndon Johnson ob-
tained in August 1964 when he decided that American military 
force might have to be used in Southeast Asia. Indeed, there was 
widespread skepticism in the U.S. press and congressional cir-
9. Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (New York, 1982), 471-72. 
10. Ibid., 472. 
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des in 1980 that this so-called "Carter Doctrine" was an empty 
threat because the United States clearly did not have the military 
forces available to repel a Soviet attack on Iran, or any other 
country in the region. While it is true that the Carter administra-
tion proceeded immediately to strengthen the newly created 
Rapid Deployment Force for use in the Gulf area, it was obvious 
in 1980 that there was little the United States could do to repel a 
sustained Soviet military thrust into Iran if Moscow chose to take 
that course. The important fact is, however, that an American 
president for the first time declared that the Persian Gulf region is 
a vital interest of the United States and that it would be defended 
by American military forces. That declaration remains the official 
view of the U.S. Government, but it has not been approved by a 
specific act of Congress-which leaves open to doubt the U.S. 
national commitment to the Persian Gulf as a vital interest. 
In his annual report to Congress for fiscal year 1984 Secretary of 
Defense Caspar Weinberger, stated: "It is our policy to support 
the independence and territorial integrity of the countries in this 
politically unstable region, and to prevent a further spread of 
Soviet domination. Furthermore, one-third of the free world's oil 
supply is produced in SWA [Southwest Asia] making it vital to 
the interests of the U.S. and especially to those of our allies." The 
Secretary went on to describe the threats that he saw to U.S. 
interests: "The continuing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the 
Iran-Iraq war, and the lower level interregional disputes, such as 
those between North and South Yemen, exemplify the range of 
regional instabilities that complicate our policy and strat-
egy ... An overt Soviet invasion would of course represent a far 
more demanding requirement for a military response. Such an 
invasion would lead to the establishment of Soviet control in vital 
areas if the U.S., together with our allies and regional friends, 
were unprepared to respond rapidly with sufficient force."11 
An excellent short report issued by the Congressional Budget 
Office early in 1983, entitled Rapid Deployment Forces: Policy and 
Budgetary Implications, was more explicit as to why the Reagan 
administration was planning for a military force of 440,000 men 
for quick deployment to the Persian Gulf: "The configuration of 
11. Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1984 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983), 192. 
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this force is designed primarily to counter what the Administra-
tion believes is the most serious threat to Southwest Asia: a Soviet 
invasion of Iran. Inherent in this thinking is the belief that all 
contingencies of a lesser nature could be handled using only part 
of the larger RDF. Thus, if the United States could defeat a Soviet 
invasion of Iran, it could carry out the Carter Doctrine that com-
mits the United States to repel any outside attempt to gain control 
of another nation in the Persian Gulf region. "12 
The CBO study assessed the amount of oil flowing to the West 
from the Persian Gulf to be 20 percent, rather than the 33 percent 
used by the Secretary of Defense in his report to Congress, but 
agreed that "a successful invasion of Iran could cut off these oil 
supplies and exert severe economic pressures on the West." The 
study went on to question whether even an enlarged Rapid 
Deployment Force could stop a Soviet invasion of Iran, in view of 
the fact that no Middle Eastern country had thus far given the 
United States permission to use its territory as a staging area for 
the RDF. It also doubted that any Iranian government would 
welcome another U.S. military presence on its soil. The CBO 
study said the Soviets would have considerable difficulty trying 
to take over Iran and that a more likely scenario, if Moscow 
moved at all, would be "a limited attack to secure the northwest 
region of Iran. Such an action would be motivated by logistic 
concerns similar to those underlying the Soviets' aggression 
against Afghanistan." The report concluded that "a Soviet inva-
sion of Iran appears to most military analysts to be a highly 
implausible prospect. The Administration agrees that limited re-
gional conflicts or subversion are in fact far more likely. Yet it has 
decided that RDF sizing and planning should be based on the 
worst possible threat."13 
There are only two grounds on which the United States might 
have a vital interest in the Persian Gulf or Southwest Asia region: 
(1) to insure the continued flow of Persian Gulf oil to world 
markets, unimpeded either by outside interference in the region 
or by conflicts among states within it-such as the Iran-Iraq war: 
and (2) to prevent the Soviet Union from expanding its influence 
12. The Rapid Deployment Force and Budgetary implications (Washignton, D.C.: 
Congressional Budget Office, 1983), 11-12. 
13. Ibid., 14-15. 
126 Middle East 
or domination in the Middle East and challenging the world 
balance of power. The latter is the U.S. world-order interest, and 
the former is its economic well-being interest. Let us examine 
these two bases of a vital interest. 
A decade ago, in 1973, the Western world was confronted by an 
embargo of Persian Gulf oil by the Arab States. Europe, Japan, 
and the United States all suffered serious economic dislocations 
as a result-including a four-fold increase in the price of oil. Yet 
despite this clear threat to U.S. economic well-being, President 
Nixon decided that the U.S. economic interest was major, not 
vital, and concluded that the country could live with the con-
sequences of his decision even though the gas lines in the United 
States and the increased prices of energy were painful. The idea of 
using force, as some commentators proposed at the time, was not 
a wise course of action for many reasons, not least because the 
American public and Congress were in no mood to be involved 
militarily in the Persian Gulf six months after the last American 
forces had been withdrawn from Vietnam. Much has happened 
in the last ten years to make Persian Gulf oil less important to the 
economic well-being of the U.S. American dependence on this 
area's oil has declined significantly as Mexican and Alaskan oil 
has become available in significant quantities; as Britain has be-
come self-sufficient in oil; as energy consumption in the United 
States, Japan, and Western Europe has declined dramatically; and 
as alternative sources of energy have been developed. For exam-
ple, the U.S. import of Arab oil in the first quarter of 1983 was 60 
percent below what it had been a year earlier. In 1984 only 3 
percent of U.S. oil imports came from the Persian Gulf. In sum, 
the United States, Western Europe, and Japan had all cut their 
dependence on Persian Gulf oil dramatically, and in early 1983 
OPEC was forced to reduce oil prices. Saudi Arabia, in particular, 
decided to reduce its production from about ten million barrels a 
day in 1979 to about half that amount in 1983 in order to maintain 
the world price at $28 per barrel. 
By most standards, it cannot be argued effectively that the 
United States and Europe in 1984 are heavily dependent on 
Persian Gulf oil; therefore, oil from this region should not be 
viewed as a vital U.S. interest. Admittedly, Japan continues to be 
heavily dependent on Iranian oil, but Japan too is aware of the 
danger to its economy and is finding alternative sources of oil, as 
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well as developing its nuclear power capacity. Indonesia and 
Mexico are increasingly important as Japanese sources of oil. 
A second possible basis for declaring a U.S. vital interest in the 
Persian Gulf-the one that clearly motivated President Carter to 
make his January 1980 assertion-is potential Soviet encroach-
ment on its southern neighbors' territory and use of this strategic 
position to dominate the politics of the Persian Gulf and South-
west Asian states. The Soviet thirst for influence and control in 
the direction of the Indian Ocean goes back to Czarist times and 
was reaffirmed at the time of Stalin's pact with Hitler in 1939, 
when the two countries divided Poland and sought to carve out 
spheres of influence. The Shah's Iran and the British Navy effec-
tively checked this Soviet ambition after World War II, but the fall 
of the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran in 1979, the power vacuum left in the 
Indian Ocean by the British military withdrawal east of Suez in 
1971, and the perceived weakness of the Carter administration in 
dealing with the political situation in Iran may have led the 
Kremlin to conclude that it could safely undermine the govern-
ment of Afghanistan, make that country another client state, and 
position itself for a strike into Iran when the opportunity arose. 
The Soviet desire, or interest, to extend its influence southward 
toward the Indian Ocean is not questioned by most experts on the 
Soviet Union; what is in dispute is what risks Moscow is willing to 
take, how strongly the small Persian Gulf states would resist 
Soviet pressures, and whether it is a U.S. vital interest-entailing 
the potential use of force-to prevent the Soviet Union from 
increasing its influence in this region. In short, has the con-
tainment of Soviet influence outside Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi 
Arabia become so important to the United States that the Presi-
dent should ask Congress for authorization to engage in warfare 
with the Soviet Union? This question is particularly pertinent 
when nearly all experts agree that such a war could not be fought 
in Iran, or elsewhere in the region, without diverting U.S. troops 
and aircraft from the European theater and depriving NATO of 
U.S. reinforcements in time of crisis.l4 
The near-term issue in the Persian Gulf, insofar as U.S. inter-
ests are concerned, is Iran. In the longer term, the issue is Saudi 
14. Ibid., ch. 3, "The Effects of an RDF Mobilization on the U.S. Commitment 
to NATO." 
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Arabia. Both have large oil reserves and both are capable of larger 
production. Both would like to exercise the primary influence 
among other Persian Gulf states, and both consider the Soviet 
Union to be an undesirable influence in the region. However, the 
Saudi government has been, and remains, friendly to the United 
States and to Western involvement in the security of the region. 
The revolutionary government instituted by the Ayatollah Kho-
meini in Iran after his elevation to power in 1979 is adamantly 
opposed to both Western and Soviet influence. It is hard to 
imagine that the American people and Congress would accept 
Iran as a vital or even major American interest in the foreseeable 
future, after the humiliation the Ayatollah's regime inflicted on 
American diplomats in 1979-80 and its unremitting propaganda 
blasts against "the Great Satan." Therefore, if the U.S. Defense 
Department believes that Iran is a strategically vital interest, this 
view must be weighed against the fact that Iran is hostile to the 
United States and that the American people would not be pre-
pared to protect Iran in case the Soviet Union decided to invade or 
subvert it. In sum, Iran like Iraq (after it changed governments in 
1958 and turned against the West) is not likely to gain the support 
of any Western country if it asks for help to resist Soviet intimida-
tion or a Soviet-sponsored insurgency designed to topple the 
revolutionary regime. Most Americans would more likely say 
that Iran and the U.S.S.R. deserve each other. 
Saudi Arabia is a different case, a country that has shared U.S. 
interests in the region since World War II and which could seri-
ously affect the West's economic well-being if it succumbed to 
Soviet or Iranian influence, or to the accession to power of a 
deeply nationalist, anti-Western government. Yet the Saudi gov-
ernment today is unwilling to have U.S. forces stationed on its 
soil, and it refuses to make peace with Israel until the latter agrees 
to provide the Palestinian people with a homeland. Although 
Saudi Arabia is certainly important to the United States, it is 
difficult to make the case that Saudi Arabia is so crucial, either for 
economic or world-order reasons, that U.S. troops should be 
used to defend it-particularly if the Saudis do not want U.S. 
military facilities on their soil. In my view, the only scenario that 
would justify treating Saudi Arabia as a vital interest would be an 
attack on it by the Soviet Union, either from the north through 
Iraq or from the east through Iran. U.S. military action would 
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Fig. ll. U.S. National Interests in the Persian Gulf 
Basic Interest at Stake Intensity of Interest 
Survival Vital Major 
Defense of Homeland Saudi Arabia 
Economic Well-Being Saudi Arabia 
Favorable World Order Saudi Arabia Iran 
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have to be contingent on the Saudi government's willingness to 
grant the United States the bases necessary to handle Air Force 
planes and the logistical facilities necessary to support the Rapid 
Deployment Force. Under no circumstances should the United 
States use its forces to intervene in a Saudi civil war, or a threat-
ened coup d'etat. 
The level of U.S. interest in the Persian Gulf may be sum-
marized as shown on the interest matrix in Figure 11. It is assumed 
here that the promotion of values interest does not include trying 
to institute Western-type governments or Christian values in the 
Muslim countries, and that guaranteeing individual freedoms is 
not a primary objective of U.S. foreign policy in this area. The 
U.S. economic interest is major because of oil; its world-order 
interest is vital only in the case of Saudi Arabia because of that 
country's central location and great influence on other Persian 
Gulf states. 
Summing Up 
The United States has had a vital world-order interest in the 
Mediterranean area since 1947 when President Truman, with 
congressional support, declared that Greece and Turkey were 
vital U.S. interests. Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Israel 
became a vital interest because of its military power and the 
growing ideological interest of the American people in Israel's 
security. Egypt became a vital U.S. interest when President An-
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war Sadat reversed Egyptian policies in the 1970s by ousting 
Soviet military advisers, by making peace with Israel, and by 
linking Egypt's defense efforts with those of the United States. 
Even though his successor, President Mubarak, has not agreed to 
the permanent stationing of U.S. forces in his country, military 
cooperation between Egypt and the United States is growing, and 
Egypt has shown through joint military exercises that it would be 
allied to the United States in time of war. President Reagan's 
decision to send U.S. Marines to Beirut as peacekeepers in 1982 
suggested that Lebanon might be added to the list of eastern 
Mediterranean states that are vital world-order interests of the 
United States, but this was denied in February 1984 by U.S. 
reluctance to become more involved in that country's in-
ternal problems and President Reagan's decision to withdraw the 
Marines. 
Conversely, there is no country in the Persian Gulf region, or 
in Southwest Asia, that can realistically be considered a vital U.S. 
interest even though two Presidents have said that region is vital. 
The possible exception is Saudi Arabia, whose oil reserves remain 
sufficiently important to the Western world and whose govern-
ment is so cooperative that the United States probably could not 
tolerate letting it come under Soviet influence through intimida-
tion or armed conflict. Neither Iran nor Pakistan can today be 
viewed as a vital U.S. interest, but Pakistan does qualify as a high 
major interest in terms of world-order. The United States would 
be justified in using economic and military assistance and a 
modest amount of covert actions to support its interests in the 
Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf area; but it would be unwise to 
acquire military bases there or contemplate using U.S. forces to 
defend any country in that region-except Saudi Arabia-if the 
Soviet Union makes additional military moves similar to its 1979 
action in Afghanistan. The United States has no interest in Iran 
that would warrant the use of American forces there. 
In the longer term, as part of a general accommodation of U.S. 
and Soviet interests in the Middle East and a reduction of military 
threats and tensions, the United States, Western Europe, and 
Japan may be forced into a situation where they will have to settle 
for a division of Iran into spheres of influence. Such accommoda-
tion would acknowledge that the Soviet Union has a key political 
role in northern Iran, with which it shares a long border, while 
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the United States, Europe, and Japan have large interests in the 
southwestern part. A political division of responsibility in Iran 
occurred during World War II when the Soviet Union, the United 
States, and Britain were allied against Nazi Germany. Although it 
is doubtful that any American President or Congress could for-
mally agree to such an understanding in the 1980s, it is con-
ceivable that a tacit arrangement could be reached in the future to 
prevent Iran from becoming the trigger for a war between the 
United States and the Soviet Union-one which could spread to 
Europe and North America. If neither the United States nor the 
Soviet Union has an interest in controlling all of Iran, a deal to 
neutralize or occupy it might be a logical alternative to war be-
tween the superpowers. 
6. East Asia: Area of 
American Ambivalence 
The Far East, as it was officially known until the 1960s, was an 
important economic area for the United States before World War 
II but was never considered a vital interest. This was so even after 
the United States gained control of the Philippines, following the 
Spanish-American War, and established military bases there. 
Acquiring these islands gave the United States a major stake in 
what happened in the western Pacific, but it did not imply that the 
United States was prepared to take a leading role in the interna-
tional relations of Northeast Asia (Japan, Korea, Soviet Union) or 
in Southeast Asia which, with the exception of Thailand, was 
under the colonial control of the British, French, and Dutch. The 
Open Door policy toward China never signaled more than a 
major U.S. interest in that country. 
Japan's rise as a major power during the early part of the 
twentieth century was not seen by U.S. policy-makers as a serious 
threat to U.S. interests in the western Pacific so long as Imperial 
Japan confined its ambitions to Northeast Asia and to China. 
Consequently, Washington acquiesced in Japan's invasions of 
China in 1931 and 1937 and its occupation of French-controlled 
North Vietnam in 1940. Even though the United States carried on 
extensive trade in China before the war, American policy-makers 
did not view China as a vital interest and were not prepared 
during the 1930s to challenge Japan's drive to control the whole of 
mainland China. After Hitler's armies attacked the Soviet Union 
in June 1941, Japan took advantage of Russia's preoccupation to 
invade South Vietnam and Cambodia (then part of French Indo-
china) and impose its own control. Only then, in July 1941, did 
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President Franklin Roosevelt heed British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill's warning that the Japanese were preparing to 
attack southward into Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East 
Indies. 1 
President Roosevelt's decision in July 1941 to freeze Japanese 
assets in the United States and ban oil shipments was a frontal 
challenge to the Japanese government and signaled that U.S. 
world-order interests in East Asia had risen from the major to the 
vital level. This sudden action struck at the vital economic inter-
ests of Japan: it could not continue its military buildup in Asia 
without oil from the United States, and it could not achieve its 
dream of a Japanese-dominated Southeast Asia if the U.S. Navy 
were used to block its movement southward. In the fall of 1941, 
therefore, Japan had a choice between accommodation with the 
new U.S. vital interest in Southeast Asia or war with the United 
States. If Tokyo chose the latter course, it needed quickly to seize 
control of the oil fields of Sumatra and protect the sea-lanes from 
there to Japan. The United States was the only power that stood in 
the way of Imperial Japan's reaching its goal of dominant power in 
East Asia, because all the European powers with interests in Asia 
(Britain, France, the U.S.S.R., the Netherlands) were by then 
absorbed in the European war. 
It is clear from a comparison of U.S. and Japanese interests in 
the fall of 1941 that Japan's were of higher intensity than those of 
the United States and that Tokyo might therefore start hostilities 
at any time. The Roosevelt administration was aware after July 
1941 that the two countries were on a collision course and that war 
probably would ensue. Having broken Japan's secret codes, the 
U.S. government expected the Japanese Navy to attack some-
where in the Pacific, the Philippines being considered the most 
likely place. It may have been a surprise that the attack was on 
Hawaii, but Japan's decision to go to war was not. Roosevelt, 
deciding that vital U.S. interests were at stake, gave the Imperial 
Government its choice: to capitulate to U.S. demands that it 
withdraw from Indochina and stop the invasion of China, or to go 
to war. 
1. The Netherlands, the colonial power in the Dutch East Indies, and France, 
which controlled the three Indochina states, were defeated and occupied by 
Hitler's armies in the spring of 1940. Britain continued to resist Hitler's attacks and 
retained control of Malaya, Singapore, and North Borneo until December 1941. 
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U.S. world-order interests in East Asia moved from the major 
to the vital level in 1941 for balance-of-power reasons--not eco-
nomic, ideological, or even defense-of-homeland reasons. The 
United States could not tolerate having all of East Asia and the 
western Pacific being controlled by one great power, just as it 
could not tolerate a similar situation in Europe. The Japanese 
declaration of war on the United States on December 7, 1941, 
solved a potentially serious dilemma for Roosevelt on two con-
tinents: Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor mobilized American public 
opinion to defeat its ambitions in Asia, and Japan's declaration of 
war caused Hitler's Germany to declare war on the United States a 
few days later. The United States was suddenly a united country 
in the struggle against both Axis powers. 
After World War II and the defeat of Japan, the United States 
again decided that it had no vital interests at stake on the main-
land of East Asia. Even though strong political forces in the 
country and in Congress thought the United States should have a 
vital interest in preventing the Chinese Communists from win-
ning their revolution and establishing a Marxist-Leninist regime 
in China, President Harry Truman decided early in his tenure 
that the United States had only a major interest in the outcome of 
the Chinese civil war. He therefore put a ceiling on the amount of 
military assistance he would grant to the Nationalist government, 
and he ruled out using U.S. military forces in an attempt to 
influence the outcome of the war. Similarly, Truman decided to 
withdraw U.S. military occupation forces from South Korea in 
1949, as part of an effort to defuse tensions on that peninsula. This 
was done because the Truman administration did not believe that 
U.S. vital interests were involved in Korea and because U.S. 
forces worldwide were stretched too thin. In Southeast Asia, 
although the United States could have played an important se-
curity role there after World War II, the U.S. Government decided 
that only peripheral U.S. interests were at stake and that the 
British, French, and Dutch should provide security in that region. 
Had Franklin Roosevelt lived, there is a strong likelihood that he 
might have opposed the return of French and Dutch colonial rule 
to Indochina and the East Indies, respectively; but Truman, who 
assumed office in April 1945, believed U.S. interests in Europe 
were far more important than those in the Far East, and he 
therefore limited the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia to the 
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Philippines. Independence was given to the Philippine people in 
1946, as scheduled, and the United States concluded a defense 
treaty that gave it the right to maintain military bases and large 
military forces in the country. The Philippines, for historical and 
strategic reasons, was reestablished as a vital world-order interest 
of the United States in 1946 and has remained so ever since. 
Australia and New Zealand, which had been protected by the 
United States during World War II and contributed enormously 
in manpower to the Allied war effort, remained a vital world-
order interest of the United States after 1945. This was confirmed 
by conclusion of the ANZUS Pact in 1951. Japan was an occupied 
country after August 1945, under the complete dominance of the 
United States, which set about to remake Japanese society. It 
eventually became a vital interest of the United States for three 
reasons: economic well-being of the United States, balance of 
power in Asia, and promotion of democratic values and govern-
ment in Asia. 
In sum, from 1945 to 1950, U.S. interests in East Asia remained 
at the major level except for the island chain off the mainland: 
Japan, Okinawa (later returned to Japan), the Philippines, Aus-
tralia, and New Zealand. The United States also administered, 
under United Nations supervision, the Pacific Trust Territories, 
groups of former Japanese-controlled islands in the western Pacif-
ic. This large area of the Pacific was assigned to the United States 
as a strategic trust. The United States has maintained military 
facilities there since World War II, and the Pacific islands remain a 
vital world-order interest of this country today. 
Truman's Shift in View of U.S. National Interests 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson, with President Truman's 
endorsement, gave a major speech at the National Press Club in 
Washington on January 12, 1950, in which he laid out his assess-
ment of U.S. interests in East Asia. This was delivered in a highly 
charged political atmosphere, due to the fact that the Communist 
Party of China had established a new government there only 
three months earlier and General Chiang Kai-shek had fled with 
his remaining Nationalist forces to Formosa (Taiwan). Congres-
sional Republicans had mounted a vigorous campaign around 
the theme of "Who lost China?" and called for Acheson's resigna-
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tion. In the Press Club address, Acheson defended the admin-
istration's decision to end U.S. support of Chiang's corrupt re-
gime, and he asserted a limited view of U.S. vital security 
interests in the Western Pacific. In his memoirs Acheson relates 
why he made this controversial speech: "Its purpose was to bring 
home what the United States Government had done to defend 
vital interests in the Pacific, not to speculate on what it would do 
in the event of various exigencies in Asia. Our defense stations 
beyond the western hemisphere and our island possessions were 
the Philippines and the defeated, disarmed and occupied Japan. 
These were our inescapable responsibilities. We had moved our 
line of defense, a line fortified and manned by our own ground, 
sea, and air forces, to the very edges of the Western Pacific." 
Acheson pointed out that General Douglas MacArthur had stated 
a year earlier in Tokyo that the U.S. defense line in the Pacific 
started in the Philippines and continued through the Ryukyu 
Archipelago and then bent back to include Japan and the Aleutian 
Island chain to Alaska. Acheson asserted that his defense line 
followed MacArthur's but went from northeast to southwest: 
"This defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and 
then goes to the Ryukyus .... The defensive perimeter runs 
from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands."2 Acheson was at-
tacked later by Republican critics who held him responsible for 
signaling to North Korea that his defense line did not include 
South Korea. 
Two events that occurred during the first six months of 1950 
shattered Acheson and Truman's view of U.S. security interests 
in Asia and forced them to extend the U.S. vital interest line to 
include South Korea: the Sino-Soviet Defense Treaty of February 
14, 1950, and North Korea's attack on South Korea on June 24, 
1950. These actions sharply altered the U.S. government's percep-
tion of its interests in East Asia and led to the U.S. military 
intervention in Korea in 1950 and in Vietnam fifteen years later. In 
both cases the United States intervened in civil wars on the Asian 
mainland in the belief that the "Sino-Soviet Bloc" was determined 
to accomplish what Japan had been prevented from achieving in 
World War II: the political domination of all of East Asia. The 
historical and political differences between the Soviet Union and 
2. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York, 1969), 356-57. 
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Communist China were not taken seriously by American policy-
makers in 1950, or in 1965; what mattered was that after the Sino-
Soviet Pact of February 1950, the United States under both Demo-
cratic and Republican presidents concluded that Moscow and 
Peking were acting in tandem in the Far East and that U.S. world-
order interests were threatened just as severely in 1950 and 1965 
by the Communist powers as they had been in 1941 by Imperial 
Japan. It was no longer sufficien~, U.S. policy-makers concluded, 
for the United States to base its Pacific defense on the offshore 
islands along the periphery of the Asian mainland. In view of the 
Communist threat, President Truman concluded that it was im-
perative for the United States to make defense agreements with 
Chiang Kai-shek's government in Taiwan, with the South Korean 
government of Syngman Rhee, and with the military government 
of Thailand to contain the expansionist power of China and the 
Soviet Union. It was also necessary, after June 1950, for the United 
States to reverse its hands-off policy toward French colonialism in 
Indochina and give the French the necessary military and eco-
nomic aid to participate in this containment effort in Asia. Britain 
was already fighting a Communist insurgency in Malaya and 
could be counted on to endorse the containment policy, but few 
Asian countries were interested in an Asian anti-Communist 
pact. Indonesia, the largest East Asian country after China, had 
achieved independence from Holland in 1949 and was opposed to 
joining either of the great power blocs. President Sukarno instead 
joined with India's Nehru in forming the nonaligned group of 
nations. Burma too followed a nonaligned course. In short, every-
thing changed in 1950 in the U.S. perception of the stakes in East 
Asia when North Korea with Soviet support attacked South 
Korea and China entered that war a few months later. The realiza-
tion in Washington that Japan would be severely threatened by 
Sino-Soviet domination of the Korean Peninsula caused President 
Truman to conclude that Korea as well as Japan was a vital world-
order interest. Therefore, he immediately dispatched U.S. troops 
to defend this expanded interest, and U.S. forces have remained 
in South Korea ever since. Truman took special care, however, to 
insure that U.S. military moves were part of a United Nations 
effort, not a unilateral American intervention. 
In Indochina, the U.S. interest escalated from a peripheral one 
prior to 1950 into a major one as a result of China's and the Soviet 
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Union's support of Vietnamese Communist forces led by Ho Chi 
Minh. In 1954, when France was on the verge of abandoning its 
position in Indochina, President Eisenhower made an agonizing 
decision about whether to support French forces with American 
air power, and possibly ground forces as well; he decided against 
it-despite strong recommendations from Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles and Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. In effect, Eisenhower concluded that although 
preventing a Communist takeover in Indochina was a major U.S. 
concern, it was not a vital one and did not therefore warrant the 
use of American military force. He believed that a Communist 
victory over French forces would be painful but not intolerable for 
the United States, and he therefore instructed Secretary Dulles to 
seek a negotiated settlement of the conflict. This resulted in the 
Geneva Accords of 1954, which divided Vietnam into two admin-
istrative parts: the North controlled by the Viet Minh Commu-
nists, and the South controlled by non-Communist political 
groups which eventually supported a government headed by 
Ngo Dinh Diem. Laos and Cambodia were given independence 
and were to remain unaligned. 
The Vietnam War and U.S. Interests 
In 1961, when John F. Kennedy became President, the security 
situation in Laos and South Vietnam was deteriorating. The new 
President had to decide whether the U.S. interest should remain 
at the major level, meaning economic and military aid only, or 
whether a Communist takeover of South Vietnam and probably 
Laos and Cambodia would be an intolerable blow to U.S. world-
order interests and thus require stronger action. After about six 
months of intensive debate within his administration, President 
Kennedy and his National Security Council decided late in 1961 
that the U.S. interest in preventing a Communist takeover of 
South Vietnam was a vital one and that American combat forces 
should be used, if necessary, to defend South Vietnam if its 
government proved incapable of doing so. From 1962 until 1965, 
the U.S. military involvement in Vietnam rose steadily, with 
helicopter crews, Green Beret units, and thousands of military 
advisers being sent there. 
When Lyndon Johnson became President in November 1963, 
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the security situation in South Vietnam was nearly hopeless. In 
August 1964, he asked Congress for a joint declaration, known as 
the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which declared that the defense of 
Southeast Asia against Communist aggression was a vital interest 
of the United States and would warrant the use of U.S. forces. 
This resolution, which gave what critics later called a "blank 
check" to the President to use U.S. forces in Vietnam, was passed 
by overwhelming majorities in both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives. After Mr. Johnson's landslide election victory in 
November 1964, he had the choice of deciding whether to accept 
President Kennedy's view that Vietnam was vital, or reverse the 
1961 decision and go back to Dwight Eisenhower's view that 
Indochina constituted only a major interest. Lyndon Johnson, 
who had urged President Kennedy in 1961 to take a military stand 
in Vietnam, predictably decided not only to increase the U.S. 
commitment, but to do so massively in the expectation that the 
Hanoi government would recognize that it could not win a war in 
South Vietnam and would then negotiate a permanent division of 
the country into two sovereign states. When extensive aerial 
bombing of North Vietnam early in 1965 did not achieve this 
result, President Johnson sent a large number of Army, Navy, and 
Air Force units to Vietnam, which eventually numbered more 
than half a million men. When even this massive use of U.S. 
power did not cause North Vietnam to end its intervention in 
South Vietnam, President Johnson decided in March 1968 to 
deescalate the war and seek a negotiated settlement. In effect, the 
President decided that "winning" in Vietnam was not a vital U.S. 
interest after all, and that the U.S. military force there should be 
reduced. It was left to his successor, Richard Nixon, who took 
office in January 1969, to find a way to extricate the United States 
from a dangerous overcommitment of arms and prestige in 
Southeast Asia. In 1973 a negotiated settlement was finally ar-
ranged whereby all U.S. military forces were removed from Viet-
nam. Two years later the North launched a final, massive attack 
and took over South Vietnam. 
Historians and pundits will argue for many years about 
whether the United States should ever have been involved in the 
armed struggle for Vietnam and, if it had vital interests there, 
why it did not invade the North and win a military victory. In my 
view, the United States had a vital interest in preventing Soviet 
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and Chinese influence from taking over all of the area known as 
Southeast Asia, but it did not have a vital interest-at least not one 
requiring the deployment of half a million U.S. combat forces-in 
protecting the government of South Vietnam if the latter could 
not deal effectively with the VietCong insurgency by using U.S. 
aid. In 1963, President Kennedy realized that the South Viet-
namese government was incapable of winning a victory over the 
Viet Cong, and he decided to replace the Diem government with 
what proved to be a series of military rulers-none of whom 
could command the full loyalty of the South Vietnamese people. 
The fateful decision about U.S. intervention was made by Presi-
dent Lyndon Johnson in the summer of 1965, and it soon became 
clear that the American public and Congress would not support a 
long war, particularly if it entailed high casualties. After three 
years of ever increasing U.S. involvement, the President decided 
to negotiate. In effect, what the Johnson administration had 
found intolerable in 1965 became more tolerable by 1968. 
If the U.S. interest in Southeast Asia was a vital one in 1965, the 
disaster that befell U.S. policy in Vietnam must be balanced 
against what occurred in the rest of Southeast Asia at that time, 
particularly in Thailand (which had joined with the United States 
in the Manila Pact of September 1954), in Indonesia, and in Ma-
laysia/Singapore. In retrospect, it may be concluded that unless 
the United States had made some kind of stand against Commu-
nist-supported revolutions in the area~ Indonesia under Presi-
dent Sukarno's tutelage probably would have become a Commu-
nist-dominated state in the autumn of 1965. That is when the PKI 
(Indonesian Communist Party) staged a revolt against the army 
and came close to taking over the government with Sukarno's 
approval. However, the army rallied, after most of its top com-
mand had been murdered, under the direction of a senior officer, 
General Suharto. It was important to the future direction of this 
army-led government that the-United States was seen as prepared 
to resist the southward thrust of Asian Communism into South-
east Asia. Earlier, in 1963-64, British, Australian, and New Zea-
land forces might not have been willing to prevent Sukarno from 
taking over Malaysia had the Commonwealth governments be-
lieved that the United States would restrict its vital interests to the 
Philippines and permit areas to the west to be subdued by pro-
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Communist forces. Similarly, the history of Thailand in playing 
off the colonial powers in the nineteenth century and accom-
modating to Japan during World War II suggests that had the 
country's rulers concluded in 1964-65 that Communism was the 
wave of the future, they would have reached an accommodation 
with Hanoi and Peking. 
What is suggested here is that while the Johnson Administra-
tion may have believed the U.S. had a vital interest in preventing 
the Communization of Southeast Asia-as it did in 1941 in pre-
venting "Japanization" -this did not necessarily mean engaging 
in a large and risky U.S. military effort to "save" South Vietnam. 
As in 1954, when Dwight Eisenhower decided that negotiation 
rather than intervention was the wiser course for the United 
States in Indochina, so in 1963 or 1964 John Kennedy or Lyndon 
Johnson might have decided that negotiations with Hanoi were 
desirable. Even if that had meant allowing South Vietnam even-
tually to fall under Hanoi's control, there was still a possibility in 
1964-65 of negotiating an agreement that Laos and Cambodia 
would remain neutral, independent buffer states not under 
Hanoi's control. Historically, their role had been that of a buffer 
between Vietnam and Thailand. By risking U.S. power and pres-
tige in a vain effort to save South Vietnam without invading the 
North, the Johnson administration not only failed to prevent the 
Communization of South Vietnam but also opened the way for 
Hanoi to extend its control over Laos amd Cambodia. American 
prestige and credibility in Asia have improved somewhat from 
the low point of 1975, but it would be unwise for an American 
President again to send U.S. troops to any country in that area to 
help it resist a Communist insurgency. Southeast Asia remains a 
major U.S. world-order interest, not a vital one. 
U.S. Interests in East Asia and the Western Pacific 
The countries in the East Asian and Pacific area that are most 
important to the United States are Japan, South Korea, China 
(including Taiwan), the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, 
Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, and-stretching the area a bit-
India. The key question is which of these are vital U.S. interests in 
the 1980s, and for what reasons. To distinguish U.S. interests in 
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this great arc of nations, three sub-areas are used in the matrix in 
Figure 12.3 The importance of these areas and countries to the 
United States is heavily influenced by their economic and military 
relationships with Washington and their capacity for influencing 
a favorable world-order in the East Asian and Pacific areas. Each 
country is briefly discussed here. 
Japan. Japan is the most important U.S. national interest in Asia, 
and it will undoubtedly remain so for the indefinite future. In 
defense-of-homeland terms, Japan constitutes a major U.S. inter-
est because of its proximity to Alaska and Canada and because the 
Japanese Self-Defense Force is closely tied to the United States 
through military purchase arrangements and through joint intel-
ligence and training operations. Similarly, as the third most 
powerful economy in the world and growing rapidly, Japan is the 
second largest trading partner of this country (after Canada) and 
thus a high major U.S. economic interest. It is not at the vital 
economic level, however, because a severe drop in U.S.-Japanese 
trade would not be a shattering blow to the American economy. 
For Japan, however, the U.S. market is a vital economic interest 
because its loss would probably cripple the Japanese economic 
system. In ideological terms (promotion of values), Japan is the 
only truly democratic country in East Asia today (not including 
Australia and New Zealand), and the United States therefore has 
a major stake in helping Japan to reinforce the free institutions 
that Washington imposed upon it after 1945. 
It is in the world-order category, however, that Japan assumes a 
truly vital interest for the United States. This is because Japan 
exercises great political and economic influence on all the coun-
tries of East Asia, and because it has the potential of exercising a 
large security influence in the western Pacific and the South 
China Sea in the future. Like Australia, Japan has the capacity to 
be a full alliance partner of the United States, one that can contrib-
ute to the economic and political security of Asia as well as 
provide the United States with military facilities. No other Asian 
3. For purposes of identifying countries on the matrix, N.E. Asia includes 
Japan and South Korea; S. W. Pacific includes the Philippines, Australia, and New 
Zealand; S.E. Asia includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. China 
is a separate entity. India, also discussed in this chapter, is not considered part of 
East Asia. 
East Asia 143 
Fig. 12. U.S. National Interests in East Asia and the Pacific 
Basic Interest at Stake Intensity of Interest 
Survival Vital Major Peripheral 
Defense of Homeland N.E. Asia S.E. Asia 
S. W. Pacific 
China 
Economic Well-Being N.E. Asia S. W. Pacific 
S.E. Asia 
China 
Favorable World Order N.E. Asia S.E. Asia 
S. W. Pacific China 
Promotion of Values S. W. Pacific N.E. Asia S.E. Asia 
China 
country, with the possible exception of China, currently has that 
capability. 
The problem in U.S. relations with Japan lies not in defining 
U.S. interests but in persuading Japan that it must contribute 
more to the mutual security of the East Asian region. Washington 
has sought for a decade to persuade Japan that it should accept a 
defense role commensurate with its economic capability and that 
it must, after thirty years of protecting domestic industries, open 
up the home market to U.S. products as the U.S. market is open 
to Japanese goods. The rise to power in 1982 of Takeo Nakasone as 
Japan's prime minister signaled some modest expansion in Jap-
an's defense forces and policies, permitting the Japanese Navy 
and Air Force eventually to patrol to a distance of 1,000 miles from 
the homeland. Japan will also spend somewhat more on its 
defense forces, but projections show that total defense outlays 
will be only about 1 percent of Japan's GNP, compared with about 
7 percent for the United States. In 1983 the Reagan administration 
finally convinced Japanese leaders that Japan cannot only be 
concerned about defense of its homeland and economic well-
being, but must also be prepared to defend a world-order interest 
in East Asia, to an extent commensurate with Japan's economic 
capabilities. Acceptance of an expanded world-order role by 
Japan will be a gradual process because many Asian countries 
remember the results of an Imperial Japanese thrust into China 
and Southeast Asia in the 1930s and 1940s and want no repetition 
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now. European countries, which have similar suspicions of a 
resurgent Germany, long ago agreed to permit a large German 
army and air force to be established and recently agreed to an 
enlarged patrolling function for the German Navy in the Atlantic. 
It will be a challenge to U.S. diplomacy to convince China, South 
Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia that they must 
recognize the Japanese contribution to the security of East Asia, 
and that the United States will not continue to fill this role uni-
laterally. 
The economic problem for Japan is that its government must 
find ways to constrain successful Japanese businesses and indus-
tries, which have penetrated the American market in a large way 
and are not concerned about unemployment in the American 
auto, electronic, and other industries. As the U.S. recession deep-
ened in the early 1980s and large numbers of U.S. auto and steel 
workers were laid off, the Reagan administration applied consid-
erable pressure on Tokyo both to limit the number of cars ex-
ported to the United States and to open Japanese markets to more 
American products, particularly agricultural ones. The U.S. trade 
imbalance in Japan's favor, projected at $24 billion in 1983, became 
a source of controversy in Congress and in American business 
circles. Several Democratic presidential aspirants began to speak 
of permanent import quotas. Japan reluctantly agreed to limit its 
export of cars to 1.6 million per year, in order to help U.S. car 
manufacturers recover from the recession and bring out competi-
tive small cars. But in June 1983, the Japanese government an-
nounced that it would not renew this auto export limitation agree-
ment when it expired in 1984. This caused further agitation in 
Congress for restrictions on Japanese auto imports, with the most 
serious proposal being that cars sold in the United States must 
contain a certain percentage of parts made in the United States 
(domestic content). Protectionism was clearly on the rise in the 
United States in 1983, and it was questionable whether the re-
cesson's end would reduce the pressure from industries such as 
auto and steel for protection against "unfair" Japanese business 
practices. 
The argument is made by some American political leaders and 
scholars that since Japan is a vital world-order interest of the 
United States, this country should not pressure the Japanese 
government to show restraint in its export/import policies with 
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the United States because the current huge trade imbalance will 
work itself out as American technology catches up with Japan in 
cars, steel, and electronics, and as American labor costs moderate 
following the recession of the early 1980s. Some argue that as 
Japan expands its defense forces, this effort will absorb the ener-
gies of many Japanese manufacturers and lessen their penetra-
tion of the U.S. market. The opposite view is that as Japan 
expands its armaments industry, it will compete more ag-
gressively with American aircraft manufacturers and the U.S. 
computer industry-both of which held a lead over Japanese 
firms during the 1970s and early 1980s. 
Judging by the intensity of feeling in the U.S. auto industry 
and auto unions, it is probably inevitable that some form of 
protectionist legislation will emerge from Congress, making it 
more difficult for Japan to export cars and other industrial prod-
ucts to the United States-unless it opens more plants in the 
United States and employs American labor. However, President 
Reagan stated in 1983 that he would veto domestic content legisla-
tion if Congress passed it. I believe that although Japan remains a 
vital world-order interest of the United States, U.S. leaders have 
valid reasons to insist on "fairness in trade" and make openness 
to the U.S. market conditional on reciprocal opportunities for 
American exporters to sell their products in Japan-without the 
multitude of restrictions that have blocked such expanded trade 
for many years. Japan needs to behave like a responsible great 
economic power and to give up much of the protectionism that it 
has practiced since its economic recovery in the 1960s. President 
Reagan's announcement on July 5, 1983, that the United States 
would impose restrictions on high-quality steel into the United 
States from Europe, Japan, and Canada was further evidence that 
domestic pressures were having their effect, despite the admin-
istration's general commitment to free trade, and that economic 
relations with Japan will continue to be strained. 
Philippines. The Philippines, like Japan, is a vital U.S. interest 
for world-order reasons. This interest has historical roots for the 
United States, going baack to the turn of the twentieth century 
when President McKinley decided to annex the Philippines. The 
Philippines is also a major defense-of-homeland interest because 
it is the westernmost outpost of U.S. naval and air power in the 
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Pacific. The Naval Base at Subic Bay and the Air Force Base at Clark 
Field are among the most important U.S. bases in the world, and 
their loss would be a serious detriment to U.S. ability to project 
power not only in the Pacific but also in the increasingly impor-
tant Indian Ocean area. This fact was underlined in the spring of 
1983 when the Reagan administration agreed to a substantial 
increase in U.S. military and economic assistance to the Philip-
pine government as part of a new base agreement. 
The United States also has a major ideological stake in the 
Philippines because it brought that country to independence in 
1946 after a long period of educating its people in democratic 
institutions. By the late 1960s, however, Philippine democracy 
was fraught with so much corruption and tampering with the 
electoral process that President Ferdinand Marcos suspended the 
constitution in 1971 and remained in power, creating what his 
critics charged was corrupt authoritarian rule. During the Carter 
administration, the U.S. government publicly criticized the Mar-
cos administration for a poor human rights record, but it kept this 
criticism within bounds in order not to jeopardize the vital U.S. 
military bases. The Reagan administration muted public criticism 
of the Marcos government, preferring to make its comments 
about the lack of democracy in private. However, President Rea-
gan's decision in October 1983 to postpone a state visit to the 
Philippines following the assassination of a major opposition 
leader, Benigno Aquino, was indicative of growing U.S. sen-
sitivity to the decline of democratic government in this former 
colony and fear that Marcos may be leading his country into 
revolution. The Philippines is an excellent example of the tradeoff 
between U.S. world-order and ideological interests. 
Australia and New Zealand. These two South Pacific countries, 
especially Australia with its large land mass and rich resources, 
are vital interests of the United States, dating from the Second 
World War when General Douglas MacArthur made Australia his 
base of operations prior to retaking the Japanese-occupied Pacific 
islands. In 1951, after the outbreak of war in Korea, President 
Truman concluded the ANZUS Pact with these Commonwealth 
countries, thus providing the basis for U.S. use of important 
military installations in Australia. Since several of these are strate-
gic facilities, Australia has become a major defense-of-homeland 
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interest of the United States as well as a vital world-order interest. 
The United States has major ideological interests in Australia and 
New Zealand because both have modern democratic systems. 
Australia and (to a lesser extent) New Zealand have been military 
partners with the United States in the Korean and Vietnamese 
wars, and both participated with Britain in defense of Malaysia in 
the early 1960s. Today, Australia maintains a modest naval pres-
ence in the Indian Ocean, and it sent an aircraft carrier to the 
waters off the Persian Gulf in 1980 at the time of Washington's 
concern that the Iranian revolution and the subsequent Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan might result in a restriction of Persian 
Gulf oil to world markets. 
South Korea. South Korea has been a vital interest of the United 
States since President Truman decided in June 1950 that it would 
be intolerable for the United States to see North Korea, with 
Soviet and Chinese support, control all of the Korean peninsula 
and threaten the security of Japan. President Carter decided in 
1977 to withdraw U.S. ground forces from South Korea, but he 
was persuaded by Japan and by U.S. military commanders that it 
would be an unwise move. South Korea's poor record on human 
rights was a factor in President Carter's view that the United 
States should not be closely identified with its authoritarian re-
gime, but he reluctantly decided to retain approximately 40,000 
U.S. military personnel in Korea to help defend it against the 
North. The United States has limited economic interests in Korea, 
and the country is not important insofar as defense of North 
America is concerned. The real U.S. interest there is a derivative 
one: South Korea is vital to the defense and economic well-being 
of Japan. If Japan is a vital world interest of the United States, the 
reasoning goes, then Korea must also be at the vital level. This is 
tenuous reasoning. 
Even if this premise is valid, should it be a U.S. responsibility 
to supply the majority of foreign forces in South Korea? Why 
should not Japan and China be the principal guarantors of South 
Korean security and provide whatever deterrence is required to 
insure that North Korea does not again invade the South? It 
should be remembered that when U.S. forces went to Korea in 
1950, China had just concluded an alliance with the Soviet Union 
and both supported North Korea's thrust into the South. That 
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situation is different today. China is an antagonist of the Soviet 
Union; it has established friendly relations with the United States; 
and Japan and China have normalized their trade and political 
relationships. It should not be necessary in this changed political 
climate for the United States to continue in the primary role of 
defending South Korea. South Korea has a formidable army that 
fought well during the Vietnam War, and it has received excellent 
U.S. equipment. Why should it not be able, particularly since it 
has a considerably larger population than North Korea, to 
provide the ground forces required to defend its territory and 
permit Japan and the United States to supply the air and naval 
presence to deter North Korea and the Soviet Union from attack-
ing the South? China has diplomatic relations with North Korea, 
but not yet with South Korea; the Peking government should find 
it in its interest to establish relations with the South and take more 
responsibility for security in that area. During 1983 the begin-
nings of such a relationship began to emerge. 
The U.S. interest in South Korea in 1984 is at the major, not vital 
level, and it is time the United States reduced its ground forces 
there to a modest level. Korea's position in Northeast Asia is 
similar to that of Saudi Arabia in the Middle East: both are impor-
tant to the United States for world-order reasons (Saudi Arabia is 
also important for economic reasons), but neither is so crucially 
essential that the United States should be obliged to maintain 
large military forces there. A major world-order interest in South 
Korea means that the United States should continue to provide 
large amounts of military assistance and use its political influence 
to support South Korea's position in Asia; the United States 
should also encourage trade and investment in South Korea. But 
a major interest does not justify 40,000 American combat person-
nel being stationed on the Korean peninsula indefinitely. The 
U.S. government should therefore gradually phase out its 
ground forces from Korea and withdraw them all by the end of 
the 1980s. U.S. Air Force and Navy units in Japan can serve as a 
continuing deterrent to North Korea. 
China and Taiwan. China was an enemy of the United States for 
twenty-one years-from 1950, when it entered the war in Korea, 
until1971, when Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's National 
Security Adviser, made the first soundings about establishing 
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official contacts with the People's Republic. The Nixon visit to 
China in 1972 and the Shanghai Communique issued at the end of 
his visit moved China into the major world-order interest of the 
United States. Later in the 1970s, the Carter administration 
sought to go beyond simply normalizing relations and conclude a 
strategic understanding with Peking. This was rejected by many 
U.S. Republican Party leaders who were unwilling to sacrifice 
U.S. interests in, and responsibility for, the security of Taiwan in 
order to achieve harmony with Peking. Candidate, and then 
President, Ronald Reagan shared this view. There was also a 
serious question about whether "playing the China card," as it 
was called, was consonant with U.S. relations with the Soviet 
Union. In the 1970s some American business interests believed 
that China offered vast economic opportunities for trade and 
investment and that the U.S. economic interest should be at the 
major level. This proved illusory because China did not, and will 
not for some time, have the economic resources to pay for the 
large amount of foreign technology and goods that are required 
to bring China to great-power status. In short, China's economic 
needs were a major hindrance to its ability to serve as a key player 
in superpower rivalry. 
When Ronald Reagan became president in 1981, the movement 
toward a strategic relationship with China, which President Car-
ter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance envisioned, came to an 
abrupt stop. The Reagan administration believed strongly that 
Taiwan should continue to receive U.S. protection against any 
effort by Peking to establish political control over the island by 
force. Nevertheless, Republicans were not willing to reject 
Richard Nixon's declaration that there was only one China and 
that Taiwan was part of it. After two years in office, and after 
strong protests by Peking that relations with the United States 
would suffer if the United States persisted in treating Taiwan as a 
protectorate, the Reagan administration announced in 1983 that it 
would not provide the government of Taiwan with modern air-
craft and would eventually phase out military assistance to the 
island. This action, plus a decision to grant China trade con-
cessions, particularly an enlarged textile quota, led to more har-
monious relations. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's 
visit to China in September 1983 moved the two countries closer 
to a strategic relationship. 
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Nevertheless, China is not, and should not be, viewed in the 
foreseeable future as a vital interest of the United States, even 
though its animosity toward the Soviet Union is beneficial to U.S. 
strategic interests. China today is a peripheral economic interest 
of the United States, and its totalitarian system makes it no more 
than a peripheral ideological interest even though it is adopting a 
more nearly free-market economy. China should be viewed as a 
major defense-of-homeland interest for the United States because 
its large standing army serves as a brake on Soviet ambitions in 
the Middle East as well as East Asia and thus contributes to the 
security of North America. But because of its stabilizing influence 
on the Asian continent, it is in the world-order category that 
China serves the most useful role for U.S. interests. China's fear 
of Soviet imperialism in the late 1960s caused it to view rapproche-
ment with the United States as desirable, despite the ideological 
gap between the two countries. China since then has been a 
restraining influence on Vietnam and has provided greater se-
curity in Northeast Asia by restraining North Korea and opening 
a dialogue in 1983 with the South Korean government. China is 
an important political force in dramatizing Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan, and it carries a significant voice in the United Na-
tions as a critic of Soviet imperialism. This is useful to U.S. 
interests; but there is risk to the United States in entering into a 
military collaboration with China, as the Carter administration 
and some members of Congress advocated, for two reasons: first, 
a military relationship between Washington and Peking, even if it 
were not formalized, would make it less likely for the United 
States and Soviet Union to work toward accommodation of their 
worldwide differences; second, since China is a Communist 
country with a previous strong defense relationship with the 
Soviet Union, it is conceivable that a new radical leadership could 
reemerge in Peking, reverse the current anti-Soviet policies, and 
again seek accommodation with Moscow. If, in the meantime, the 
United States substantially assists China to become a formidable 
military and industrial power, that could eventually work to the 
detriment of the United States. Unlike the NATO countries and 
Japan, China does not share a democratic value system, and its 
long-term policies are therefore less likely to be convergent with 
those of the United States. 
In sum, China is a strong major interest of the United States, 
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but not a vital one. This suggests that the United States should 
provide China with a moderate amount of assistance to build its 
economy and to improve its defense capability, and grant it trade 
concessions. But Washington should not for the reasons stated 
above, give China advanced military equipment and technology, 
or guarantee China's defense. Good political relations and ex-
panded trade are in the U.S. interest, but a strategic relationship 
at this time is not. In time, as China's Communist system evolves 
into something more compatible with American values, perhaps 
the political relationship will deepen. 
Thailand and Indonesia. Neither of these two Southeast Asian 
countries is a vital interest of the United States in the 1980s, even 
though Thailand has an indirect defense relationship with Wash-
ington stemming from the Manila Pact of 1954. 4 The Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) no longer exists, having been 
terminated after the end of the Vietnam War. The U.S. security tie 
to Thailand is therefore somewhat tenuous because no bilateral 
treaty links the two countries, as is the case with the Philippines 
and Japan. Neither Thailand nor Indonesia is a major economic 
interest to the United States, although Indonesia's oil and mineral 
exports are important to the world economy, especially to Japan. 
Ideologically, Thailand and Indonesia are ruled by military-led 
governments, and they have not had much success with demo-
cratic experiments. As with China, it is the world-order category 
that makes them major interests for the United States: Thailand is 
a front-line state bordering Communist-dominated Laos and 
Cambodia and, behind them, a united Vietnam; and Indonesia, 
the largest and most richly endowed Southeast Asian state, is 
stratgically situated on the water routes between the South China 
Sea and the Indian Ocean. Seventy percent of Japan's oil comes 
from the Persian Gulf and passes through the Strait of Malacca 
between Sumatra and Singapore. U.S. Navy ships moving from 
the Pacific to the Indian Ocean use the same channel when 
deployed near the Persian Gulf. Thailand and Indonesia are two 
of six nations (others are Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and the 
Philippines) making up the regional group known as the Associa-
4. The original members of the Manila Pact were Thailand, the Philippines, 
Pakistan, Britain, France, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. 
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tion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which is important in 
determining the political and economic policies of that region. 5 
The United States has provided substantial amounts of military 
aid to Thailand and Indonesia, and in the spring of 1983 it airlifted 
military equipment to Thailand when Vietnamese forces were 
harassing Cambodian refugee settlements inside Thailand. Dur-
ing the Vietnam war, from 1965 to 1975, Thailand made numerous 
military facilities available to the U.S. Air Force, for bombing 
operations and reconnaissance in Laos and Vietnam. After the 
U.S. evacuation from Vietnam in 1975, Thailand asked that these 
facilities be removed, and the United States today has only a 
modest military assistance mission in that country. Indonesia has 
never permitted the United States to use its soil for military 
operations but has accepted a military assistance group to admin-
ister an aid program. Unlike Thailand, Indonesia refused to join 
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in 1954 and, under Sukar-
no's leadership, became increasingly hostile to U.S. policy in 
Southeast Asia. The government of General Suharto, which came 
to power in 1966, has followed a friendly but nonaligned policy 
toward the United States and other Western countires. Both the 
Thai and Indonesian governments are strongly anti-Communist. 
Although the Reagan administration reaffirmed the U.S. com-
mitment to defend Thailand, in case it is attacked by a Communist 
power, that country should not today be considered a vital nation-
al interest of the United States. As with South Korea, Thailand 
may have been a vital world-order interest of the United States 
while China was a hostile power cooperating actively with 
Moscow. When China and the Soviet Union became antagonists 
in the 1960s, however, and China moved toward detente with the 
United States, Thailand was less threatened. With China now on 
friendly terms with the United States and Japan, it is desirable 
5. ASEAN was formed in the mid-1960s, following the overthrow of Sukarno's 
government in Indonesia, as a means of creating a nonmilitary forum for con-
sultations among five western-oriented states of Southeast Asia. Burma and 
Cambodia were offered membership but declined. South Vietnam sought admis-
sion to ASEAN, but some members believed this would embroil the association 
too heavily in the Vietnamese war. Indonesia pressed for a declaration that 
ASEAN should work for the elimination of foreign bases in the ASEAN area, but 
this was resisted by the Philippines and Singapore, which relied on U.S. and 
Commonwealth protection. 
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that these two Asian powers take the primary responsibility for 
protecting Thailand against united Vietnam and its clients, Laos 
and Cambodia. China has increasingly filled that role since the 
end of the Vietnam War; as Vietnam extended its control over 
Cambodia in 1978, China aided the Cambodian insurgents and 
gave Thailand political and some material support in its efforts to 
protect its border. China even fought skirmishes against Vietnam 
as a warning to Hanoi. Japan is Thailand's largest trading partner 
today, and Tokyo has an important interest in seeing that 
Thailand remains an independent, non-Communist state. The 
United States should, therefore, refrain from reestablishing a 
close military relationship with Thailand and should encourage 
Bangkok to improve its security ties with China and Japan as well 
as with the ASEAN countries. 
India. India is neither an East Asian nor a Middle Eastern state 
and therefore does not fall neatly into a consideration of U.S. 
interests in those areas. However, India has been an important 
political (world-order) and ideological (promotion-of-values) in-
terest of the United States since it gained independence from 
Great Britain in 1948. As the country with the second largest 
population in the world and also as the largest democratically 
governed state, India was supported by the United States from 
1950 until the 1970s with large amounts of economic aid because it 
was considered by American leaders to be a counterweight to the 
growing power and hostility of Communist China. Under Prime 
Minister Nehru, India resisted U.S. efforts to bring the country 
into a Western military arrangement in Asia, preferring to be a 
leader of a nonaligned Third World-along with Indonesia's 
Sukarno, Egypt's Nasser and Yugoslavia's Tito. Because Pakistan 
joined SEATO as well as the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO), U.S. 
interests in the Indian subcontinent were difficult to sustain 
when India and Pakistan went to war in 1971. Pakistan lost its 
Eastern segment, which became Bangladesh, and it blamed the 
United States for failing to restrain India. India had concluded an 
agreement to buy military equipment from the Soviet Union and 
maintained warm relations with Moscow; as a result, U.S. aid to 
India was phased out during the 1970s. Following the Soviet 
Union's invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, India decided 
to improve its relations with the United States and it also estab-
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lished a detente with Pakistan. India opposes the naval buildup 
by both superpowers that has taken place in the Indian Ocean 
since 1978. In 1983, U.S. relations with India improved consider-
ably, and the Reagan Administration then decided to revise U.S. 
policy and sell India fuel for its nuclear power plants, a move that 
caused considerable criticism in Congress and in the American 
press. 
In sum, India is a major world-order interest of the United 
States because of its location, size, and democratic institutions. It 
will become more important as a power as it develops into an 
economically strong country in Asia, one with which Wash-
ington hopes to build a friendly, lasting relationship based on a 
shared belief in democratic government. 
Summing Up 
U.S. national interests in East Asia moved from the major to 
the vital level in the 1950s, following the Communist conquest of 
China, its subsequent alliance with Moscow, and its intervention 
in the Korean War. So long as China remained hostile to U.S. 
interests in Asia, successive governments in Washington con-
cluded that all the countries bordering China were vital to the 
U.S. objective of containing China's aggressive policies. The 
disastrous Vietnam War caused President Nixon to seek accom-
modation with Peking in order to permit the United States to 
withdraw "with honor" from Vietnam. Although a new rela-
tionship with Peking resulted in the 1970s, it did not prevent the 
United States from suffering a humiliating defeat in Vietnam in 
1975. The U.S. military withdrawal from the Asian mainland and 
the new relationship with China convinced Presidents Nixon, 
Ford, and Carter that the U.S. interest in Southeast Asia should in 
the future be at the major, not vital, level. While the Reagan 
administration's public statements suggest that Thailand may be 
in the vital category, it is unlikely that U.S. forces would again be 
sent to fight in that country, because China has replaced the 
United States as the principal protector of Thailand against Viet-
nam. Indonesia and India are major U.S. world-order interests, 
and both countries prefer that designation because it avoids sug-
gestions that they should accept U.S. military protection and a 
large military assistance mission. South Korea, by virtue of the 
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fact that 40,000 American troops are stationed there, is on the 
borderline between a major and a vital interest; yet that country's 
value to the United States is based on Japan's concerns rather than 
directly on the U.S. stake in Korea. It is therefore desirable that 
American ground forces gradually be withdrawn from Korea and 
that U.S. air power become the major deterrent to any North 
Korean attack. If foreign ground forces are required to protect 
South Korea, Japan should form a rapid deployment force and 
make it ready for transfer to Korea if war should erupt there. 
China should be prepared to use its influence with North Korea 
to restrain its pressure on the South. In the 1980s and onward, the 
primary responsibility for defending South Korea should be 
Asian, not American. 
Finally, the United States should press Japan to take greater 
responsibility for the security of Northeast and Southeast Asia. 
Forty years after the Second World War, Japan and the other 
Asian countries must realize that the United States should not be 
expected to carry this responsibility alone-particularly as the 
U.S. assumes new burdens in the Indian Ocean and takes care of 
the growing security problems closer to its homeland in the 
Caribbean and Central America. As for the Philippines, the Unit-
ed States should expect its former colony to do a better job of 
living up to the democratic traditions that the United States 
taught it early in this century. A return to democratic government 
is in the vital interest of the American as well as the Philippine 
people, and Washington should use its vast influence there to 
make that possible. 
7. South America 
and Southern Africa: 
Secondary U.S. Interests 
Traditional thinking in the United States about U.S. interests in 
and policies toward South America has been blurred by the 
Monroe Doctrine legacy, which assumed that everything in the 
Western Hemisphere was a vital national interest. This view was 
reinforced by the Rio Pact in 1947, which treated the security of all 
parts of Latin America as equally important to the security of the 
United States. The assumption is not valid, however, either in 
strategic or economic terms, and certainly not in ideological 
terms. Looking realistically at U.S. national interests in a broader 
context, the term "Latin America" should not be the controlling 
geographical concept. The division of the Western Hemisphere 
into North America (discussed in Chapter 3) and South America 
is much more appropriate in defining the basic national interests 
of the United States. Even then, the continental division is not 
precise, because two South American countries bordering on the 
Caribbean-Venezuela and Columbia-are more appropriately 
part of the North American sphere, as their economic, cultural, 
and security interests all flow northward. 
A similar division exists on the continent of Africa. The North 
African states-Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt-
border on the Mediterranean and are a part of the NATO defense 
area, even though none of the five countries is a member of the 
European military pact. By race, trade, and political ties, North 
Africa is closer to Spain, France, Italy, and Greece than to the 
countries of southern Africa. In terms of U.S. national interests, it 
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is easier to deal conceptually with the division of Africa between 
north and south than it is to divide South America, because the 
term '~frica south of the Sahara" is widely used in government 
and in academia. No similar term separates the northern part of 
South America (Venezuela and Colombia) from the rest of the 
continent. 
U.S. Interests in South America 
South America is one of the fastest developing areas of the 
world, and it constitutes an important area of U.S. trade and 
investment. Brazil, for example, has the potential of being an 
economic power of the first magnitude by the year 2000. Argen-
tina and Chile are economically advanced and have a moderate 
amount of military power. All three countries have important 
trade links with the United States, but none of them today can be 
considered a U.S. vital interest-in economic, defense, or ide-
ological terms. All three states have a history of repressive politi-
calleaderships, resulting from the polarization of politics among 
important segments of their societies. In 1983 Argentina held 
elections and abandoned its military dictatorship, however. Brazil 
has recently shown promise of a relaxation of military rule and 
renewed interest in democracy, but the social and economic ten-
sions within the vast country are so great that any movement 
toward democracy is likely to be a slow process. Chile remains 
firmly under military control. 
It is U.S. world-order interests in South America that make the 
continent important. As a rapidly developing area with an ex-
ceedingly high population growth rate, any significant part of 
South America would become a serious problem for the United 
States and Western Europe if it turned hostile to the North 
Atlantic countries. This would be particularly so if any of the large 
countries-Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru-were to adopt a Com-
munist system and align itself with the Soviet Union. The Nixon 
administration viewed the threat of a Marxist government in 
Chile, under Salvadore Allende, to be intolerable to U.S. world-
order interests and used heavy U.S. economic and political pres-
sure to bring about its downfall. This suggests that Chile may 
have been a vital interest to President Nixon and his National 
Security Advisor, Dr. Henry Kissinger, yet it is debatable whether 
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Chile matters so much to U.S. world-order interests in South 
America. Argentina is a similar case: although it is an important 
South American state and has the potential of being a strong 
economic and political power on that continent if it can solve its 
deep internal political problems, Argentina cannot now be con-
sidered more than a major interest of the United States; it is not in 
a position today to vitally affect U.S. security or economic well-
being. 
Brazil is in a somewhat different category; it is larger, more 
strategically located, and has greater political stability than Ar-
gentina. Brazil is potentially an economic superpower, with a 
GNP in 1983 of $250 billion. Its economy grew at a fast rate during 
the 1970s, a result of very high foreign investment and govern-
ment borrowing, and this overspending caused a serious eco-
nomic crunch early in 1983 when the country owed foreign banks 
and other creditors about $80 billion and could not pay the inter-
est without additional loans. Seventeen percent of Brazil's ex-
ports go to the United States, and 17 percent of its imports are 
from the United States. Brazil is by far the most influential politi-
cal entity in South America, and its military forces maintain close 
links with the U.S. armed forces. Brazil's strategic location in the 
South Atlantic was important to the Allies during World War II 
because it provided the route by which U.S. planes bound for 
Europe and the Middle East were ferried to West Africa and the 
war theaters. Were Brazil to be attacked by a hostile outside 
power, there is little doubt that the United States would aid its 
government under terms of the Rio Pact. However, it is question-
able whether the United States should or could stop a leftist 
revolution that might try to overthrow the current military gov-
ernment-if economic conditions, for example, should become 
intolerable there. This does not mean that the United States 
should deny the Brazilian government military aid if it comes 
under severe internal political pressure; but it is difficult to imag-
ine a situation in which U.S. military forces should be used to 
prevent a Brazilian government from being overthrown, even if 
insurgents were being supplied by a neighboring country. In 
short, the U.S. interest in Brazil is at the major, not vital level. 
U.S. interests in South America are summarized by placing 
three important countries-Brazil, Argentina, and Chile-on the 
national interest matrix, as seen in Figure 13. This elaboration of 
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Fig. 13. U.S. National Interests in South America 
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interests suggests that Brazil is a high major interest of the United 
States. It might under some circumstances become a vital inter-
est-depending on the situation that would threaten Brazil's se-
curity. Neither Argentina nor Chile ranks as high as a defense 
interest, but they share with Brazil the major category under 
world order. This is because they have long coastlines and are in a 
strategic position regarding commercial ocean traffic in the 
Southern Henisphere. Brazil's and Argentina's navies are impor-
tant to the security of the South Atlantic; however, they are of 
only major national interest to the United States at present be-
cause the South Atlantic is not a primary theater of superpower 
rivalry. The U.S. Navy may sense a vital interest at stake in the 
South Atlantic because of the important sea routes around the 
Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn; yet, the vital interests of 
neither the United States nor the Soviet Union are tied up in the 
South Atlantic today. This is the principal reason that Brazil and 
Argentina continue to be major U.S world-order interests. 
The Falkland Islands Crisis and the U.S. Response 
The relative importance to United States interests of South 
America and the South Atlantic area was highlighted by the 
short war between Great Britain and Argentina in the Falkland 
Islands (Islas Malvinas) during the spring of 1982. Here was a case 
where the Reagan administration was obliged to make a difficult 
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choice between two countries with which it had good relations-
Argentina and Great Britain-as they clashed over several small 
islands near the southern tip of South America. The decision-
making of the Reagan administration in this episode is indicative 
of the dilemmas that policy-makers face in deciding tradeoffs in 
national interests. A brief analysis of this crisis illustrates how the 
national interest matrix may be used to determine which interests 
take priority when they are in conflict. 
When Argentina invaded the Falklands on April2, 1982, it was 
inevitable that the Reagan administration would have to choose 
between two allies and that it stood to lose prestige no matter 
what it decided. Once the British decided to retake the islands by 
force, President Reagan and Secretary of State Alexander Haig 
had only one possibility of averting a diplomatic firestorm: con-
vincing the Argentine government that it should withdraw its 
9,000 troops from the Falklands and permit the United States to 
negotiate the sovereignty issue with Britain. Otherwise, an 
armed clash was inevitable as soon as the British fleet and troops 
arrived in the South Atlantic. Secretary of State Haig left no doubt 
where the U.S. government stood: according to an authoritative 
account published by the Sunday Times of London, the State 
Department sent a strong message to the Galtieri government 
advising that unless it called off its imminent invasion of the 
Falklands, the warm relationship with the United States would be 
in jeopardy. The Buenos Aires government did not take the 
warning seriously, however. On April 1, President Reagan tele-
phoned President Galtieri and spent nearly an hour trying to 
convince him that American public opinion would not accept the 
use of force and that the invasion should be called off. The 
President's personal intervention had little effect. 
The U.S. position was clarified in a White House statement 
issued on April 2: "We have made clear to the Government of 
Argentina that we deplore use of force to resolve this dispute. We 
have called on Argentina to cease, immediately, hostilities and to 
withdraw its military forces from the Falkland Islands."1 The 
following day the United States voted with the majority of the 
United Nations Security Council in a resolution demanding the 
immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland 
1. Department of State Bulletin (DSB), June 1982, p. 81. 
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Islands and calling on the governments of Argentina and the 
United Kingdom to seek a diplomatic solution to their dif-
ferences. 
From the beginning of the Falklands crisis, U.S. policy sup-
ported Britain against Argentina on the latter's use of force to 
settle a longstanding territorial dispute with Britain. In order to 
persuade Argentina to withdraw its forces before Britain used 
force to retake the islands, President Reagan sent Secretary Haig 
on a mediation mission between London and Buenos Aires to see 
whether an agreement could be reached that would enable the 
Argentine government to withdraw its troops before the British 
were in position to attack-a period of about four weeks. The 
dilemma faced by the United States in trying to avert war between 
two friendly states was illustrated in President Reagan's press 
conference statements on April 5. He said: "It's a very difficult 
situation for the United States, because we're friends with both of 
the countries engaged in this dispute, and we stand ready to do 
anything we can to help them. And what we hope for and would 
like to help in doing is have a peaceful resolution of this with no 
forceful action or no bloodshed." Answering another question, 
the President asserted that "we're friends of both sides in this, 
and we're going to try, strive for-and I think that they will be 
willing to meet in the idea of a peaceful resolution [sic]." In 
response to the question as to what the United States would do if 
diplomacy failed to resolve the crisis before fighting erupted, the 
President said, "I hope I never am faced with that."2 
Haig's shuttle diplomacy brought no results in Argentina be-
cause all his efforts foundered on one central point: Argentina 
insisted that it had sovereignty over the Falklands, while Mrs. 
Thatcher's government insisted that the will of the Falkland Is-
landers had to be a decisive element in the final determination 
about the islands' sovereignty. The U.S. negotiating position was 
made more difficult when the Council of the Organization of 
American States (OAS) requested Britain to "cease the hostilities 
it is carrying on within the security region" covered by the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) and "refrain 
from any act that may affect inter-American peace and security." 
The resolution called on both sides to resume negotiations aimed 
2. Presidential Documents 18, no. 14 (12 April 1982): 441. 
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at a peaceful settlement of the conflict by "taking into account the 
rights of sovereignty of the Republic of Argentina over the Mal-
vinas (Falkland) Islands and the interests of the islanders."3 This 
OAS resolution was adopted by a vote of 17 to 0, with four 
abstentions-including the United States. The OAS thus af-
firmed its belief that Argentina was entitled to sovereignty and 
that Britain had no right to use force to dislodge the Argentine 
forces then in control of the islands. It also put the United States 
squarely at odds with most of the Latin American countries. 
Although Secretary Haig, in his statement at the OAS meeting, 
sought to focus on the initial use of force by Argentina, the OAS 
resolution implicitly gave Argentina the right to retain troops in 
the Falklands while negotiations on the sovereignty question 
took place. At a time when it needed hemispheric support in 
Central America to isolate the Marxist government of Nicaragua, 
the United States found itself in a difficult diplomatic position 
because of its failure to support the claims of a Latin American 
country against an outside power. 
On April30, 1982, as British forces launched their first air strike 
on Argentine forces in the Falklands, Secretary Haig defined the 
Reagan administration's policy in the crisis by announcing eco-
nomic sanctions against Argentina. The Secretary said that the 
United States was guided by the principles of rule of law and 
peaceful settlement of disputes. The collapse of this principle, he 
argued, would result in chaos and suffering. Haig took account of 
the U.S. stake in the dispute by saying: "We made this effort 
because the crisis raised the vital issue of hemispheric solidarity at 
a time when the Communist adversaries seek positions of influ-
ence on the mainland of the Americas." Haig reported that Ar-
gentina had turned down his proposal for a joint U.S.-U.K.-
Argentine interim authority in the Falklands because it did not 
recognize Argentine sovereignty. He asserted: "Now, however, in 
light of Argentina's failure to accept a compromise, we must take 
concrete steps to underscore that the United States cannot and 
will not condone the use of unlawful force to resolve disputes." 
The Secretary said the President had ordered economic sanctions 
and a halt in military assistance to Argentina, and that the United 
States would provide material support for British forces-with-
3. DSB, June 1982, p. 87. 
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out, however, the direct involvement of U.S. military personnel. 
Finally, Haig reiterated a U.S. readiness to help the parties reach a 
mutually acceptable settlement of their dispute: "In the end, 
there will have to be a negotiated outcome acceptable to the 
interested parties. Otherwise, we will all face unending hostility 
and insecurity in the South Atlantic."4 
The President's decision to support Britain was reinforced by a 
Senate resolution on April 29 declaring that the United States 
"cannot stand neutral" and must help Britain to "achieve full 
withdrawal of Argentine forces" from the Falklands. The vote was 
an overwhelming 79 to 1 in favor of support for Britain. Only 
Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina voted against, arguing that 
Argentina had sovereignty over the Falklands predating the Brit-
ish takeover in the 1830s. Helms felt strongly that the United 
States needed Argentina's help in combating Communism in the 
Western Hemisphere and that a U.S. decision to support Britain 
in this dispute would alienate U.S. friends in Latin America at a 
time when Washington needed their support for its foreign policy 
goals. 
The U.S. decision to support Britain in retaking the Falkland 
Islands and to impose sanctions against Argentina did not end 
the debate within the U.S. government over how to limit the 
damage to U.S. relations with Latin America. Led by the U.S. 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, and to a lesser extent by the Assistant Secretary of 
State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Enders, the pro-Latin 
America group argued that the United States had deep political, 
economic, and security interests in Latin America and that strong 
efforts should be made through diplomatic channels to initiate 
negotiations between Britain and Argentina. Meanwhile, the 
OAS became a forum for anti-American sentiment. On May 29, 
for example, the 20th Meeting of OAS Foreign Ministers voted 17-
0, with four abstentions (including the United States) in favor of a 
resolution "to condemn most vigorously the unjustified and dis-
proportionate armed attack perpetrated by the United Kingdom, 
and its decision, which affects the security of the entire American 
hemisphere, of arbitrarily declaring an extensive area of up to 12 
miles from the American coast as a zone of hostilities." It blamed 
4. Ibid., pp. 87-88. 
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the United Kingdom for not being willing to negotiate its dif-
ferences with Argentina and for refusing to accept a cease-fire. 
The OAS urged the United States to order the immediate lifting of 
sanctions against Argentina and to stop giving material as-
sistance to Britain, "in observance of the principle of hemispheric 
solidarity recognized in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance." The OAS requested members to give Argentina "the 
support that each judges appropriate to assist it in this serious 
situation."5 The United States was thus isolated diplomatically in 
Latin America because of its support for Britain. 
The U.S. dilemma in trying to walk a thin line between support 
for Britain and preservation of its ties with Latin America was 
illustrated by President Reagan's informal session with reporters 
on May 28. When asked about the impending OAS vote against 
U.S. sanctions on Argentina and against U.S. support for Britain, 
the President said: "The only thing that we have to face here is the 
issue ... whether we can allow armed aggression to succeed 
with regard to such territorial claims. There are 50 places in the 
world right now where, if this succeeds, that could be opened to 
the same thing happening. And the armed aggression, I'm sorry, 
did start by the action of one of our neighbors here in the Amer-
icas. That principle must not be allowed to fail." 6 
Early in June, while the President and Secretary of State were 
in Europe attending several summit conferences with European 
leaders, the administration found itself in a deeply embarrassing 
situation at the United Nations when Ambassador Jeane 
Kirkpatrick voted with the British government against a Security 
Council resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire in the 
Falkland Islands. A few minutes later, after receiving new instruc-
tions from Secretary Haig, she informed the Council that the U.S. 
position should have been "abstention." The blunder was com-
pounded when Secretary Haig, asked by a reporter why he had 
not called Kirkpatrick on the phone instead of sending instruc-
tions through the State Department bureaucracy, said that a field 
commander does not deal directly with a company commander. 
The Haig-Kirkpatrick blowup over U.S. policy on the Falklands 
issue was the most visible manifestation of a growing split within 
5. DSB, July 1982, p. 90. 
6. Presidential Documents 18, no. 22 (7 June 1982): 726. 
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the State Department over U.S. national interests in Latin Amer-
ica. 
The swift and decisive British military victory in the Falklands 
was a godsend for an increasingly divided U.S. government. The 
British success relieved the political pressure on Washington to 
show more concern for the Argentine position because, with 
British forces in full possession of the islands and Argentine 
troops defeated, the calls for a cease-fire and aU .N. peacekeeping 
force were outdated. Thus, President Reagan could state in a 
news conference on June 30, in response to a question about 
when he would remove sanctions on Argentina: "I can't give you 
an answer on that, what is going on right now. We did our best, as 
I said before, to try to bring about a peaceful settlement. It didn't 
happen. And there was armed conflict, and there has been a 
victor and a vanquished, and now it's hardly the place for us to 
intervene in that. We'll stand by ready to help if our help is asked 
for." 7 
Comparing U.S. Interests in the North Atlantic 
and South Atlantic 
The public wrangling between the Secretary of State and the 
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations during June 1982 illus-
trated Washington's difficulty in deciding on, and adhering to, a 
clear assessment of its national interests in two sectors of the 
Atlantic Ocean. In brief, the issue could be stated like this: did the 
United States have vital interests at stake in South America and 
the South Atlantic equivalent to its interests in the North Atlan-
tic area? 
Looking at U.S. actions and the public statements of its top 
political leaders from April through June 1982, it is clear that the 
Reagan administration decided early that if Argentina invaded 
the Falklands, the United States would uphold the principle that 
disputes should not be settled by military force and that Argen-
tina would not be supported. However, the United States was not 
prepared to agree that Britain had a clear legal right to the 
Falklands, despite the fact that it had been in possession of them 
for 150 years. This was the U.S. official position. yet the question 
7. DSB, August 1982, p. 38. 
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that was actually at issue in Washington was whether Britain or 
Argentina was a greater political asset to the broader national 
interests of the United States. Secretary Haig and Ambassador 
Kirkpatrick obviously disagreed on this point, and the State De-
partment found itself divided when it was clear that Argentina 
would not withdraw its troops from the Falklands without a prior 
commitment regarding its sovereignty. 
The relative importance of British, Argentinian, and U.S. inter-
ests in the Falklands crisis is illustrated in Figure 14. What this 
suggests is that both Argentina and Britain had vital interests at 
stake-particularly world-order interests-but that the United 
States had only peripheral and major ones in this conflict. The 
U.S. interest was strongest in the world- order category, and that 
was to support its ally, Great Britain, when the Thatcher govern-
ment decided to retake the Falklands if Argentina refused to 
accept a reasonable compromise. But the United States also had a 
major interest in keeping the lines of communication open to 
Argentina, for two reasons: (1) the Galtieri government had given 
President Reagan strong support for his efforts in 1981 and 1982 to 
stem the growth of Communist influence in Central America; and 
(2) Argentina had the moral support of most Latin American 
countries in its dispute with Britain over sovereignty in the 
Falklands. Even though Argentina's government and political 
system were antithetical to the values of the American people 
(promotion-of-values), the authoritarian government in Buenos 
Aires had cooperated with the United States in many of its 
international policies (world-order). The basic miscalculation 
made by the Galtieri government was in thinking that its ties with 
Washington had become so important to the Reagan administra-
tion that Washington would not join with Britain if Mrs. Thatcher 
decided to use force. Argentina assumed that its strong support 
would be viewed as vital to U.S. world-order interests when, in 
fact, it never was. It may be recalled that Great Britain made an 
equally serious error in judgment in 1956 when the Eden govern-
ment assumed that it could invade Egypt and retake the Suez 
Canal without incurring the wrath of President Eisenhower. 
A footnote to the Falkland Islands war and the British victory 
was a United Nations General Assembly resolution on November 
4, 1982. The resolution, jointly sponsored by twenty Latin Amer-
ican countries, called on Argentina and Britain "to resume nego-
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Fig. 14. Interests at Stake in the Falkland Islands, 1982 
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tiations in order to find as soon as possible a peaceful solution to 
the sovereignty dispute relating to the question of the Falkland 
Islands (Malvinas)." After getting the original resolution modi-
fied so that the question of sovereignty was not prejudged and 
force would not again be employed in this dispute, the United 
States joined 89 other nations in voting for it; 52 nations abstained, 
including most West European countries and many Common-
wealth nations. The British press and government expressed 
dismay that the United States had voted for the resolution rather 
than abstaining, and calls of betrayal were heard in London. 
However, cooler British heads understood the reasons for the 
U.S. decision, particularly as the resolution was not binding on 
either Britain or Argentina. 
Kenneth Adelman, U.S. Representative to the General Assem-
bly's 37th Session, summed up the U.S. dilemma: "For the United 
States, the Falkland crisis has been and still is a particularly 
agonizing, tragic event. As the whole world knows we have a 
longstanding alliance and, beyond that, the closest relations of 
friendship with Great Britain, the country from which our politi-
cal institutions, law and language derive. But we have not forgot-
ten for a moment our close geographical, economic and political 
relations with our Latin neighbors. We do not only care about 
this hemisphere, we are part of this hemisphere, and we share 
many of the aspirations, goals and dreams of all nations of the 
Americas." Adelman emphasized that the resolution ex-
pressly reaffirmed the principle of nonuse of force in interna-
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tional relations and said the United States welcomed its refer-
ences that the parties should not renew the threat of force. He 
expressed hope that the resolution would "serve as a basis for 
negotiation to close this unhappy chapter and move forward 
again toward peace, understanding and development in this 
hemisphere. "8 
The Falkland Islands crisis underlined the fact that U.S. nation-
al interests in South America are not as cruCial as U.S. interests in 
the North Atlantic region. This is not to say that the South 
Atlantic is not important to the United States, but only that its 
relative importance is lower than that of Great Britain and Europe. 
Nor does the Falklands crisis suggest that U.S. interests in Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean region were downgraded; on the 
contrary, the episode showed more clearly than before that the 
United States does not view Latin America as one general interest 
but distinguishes between those parts that are in close proximity 
to the United States and those that are not. 
U.S. Interests in Africa 
North Africa. The five countries of this region (Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt), all bordering on the Mediterranean, 
are of considerably greater importance to U.S. national interests 
than the numerous states of Central and Southern Africa. This 
results from their geographical proximity to Europe and to 
NATO's bases in Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey. It also results 
from growing U.S. interests in the eastern Mediterranean area. 
Egypt became a vital world-order interest of the United States 
after it made peace with Israel in 1979 and decided to cooperate 
with the United States in defense planning for the Middle East 
area. Three of the other four North African states are friendly to 
the United States (Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria); the fourth 
(Libya) is hostile. The United States has a major world-order 
interest in insuring that the three friendly countries remain favor-
able to U.S. interests in the Mediterranean, and a major interest 
in preventing Libya from upsetting the political stability of its 
8. United States Mission to the United Nations, press release 122-82, 4 Nov. 
1982. 
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neighbors to the south or hindering U.S. military operations in 
the Mediterranean. The Reagan administration underlined this 
fact in 1981 when it sent a carrier task force into the Gulf of Sidra, 
to demonstrate its intention to uphold the principle of "freedom 
of the seas." The administration also sent planes to Egypt in 1982 
when Libya reportedly sought to aid guerrillas it had trained to 
overthrow the government of Sudan. U.S. interests in several 
other East African countries, notably Kenya and Somalia, in-
creased from the peripheral to the major level in the early 1980s as 
a result of the buildup of U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean near the 
Persian Gulf. Both countries granted the United States facilities of 
considerable importance to U.S. naval operations in the Indian 
Ocean. They are not American bases, however. 
A minor crisis for U.S. interests in North Africa occurred in 
August 1983 when Libya intervened with its own forces in a civil 
war in neighboring Chad. Although the Reagan administration 
believed that France, as the former colonial power in Chad, had 
the primary national interest there, Washington nevertheless 
sent a carrier task force to waters off Libya and early warning 
planes (AWACS) to Sudan to monitor Libyan air attacks in Chad. 
U.S. interests in Chad normally would not be considered higher 
than peripheral, but President Reagan apparently believed that 
U.S. interests in Egypt and Sudan (on which Egypt depends for 
water resources and political support) would be severely affected 
if Libya, with its pro-Soviet government, succeeded in replacing 
the Chad government with another pro-Soviet regime. The ap-
parent U.S. interest in this remote African civil war was expressed 
by White House spokesman Larry Speakes, who asserted on 
August 5, 1983, that "the United States has a strong strategic 
interest in assuring that Qaddafi [Libya's leader] is not able to 
upset governments or to intervene militarily in other countries as 
is currently happening in Chad. If Libya or Libyan-supported 
forces were to gain control of Chad, close U.S. allies such as Egypt 
and Sudan would be seriously concerned about their own se-
curity. Other states in the region would also be deeply worried."9 
This was a classic case of the U.S. government's trying to 
convince its friends as well as the American public that it had a 
high stake in a remote part of Africa when, in fact, most Amer-
9. Washington Post, 6 Aug. 1983, p. 1. 
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icans would conclude that the interest was at the major level at 
best. The threat of Libyan-backed revolutions in Africa may in-
deed be of vital importance to Egypt and Sudan, and perhaps to 
France; but the Reagan administration was stretching credibility 
in trying to persuade the world and the American public that U.S. 
interests were being so severely tested by Libya that the White 
House should contemplate using U.S. forces to restrain Libya. 
Southern Africa. Historically, U.S. interests in the southern part 
of Africa have been peripheral. Most of the countries there were 
part of European colonial empires until the 1960s and early 1970s, 
and the United States was content to permit France, Britain, 
Belgium, and Portugal to exercise the primary political influence 
in these poor, extremely backward countries. South Africa, a 
white minority dominated country, held a higher place in U.S. 
interests for two reasons: (1) it occupies an important location on 
the sea routes between the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans and 
has excellent port facilities for naval as well as commercial vessels; 
and (2) the country is one of the world's major sources of precious 
minerals, among them diamonds and gold. Thus, South Africa 
during the early postwar period was a major economic and world-
order interest of the United States. By the 1970s, however, these 
factors were increasingly outweighed by a strong U.S. ideological 
bias against the South African government's blatantly repressive 
apartheid policies. South Africa's condemnation by the United 
Nations for its racist laws against the black majority and its 
subsequent withdrawal from the British-led Commonwealth 
caused the United States to downgrade relations with that coun-
try. A contributing factor was the growing demand of the Amer-
ican black community for tougher U.S. policies against South 
Africa's racist regime. 
A significant change occurred in the U.S. Government's view 
of world-order interests in 1974, following Portugal's decision to 
withdraw from colonial rule in Angola and Mozambique and to 
grant those countries independence. A Marxist faction quickly 
gained political control in Mozambique and established warm 
relations with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. 
In Angola, a civil war ensued among three factions, two of pro-
Western orientation and the other a Marxist, pro-Soviet group. At 
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the urging of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the United 
States provided covert military aid to the non-Communist forces 
in Angola until Congress decided late in 1975, as a legacy of anti-
Vietnam sentiment in the United States, to prohibit all military 
and covert assistance to any group in Angola. Almost imme-
diately, Soviet arms and 15,000 Cuban troops were introduced 
into Angola, and within a few months the Marxist faction had 
control of the government. Cuban troops with strong Soviet 
support remain there today. The Marxist government recently 
has sought better relations with the United States and has encour-
aged private American firms, particularly oil companies, to oper-
ate in the country; but it has been unwilling thus far to ask Cuba 
to withdraw its forces, a condition set by the Reagan administra-
tion for normalizing relations. In 1975 Angola was a test case 
between the President and the Congress in determining the level 
of U.S. interest in Southern Africa. Congress mandated that the 
level of U.S. interest should be major, not vital, and it was one of 
Dr. Kissinger's rare political defeats as chief architect of U.S. 
foreign policy. 
The mid-1970s witnessed another serious setback to U.S. inter-
ests in Africa, on the East coast of that continent. Ethiopia, which 
had been pro-West as long as Emperor Haile Selassie remained in 
control, underwent a profound change of direction when a mili-
tary coup overthrew the monarchy in 1975. The leftist military 
group that seized control vowed to establish a Marxist-socialist 
state, and it turned to the Soviet Union and Cuba for help. Within 
a short space of time, Ethiopia became a base of Soviet and East 
European power in East Africa, and about 20,000 Cuban troops 
were dispatched there to help the new regime maintain order and 
build the armed forces. Neighboring Somalia, which had been 
pro-Soviet and had granted Moscow a naval base on the Gulf of 
Aden, then became alarmed over Soviet support of its traditional 
enemy, Ethiopia, and asked the United States for political and 
military support. The Carter administration wrestled with the 
issue of U.S. interests in the "Horn of Africa" and decided that 
they were at best major. 
In Southern Africa, President Carter strongly emphasized 
human rights (ideology) as a major component of U.S. interest 
and policy. His administration put great pressure on both the 
white minority Rhodesian government to relinquish control to 
172 South America and Southern Africa 
the majority blacks, and on the South African government to give 
up control of Namibia (Southwest Africa) in accordance with 
United Nations resolutions. After Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher came to power in Britain in 1979, her government negoti-
ated a peaceful transition of power in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) 
to the black majority. The United States strongly endorsed this 
action. In Namibia, however, U.S. policy on that country's inde-
pendence remains tied to the withdrawal of Cuban forces from 
Angola. 
In the mid-1980s, the United States has major national interests 
at stake in Southern Africa, but not vital ones. This is true for all 
four basic U.S. interests. In terms of defense-of-homeland, the 
west coast of Africa is a major U.S. defense interest because of its 
proximity to oil supply lines from the Middle East. In economic 
terms, the need of U.S. industry for scarce minerals from the 
African states is growing, and some of these countries will be-
come important U.S. trading partners. Nigeria, with its large 
population and significant export of oil, is the most important 
black African country, both economically and politically. South 
Africa remains a major economic interest of the United States and 
could become a major political one as well if it makes peace with 
its neighbors. In ideological terms, black Africa looms in-
creasingly important to U.S. interests for two reasons: (1) these 
newly independent countries make up a large voting block in the 
United Nations, and they are well disposed toward the United 
States so long as U.S. policy is opposed to racist regimes; and (2) 
American blacks, increasingly conscious of their roots, have taken 
a much greater interest in U.S. relations with African countries 
and exert growing influence on U.S. policy there. Just as Amer-
ican Jews give enormous political support to Israel and American 
Greeks lobby Congress on behalf of Greece, so do American 
blacks feel a responsibility to press for greater attention by U.S. 
policy-makers to the needs and concerns of the black African 
nations. 
U.S. world-order interests are an ambiguous area, however, as 
was the case in 1975 when Henry Kissinger pressed for large-scale 
military assistance to Angola and Zaire to help stem growing 
Soviet and Cuban influence in Africa. Specifically, the issue is 
whether U.S. interests in Southern Africa are so crucial (vital) that 
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it would be intolerable for Washington to consider sharing influ-
ence on that continent with the Soviet Union and its satellites. For 
example, the Reagan administration has refused to give its bless-
ing to independence for Namibia until neighboring Angola asks 
Cuban troops to withdraw. Washington's reasoning is that 
Namibia would quickly fall into civil war and succumb to Marxist 
insurgents if Cuban forces across the border in Angola provided 
them help. The issue is not whether Namibia should be free of 
South African control (South Africa agreed in 1982 to give up 
control if there were guarantees for Namibian security); it is 
whether the Soviet Union and its client states should continue to 
have a foothold on the west coast of Africa and, possibly, expand 
their influence there. The Reagan administration's policy was to 
give military and economic assistance to Zaire in Central Africa-
despite its government's poor record on human rights and its 
corruption-because Zaire is strategically located, is pro-West, 
and forms a bulwark against further Soviet expansion in West 
Africa. In East Africa, the United States has concluded agree-
ments with Kenya and Somalia for naval facilities, and in 1983 it 
carried out military maneuvers on Somalian soil. In Nigeria, the 
richest African state, the United States is giving political support 
to a new military government established in 1983 even though it 
would prefer to deal with a democratically elected one. The 
previous government had led the country to near economic ruin, 
and Nigeria is now in need of financial assistance despite its great 
oil wealth. 
Figure 15 indicates which of the southern African countries 
currently qualify as major national interests of the United States. 
This listing of countries on the matrix suggests that the United 
States has major interests (but no vital ones) in Southern Africa. 
There is a strong rationale therefore to supply these and other 
selected countries in the region with economic and military as-
sistance and political support where these are required to main-
tain good relations and to prevent anti-Western forces from gain-
ing control. In the mid-1980s, however, there is no country in 
southern Africa that qualifies at the vital U.S. level; the United 
States should therefore refrain from concluding defense agree-
ments and deploying U.S. military forces there. In relations with 
South Africa, which is by far the most developed country and the 
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most pro-Westin its political leanings, U.S. policy should encour-
age that government to modify its apartheid policies, broaden its 
political base, and adopt a cooperative attitude toward the black 
African countries. Such cooperation is possible if the Nationalist 
government moves away from repression of its majority popula-
tion and includes blacks and coloreds in the political process. If 
South Africa is willing to make such concessions, it might one 
day be considered a vital U.S. interest and be worthy of a close 
military relationship. For the time being, however, U.S. ide-
ological interests preclude a defense relationship with the Pre-
toria regime. 
Summing Up 
North Africa and Southern Africa are important areas in terms 
of U.S. economic and world-order interests, but they do not 
qualify as vital U.S. concerns today. North Africa, because of its 
importance to Western Europe and to the eastern Mediterranean, 
has several countries-notably Egypt and possibly Morocco-
that may be in the vital interest category for world-order reasons. 
If the South Atlantic region becomes strategically important in 
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world affairs, as the Falkland Islands crisis suggested, it is con-
ceivable that other African countries-Nigeria, Zaire, and An-
gola-may one day be viewed as vital U.S. interests. In the 
mid-1980s, however, there is little if anything south of the equator, 
either in Africa or in South America, that should cause the United 
States to go to war. 
8. The Soviet Empire: 
An Enduring Competitor 
The Soviet Union is the only serious competitor of the United 
States for power and prestige on a worldwide scale. Despite the 
earlier speculation of academics and journalists about the emer-
gence of a "multi-polar world," there are only two powers today 
that can justifiably be called superpowers. Neither Britain nor 
France, two European powers with modest nuclear military ca-
pability and interests outside Europe, is a competitor of the 
Soviet Union and the United States. Japan and Germany are 
world economic powers, and they exert regional political influ-
ence as well, but neither is willing at this time to reach for the kind 
of great power role that their previous regimes played in the 1930s 
and 1940s. 
The Soviet Union and the United States not only emerged from 
World War II with their military power and prestige enhanced; 
they also exhibited the political will to extend their influence into 
areas that they were not willing to exploit prior to World War II. 
The American prewar sphere of influence was limited primarily 
to the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific islands-including 
the Philippines. The Soviet prewar area of influence was the 
Soviet Union itself plus the Baltic states and, after August 1939, 
half of Poland. By virtue of their military victory over Nazi Ger-
many, both the United States and the Soviet Union extended their 
influence into Central Europe. Their troops remain there forty 
years after the cessation of hostilities to reinforce that postwar 
reality of European politics. 
In Asia, it appeared for a while after World War II that the 
Soviet Union, in alliance with the People's Republic of China, 
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would extend Communist influence into Southeast Asia and over 
the entire Korean peninsula. However, the falling out between 
Moscow and Peking in the 1960s had the effect of limiting 
Moscow's reach in East Asia. Since December 1979, the Soviet 
Union has extended its power into Afghanistan, which poses a 
threat to Pakistan, Iran, and the Persian Gulf. The United States 
retained exclusive military and political influence in Japan follow-
ing World War II and concluded defense ties with South Korea, 
Taiwan, Thailand, and the Philippines. After Great Britain with-
drew its military presence from the Indian Ocean and the Persian 
Gulf in 1971, the Soviet Union and the United States competed for 
position and influence in Asia with increasing intensity-par-
ticularly after the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran in 1979. 
Despite their intense competition in the post-World War II 
period, neither country demonstrated territorial ambitions in the 
other's immediate sphere of influence. While Soviet and Amer-
ican rhetoric suggested that each side would like to replace the 
government of the other with a political system more compatible 
with its own, there is little evidence that either country seriously 
contemplated pursuing this objective. In the economic sphere, 
the Soviet Union is not a serious competitor of the United States 
for markets and raw materials around the world because the 
Soviet economy has little to offer in exports except oil and gas, 
certain minerals, and military equipment; few countries buy So-
viet manufactured goods for hard currencies. In the ideological 
competition, it was clear by the 1980s that the Marxist-Leninist 
model of government had lost its appeal in Western societies; and 
only a few developing countries were attracted to it because 
Communism seemed to offer a shortcut to economic growth and 
political cohesion. The Marxist appeal seems strong only in those 
Third World countries that have wide disparities in wealth and 
where few, if any, human rights prevail. This situation exists in 
many Caribbean Basin countries, a traditional area of U.S. influ-
ence, and Soviet efforts are increasingly directed there in the 
1980s. In terms of defense-of-homeland, economic, and ide-
ological interests, the competition between the Soviet Union and 
the United States is probably not at the vital level, because neither 
side covets the territory or economic system of the other. 
It is the world-order interests of the two superpowers that 
constitute the dangerous area of world competition. This embrac-
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es the struggle for influence and prestige in the large world arena, 
and it involves a determination by each one not to be humiliated 
or slighted by the other in pursuit of international objectives. In 
effect, the last half of the twentieth century is witnessing a classic 
case of two proud empires vying with each other for political 
influence on a global scale. It is not unlike the competition be-
tween Great Britain and France during the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, first in North America, then in Europe, and-
after the Napoleonic Wars-in Africa and Southeast Asia. When 
a third power, Germany, asserted itself in the twentieth century, 
Britain and France agreed to cooperate to put down the new 
threat to their colonial empires and the security of Europe. Sim-
ilarly, the U.S.S.R. and the United States cooperated during 
World War II when Nazi Germany sought to upset the balance of 
power in Europe and the Middle East. Since 1945, the peace of 
Europe has been maintained by Soviet and U.S. forces in Ger-
many, with the NATO and Warsaw pacts supporting the two 
superpowers in maintaining a new balance between the Soviet 
and the Euro-American spheres of influence. In Asia, the inde-
pendent power of China has been informally added to that of the 
United States in a new balance that seeks to restrain Soviet 
expansionism in East and Southeast Asia. 
A fundamental question in the 1980s, therefore, is this: where 
do the superpowers consider their vital world-order interests to 
lie and under what conditions are they willing to risk war to 
advance or defend them? If we assume that neither superpower 
will directly threaten the other's homeland because it would risk 
its own annihilation, the challenge for policy-makers in Moscow 
and Washington is to find ways to enhance their own country's 
world-order interests without threatening the vital interests of 
the other. That suggests an analysis of how each country views its 
national interests in the mid-1980s and where the ambiguities as 
well as flash points in the relationship probably lie. 
The Soviet View of Its Interests Vis-a-Vis the U.S. 
There is little ambiguity about what the current Soviet lead-
ership views as its nation's vital defense-of-homeland interests: 
all of Eastern Europe; the areas along the Soviet border in South-
west Asia, including Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and the long 
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border with China; and North Korea and the waters off Sakhalin 
and Kamchatka in the Far East. Moscow has demonstrated on 
several occasions that it will use force to maintain pro-Soviet 
regimes in Eastern Europe, the most recent being its threat in 
1981-82 to intervene in Poland if the Polish government failed to 
crush the Solidarity free trade union movement. Whether the 
Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 was 
motivated by ambition to extend the Soviet sphere of influence 
southward or whether it was a defensive move designed to pre-
vent that country from creating an anti-Soviet regime, the move 
clearly improved the Soviet Union's security situation on its 
southern border, particularly among the fifty to sixty million 
Moslems living in that part of the U.S.S.R. In East Asia, Moscow 
has built up Vietnam militarily-to warn China against pressing 
historic claims on Soviet territory along their lengthy mutual 
border and to enhance Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. In 
sum, Soviet leaders view the areas adjacent to their borders, 
particularly in Eastern Europe where most invasions of Russia 
have occurred, to be vital defense interests. The Soviet leadership 
apparently has no qualms about using force-even limited nu-
clear war-to protect its borders. The shooting-down of a Korean 
commercial airliner over Sakhalin in September 1983 demon-
strated the acute concern felt by Soviet leaders over foreign intru-
sions on Soviet territory. 
The Soviet Union probably has no vital international economic 
interests, because its economy has been largely insulated from 
the outside world (other than the Soviet trading bloc with Eastern 
Europe). Because of its highly centralized and controlled econo-
my, the Soviet Union is less dependent on international trade and 
foreign sources of raw materials than any other major power. The 
exception is grain, and Soviet leaders have made great efforts in 
the past decade to insure that bad harvests at home will not result 
in starvation. Even when President Carter decided to put an 
embargo on grain sales to the Soviet Union in 1980, in retaliation 
for the invasion of Afghanistan, Moscow was able partially to 
overcome this deficit by increasing purchases from Argentina, 
Australia, and Canada. The Soviet leadership wishes to obtain 
advanced technology from the West and has gone to great lengths 
to steal it through clandestine means when it could not be ob-
tained on the open market. In the early 1970s Moscow thought 
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that detente with the United States would bring economic as well 
as political benefits; however, when Congress blocked plans by 
the Nixon administration to grant "most favored nation" treat-
ment to the Soviet Union, Kremlin leaders viewed that move as a 
violation of understandings reached at the Moscow summit con-
ference in 1972. Moscow's building of a gas pipeline from Siberia 
to Western Europe in the early 1980s was seen by the Reagan 
administration as Moscow's attempt to earn $10 billion dollars a 
year in hard currency from West Europeans in order to ease its 
dearth of hard currency to pay for grain imports as well as 
Western manufactured products. In sum, the Soviet Union has a 
major interest in trade with the United States and the West, but 
certainly not a vital interest. In case of an emergency or war, the 
Soviet Union would be self-sufficient in most essential goods. As 
for food, the Kremlin leadership has demonstrated on many 
occasions that it can force a tighter diet on its citizens, if neces-
sary. It is unlikely that the Soviet leadership will ever permit the 
country to become crucially dependent on food imports from the 
West. 
Soviet world-order and ideological interests are the areas 
where the risk of war may be substantial because Soviet leaders 
seem prepared to risk confrontations in Third World areas when 
they believe they will be successful or when they are committed 
to defend a Communist ally. The Brezhnev Doctrine, enunciated 
by the Soviet leader at the time of Soviet intervention in Czecho-
slovakia in 1968, proclaimed that once a country has adopted a 
Communist system of government, it can count on the Soviet 
Union to provide whatever support is necessary to insure that the 
system is not overthrown by either internal or external means. 
Although Czechoslovakia is within the Soviet defense-of-home-
land interest, the implication of Brezhnev's 1968 statement was 
that Moscow would intervene anywhere if it believed that a true 
socialist government was being threatened. This doctrine clearly 
applies to Cuba, and it also includes Vietnam since 1978, when 
the two countries signed a mutual defense pact. The Brezhnev 
Doctrine probably also includes Angola, whose Marxist govern-
ment was brought to power in 1976 with Soviet and Cuban sup-
port: it also applies to Syria, whose government, although not 
Communist, nevertheless welcomed a Soviet defense guarantee 
in 1~81 as insurance against an attack by Israel. In sum, the Soviet 
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Union has staked out in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the 
Middle East certain interests that are probably at the vital world-
order level. Moscow reinforces these world-order interests with 
strong ideological rhetoric designed to show solidarity with "fra-
ternal Communist governments." In return, those governments 
are expected to cooperate with Moscow in furthering the cause of 
socialism in their parts of the world and to provide the U.S.S.R. 
with military facilities and voting support in the United Nations. 
How far is the Kremlin leadership willing to go in pressing its 
brand of socialism and its military power into distant areas of the 
world? Professor Seweryn Bialer, a leading Sovietologist from 
Columbia University, had this evaluation in the spring of 1983: 
"Soviet ambition and ideology are rarely in conflict, but rather 
reinforce each other, adding virulence to Soviet international 
ambitions and expectations. The direction of Soviet military and 
foreign policy is determined by these forces and the Soviet capaci-
ty to pursue them, independent of any behavior of the Western 
powers." Bialer argues that Soviet foreign and military policy are 
primarily conditioned by the extreme Soviet preoccupation with 
defense-of-homeland interests and that the projection of Soviet 
power and influence into other parts of the world is of only 
secondary importance. He asserts that no amount of military 
expenditures by the state will make Soviet elites feel fully secure: 
"What they are actually pursuing, therefore, is total security, 
which in reality is unattainable." As for Soviet objectives in the 
Third World, Bialer thinks they are based on "the idea that the 
achievement of strategic parity with the United States should be 
translated into visible gains in Soviet influence and power, and 
that the term "political equality" means that the Soviet Union will 
be as free as the United States to project its power and influence 
anywhere in the world.1 
It is reasonable to conclude that Soviet national interests are 
based fundamentally on the protection of Soviet borders and 
institutions as well as adjoining areas in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia (defense of homeland), and thereafter on projecting 
Soviet power and influence to other areas of the world where 
Soviet leaders believe they have earned the right to be consulted 
1. "The Soviet Union and the West in the 1980s: Detente, Containment, or 
Confrontation?" Orbis (Spring 1983): 42-43. 
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about any international issue. Soviet ideology justifies supporting 
"socialist forces" everywhere in the world, particularly if this 
weakens the ability of the United States and Western Europe to 
resist Soviet pressures internationally. The risks that Soviet lead-
ers are willing to take to advance their country's world role are 
based on the "correlation of forces" and their ability to gain 
advantage from Western weakness or indecision. Since 1970, 
Soviet leaders have been bolder in pushing their advantage out-
side the area of Soviet defense interests. This corresponds to the 
growing Soviet capability to project military power to other parts 
of the world and to take advantage of the uncertain direction of 
U.S. foreign policy after the failure of that policy in Vietnam. 
President Carter's emphasis on human rights as an important 
component of American foreign policy baffled Soviet leaders, as 
did his uncertain policies on strategic arms limitations and his 
indecision on dealing with Iran in 1978-79. By the end of the 1970s, 
Soviet leaders were contemplating the fracture of NATO over the 
issue of theater nuclear weapons, believing that the Soviet Union 
could intimidate West Europeans-especially West Germans--
into accepting the presence of Soviet medium-range missiles in 
Eastern Europe while rejecting corresponding American missiles 
in Western Europe. 
Moscow's decision to take greater risks in pursuing its world-
order interests, dating from the early 1970s, corresponds with 
that country's achievement of nuclear parity with the United 
States. Its success in catching up with the other superpower in 
strategic weapons resulted from a crash program initiated after 
the humiliating Cuban missile crisis of 1962 when the Kremlin 
decided never again to be caught in an inferior military position in 
relation to the United States. From 1970 onward, Soviet leaders 
were confident of their ability to protect their borders against 
conventional attack on Soviet territory. Therefore, Soviet leaders 
could afford to be less worried about possible attacks on Soviet 
territory and to pay greater attention to ways in which their 
country could play a world role and enhance its ability to trade 
with the West (economic interest). They decided to increase Sovi-
et political influence abroad by supporting governments that 
were friendly to Soviet objectives (world-order) and providing 
clandestine aid to Communist insurgent groups that were fight-
ing "capitalist exploiters" in the underdeveloped world (ide-
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ology). By 1983, Moscow was pushing its influence not only into 
Africa, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia, as it 
had done in the 1970s; it was also risking a confrontation with the 
U.S. government in Central America. Whether stirring up revo-
lutions on the U.S. doorstep was viewed by Moscow as retaliation 
for the Reagan administration's strong rhetorical support for free 
trade unions in Poland or as a response to a tempting opportunity 
following the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua 
in 1979 is not clear. What is not in doubt, however, is that the 
Kremlin apparently gave its client, Fidel Castro, a green light to 
see how far he could push in undermining all the Central Amer-
ican governments before getting a strong reaction from Wash-
ington. By the summer of 1983, it was clear that the Reagan 
administration would use force in Central America to prevent the 
spread of Cuban and Soviet influence; Castro then began to talk 
about negotiations and withdrawal of his military advisers if the 
United States did the same. But Soviet and Cuban influence was 
by then already deeply embedded in Nicaragua. 
Soviet national interests relative to the United States in the 
mid-1980s can be illustrated on the interest matrix as seen in 
Figure 16. The policy implications of this analysis of interests are 
as follows: (1) Soviet leaders will use force whenever they think 
their own territory, or the territory of an adjacent friendly state, 
may be attacked or when the government of any neighboring 
friendly country might be replaced with a less friendly one; (2) 
Moscow is likely to use force whenever it believes the correlation 
of forces in areas not part of the Soviet defense area is in its favor, 
and it will risk confrontation with the United States unless 
Moscow believes that doing so could result in a nuclear war. 
Neither economic nor ideological interests are at the vital level of 
intensity for the Kremlin's leaders because they have insulated 
their economy from heavy outside dependence and because pro-
motion of Marxism-Leninism, by itself, has not been seen as a 
vital interest to Soviet leaders. Yet, the creation of a world order 
that is more pro-Moscow and less pro-Washington has become a 
vital national interest of Soviet leaders in the past decade because 
Soviet military capabilities have more nearly matched Soviet 
world ambitions. Seweryn Bialer, cited earlier, thinks that Soviet 
international behavior can be explained by the ideology of its 
elites: "Soviet ideology should be understood not as a set of 
184 The Soviet Empire 
Fig. 16. Soviet National Interests Vis-a-Vis the United States 
Basic Interest at Stake Intensity of Interest 
Survival Vital Major Peripheral 
Defense of Homeland u.s. 
Economic Well-Being u.s. 
Favorable World Order u.s. 
Promotion of Values u.s. 
doctrinal dogmas that directly dictates Soviet actions, but as tend-
encies and patterns of thought and belief that shape the mind-set 
of Soviet policy-makers, and are a product of the fusion of the 
most general doctrinal precepts with Soviet and Russian histor-
ical experience. "2 
The U.S. View of Its Interests Vis-a-Vis the U.S.S.R. 
U.S. relations with the Soviet Union have never been cordial, 
even during World War II when the two countries were allies 
against Nazi Germany. From 1917, when the Bolshevik revolution 
swept Lenin and his lieutenants into power, until 1933, when 
President Roosevelt first opened diplomatic relations with the 
new regime, the United States was chiefly concerned with the 
ideological thrust of the Soviet revolution and the determination 
of Soviet leaders to undermine capitalist systems in Western 
Europe and North America. After 1933, the United States dealt 
"correctly" with the Soviet government while keeping the U.S. 
Communist Party under close surveillance. This became a par-
ticular problem between the summer of 1939 and June of 1941, 
because the American Communist Party agreed with Stalin's 
policy of cooperation with Nazi Germany at a time when official 
American policy was moving toward support of Britain. This 
changed when Hitler attacked Russia in June 1941 and President 
Roosevelt initiated Lend-Lease aid for the Soviet Union. When 
the United States joined the war against Germany in December 
1941, President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill 
vigorously supported Stalin's efforts to resist Hitler's armies. 
2. Ibid. I 41. 
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Stalin suspected that the Allied invasion of the continent was 
purposely postponed until1944 so that the German and Russian 
armies would exhaust each other and permit Roosevelt and 
Churchill to arrange the peace terms-to Moscow's disadvan-
tage. Despite Roosevelt's efforts at Yalta to extract commitments 
from Stalin to respect the independence of Eastern Europe, Stalin 
had no intention of permitting any East European country, par-
ticularly Poland, to adopt a government that was not friendly to 
the Soviet Union. The presence of Soviet troops in Eastern Eu-
rope at the war's end insured that Soviet power and influence 
would be supreme up to the line dividing Germany into Soviet 
and Western occupation zones. 
In 1945, the Soviet Union was no longer just an ideological 
threat to the United States; it had also become a military menace 
whose near-term ambition was the extension of Soviet power 
over Western Europe. President Harry Truman had the task, 
from the moment he took office in April1945, of deciding U.S. 
national interests in relation to the Soviet Union; it soon became 
clear to him that Stalin was not interested only in dominating 
Eastern Europe, which his armies had liberated from Germany, 
but that he intended also to dominate all of Germany and, 
through the help of the French and Italian Communist parties, to 
dominate Italy and France as well. 
Truman's assessment of Soviet postwar interests and policies 
was made at the Potsdam summit conference with Stalin and 
Churchill in July 1945. He came away from that intensive series of 
meetings with a deep suspicion of Soviet objectives: "The person-
al meeting with Stalin and the Russians had more significance for 
me, because it enabled me to see at first hand what we and the 
West had to face in the future." The Russians were "relentless 
bargainers, forever pressing for every advantage for themselves," 
Truman wrote in his memoirs. "Yet I was not altogether disillu-
sioned to find now that the Russians were not in earnest about 
peace. It was clear that the Russian foreign policy was based on 
the conclusion that we were heading for a major depression, and 
they were already planning to take advantage of our setback." 
Truman revealed that the only secret agreement he reached at 
Potsdam was that the Soviet Union reaffirmed its intention to 
enter the war against Japan, which it had pledged to do at the 
Yalta Conference earlier that year. But his experience in dealing 
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with Stalin caused the President to conclude that he would never 
agree to a joint occupation of Japan: "Anxious as we were to have 
Russia in the war against Japan, the experience at Potsdam now 
made me determined that I would not allow the Russians any part 
in the control of Japan. Our experience with them in Germany 
and in Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Poland was such that I 
decided to take no chances in a joint setup with the Russians .... 
Force is the only thing the Russians understand. And while I was 
hopeful that Russia might someday be persuaded to work in co-
operation for peace, I knew that the Russians should not be 
allowed to get into any control of Japan."3 
From 1945 to 1953, the year Stalin died, U.S. policy was to 
confront the Soviet Union's expansive world-order interests head 
on, in Greece and Turkey, in Iran and Korea. U.S. policy also tried 
to slow down the absorption of Eastern Europe into the Soviet 
empire, even though Truman knew that this could only be a 
delaying action, given the Soviet army's tight grip on these coun-
tries. The one exception was Yugoslavia, which in 1948 broke with 
Moscow and followed an independent Communist course under 
its wartime leader, Marshal Tito. The Berlin Blockade, imposed by 
Stalin in 1948, was a different matter. This was seen as a bold move 
to freeze out the British, French, and Americans from their oc-
cupation rights in West Berlin. The crisis could well have involved 
the United States in war with the Soviet Union had not a remark-
able U.S. airlift succeeded in keeping the economy of West Berlin 
functioning. The North Atlantic Pact in April1949, and the subse-
quent U.S. decision to create a separate West German state in 
NATO, was part of the Cold War containment policy designed by 
President Truman to prevent Moscow from achieving its postwar 
goal of undermining West European governments. The Truman 
Doctrine of aid to Greece and Turkey sought to prevent Soviet 
domination of the straits between the Black Sea and the eastern 
Mediterranean. Stalin's support for the North Korean attack on 
South Korea in June 1950 confirmed Truman's suspicion that the 
Soviet Union was preparing for a military showdown with the 
United States in Europe, and he persuaded NATO leaders to set 
up a unified command under an American supreme commander, 
the first one being General Dwight D. Eisenhower. When Truman 
3. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Year of Decisions (New York, 1955), pp. 411-12. 
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left office in January 1953, the Cold War was at its height, and the 
Korean War was stalemated. Stalin's death a few months later, 
however, opened an opportunity for a reassessment of U.S.-
Soviet relations. 
The Eisenhower administration continued Truman's hard line 
against Soviet expansionist policies, but because of the death of 
Stalin, it was able to take advantage of the new Soviet leadership's 
willingness to avoid confrontations and to negotiate an end to the 
Korean War, a truce in Indochina, a peace treaty for Austria, and 
begin a dialogue designed to reduce conflict over Berlin and 
Central Europe. The Geneva summit conference in 1955 ushered 
in a period of East-West detente which saw a lessening of ten-
sions, exchange programs between U.S. and Soviet groups, and a 
visit to the United States by Soviet Party Secretary Nikita 
Khrushchev. This "spirit of Geneva" came to an end in the sum-
mer of 1960, however, on the eve of another summit conference in 
Paris. The Soviet government had shot down an American U-2 
spy plane over its territory and sought to embarrass President 
Eisenhower by making public the identity of the pilot and the 
nature of his mission. Instead of denying the charge, as govern-
ments normally do when accused of espionage, the President 
admitted that the United States had been overflying Soviet ter-
ritory with the U-2 plane for four years, gathering crucial intel-
ligence information. This admission so infuriated Khrushchev 
that he canceled the summit meeting and began a renewal of the 
previous confrontation policy-in Berlin, Laos, and the Middle 
East. 
President John Kennedy, who assumed office in January 1961, 
became the object of Khrushchev's determination to push the 
Soviet psychological advantage that resulted from having been 
the first country to orbit an earth satellite. Moscow had also 
successfully tested an intercontinental missile. Kennedy was hu-
miliated first by the unsuccessful CIA-supported invasion of 
Cuba by Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs in April1961, then by the 
subsequent erection of the Berlin Wall in August. He was also 
unable to persuade Khrushchev to stop Laotian Communist 
forces, with Soviet support, from advancing against the Laotian 
capital of Vientiane-defended by forces supplied by the United 
States. All three of these setbacks for American policy in 1961 put 
the Kennedy administration on the defensive in relations with the 
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Soviet leadership and caused the President to inaugurate a mas-
sive military buildup, with particular emphasis given to strategic 
forces. This period of confrontation came to an end in October 
1962 when Chairman Krushchev overplayed his hand by secretly 
placing Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba and bring-
ing on the Cuban missile crisis. Because of President Kennedy's 
dramatic ultimatum to Moscow, the Soviets withdrew the missiles 
and suffered a humiliating diplomatic defeat. 
In 1963 a new period in U.S.-Soviet relations ushered in the 
first serious efforts at control of strategic nuclear weapons. After 
Kennedy's death in November 1963, President Lyndon Johnson 
continued the attempt to reach accommodation with the Soviet 
Union on the arms question, but he subsequently became so 
preoccupied with the war in Vietnam and with Chinese pressures 
in East Asia that his administration was unable to complete these 
arms negotiations before leaving office in January 1969. President 
Johnson wanted to hold a summit conference with the Soviet 
leader, Leonid Brezhnev, in 1968; but the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in September, to impose a hard-line Communist 
government there, precluded the presidential visit. 
From the time that Richard Nixon became President in January 
1969 until January 1981, when Ronald Reagan assumed the presi-
dency, the American view of the Soviet Union vacillated between 
two major conflicting viewpoints, both of them based on the 
conclusion reached by Harry Truman in July 1945 that the 
U.S.S.R. was an aggressive power and would pursue relentlessly 
its goal of world domination. The first of these opposing views 
held that Soviet leaders were as anxious as American leaders to 
control the development and deployment of strategic nuclear 
weapons and that they were prepared to make real concessions to 
reduce the danger of nuclear war. Some American leaders, 
among them Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's National 
Security Advisor, believed that Soviet leaders would work toward 
a reduction of world tensions and show restraint in pursuing 
Soviet world- order interests in the Third World. Proponents of 
this view thought that the United States could encourage Soviet 
leaders to act "responsibly" by offering them economic incen-
tives, such as "most favored nation" treatment in trade and finan-
cial credits to assist in the import of U.S. products. The sale of 
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large quantities of American grain was seen as an inducement to 
good Kremlin behavior. This view formed the basis of the "link-
age" theory, and it constituted the undergirding of Nixon's and 
Kissinger's approach to Moscow on arms control and on manag-
ing U.S. world-order interests. 
The second view, one often associated with the late Senator 
Henry Jackson of Washington and shared by many Republicans 
(including the 1976 presidential candidate, Ronald Reagan), as-
sumed that the Kremlin leadership was interested in arms control 
only to the extent that it enhanced the Soviet Union's power 
position. Adherents of this view argued that Moscow wanted to 
encourage Western Europe and the United States to reduce their 
defense expenditures and to expand trade and credits to the 
financially pressed countries of Eastern Europe while gearing its 
own economy to an ever expanding war machine. Proponents 
believed that Kissinger was wrong in his assessment of Moscow, 
that the Soviet Union would never modify its ambitious world-
order interests in return for economic incentives or for the sake of 
arms reduction. Soviet and Cuban exploitation of the Angolan 
civil war in 1975 and their subsequent move into Ethiopia in 1977 
to support a Marxist military group reinforced the hard-line 
criticism that Kissinger's detente policies had resulted in gains for 
the Soviet Union in the Third World, while the United States and 
Western Europe cut back on defense programs and on Third 
World involvements. 
Although the policies espoused by the second group of policy-
makers are believed to have commenced in 1981 when President 
Reagan took office, this hard-line actually commenced a year 
earlier, in January 1980, when President Carter decided that the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan proved that the Russians could not 
be trusted. Mr. Carter's policies then hardened considerably. 
They included a cancellation of American participation in the 1980 
Olympic Games in Moscow, suspension of grain sales to the 
Soviet Union and an imposition of economic sanctions and sus-
pension of cultural contacts. These actions were designed to show 
U.S. displeasure with Soviet behavior not only in Afghanistan 
but also in Africa, in Southeast Asia (support of Vietnam's oc-
cupation of Cambodia), and in Eastern Europe, where the Soviets 
began installing medium-range nuclear missiles while objecting 
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to NATO's plan to install similar weapons. The Carter administra-
tion also shifted policy toward Nicaragua in 1980, and it began 
sending arms to the El Salvador government to help it cope with 
insurgents being armed and trained in Nicaragua. In short, when 
Soviet armies moved into Afghanistan in December 1979, Amer-
ican policy shifted decisively away from flirtation with detente 
and efforts to reach accommodation with Moscow. 
The Reagan View of U.S. Interests Vis-a-Vis Moscow 
Ronald Reagan not only pursued a hard-line policy toward the 
Soviet Union when he came to the White House in 1981; he also 
sharpened American anti-Soviet rhetoric to a point unknown 
since the early days of the Eisenhower administration. Reagan 
held the Soviet Union responsible for most of the trouble in the 
world and for running a bankrupt society which could not main-
tain itself without overwhelming military power. He predicted 
that the Marxist-Leninist system would fail in due course and 
said that the West must be strong enough to prevent the Soviet 
Union from achieving by force what it could not do by peaceful 
means. To many Americans and Europeans, Mr. Reagan's views 
were a return to the Cold War of the late 1940s and early 1950s. A 
big difference, however, was that a new generation of Europeans 
and Americans had grown up during this thirty-year period and 
were not as confident as was Mr. Reagan's generation that the 
Soviet Union could be contained with military power. Moscow's 
achievement of parity with the United States in strategic weapons 
during the 1970s and its overwhelming superiority in con-
ventional arms in Central Europe made it appear to be a greater 
threat than ever. This perception promoted new peace move-
ments in Western Europe and in the United States, demanding 
an end to the arms race and negotiations between the super-
powers to reduce the threat of nuclear war. Thus, while the 
Reagan administration in 1981-82 was pushing through Congress 
the largest peacetime increases ever in the U.S. military budget 
and preparing to confront the Soviet Union on a worldwide scale, 
European and American opinion was increasingly divided on the 
wisdom of doing so. Beginning in the fall of 1981, the President 
made serious offers to renew SALT negotiations with the Soviet 
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Fig. 17. U.S. National Interests Vis-a-Vis the Soviet Union 
Basic Interest 
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Defense of Homeland 
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Union, and in accordance with his determination to bring about 
reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, he renamed the process 
START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks). Thus, while greatly 
expanding U.S. conventional and strategic forces and publicly 
chastising the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" and a threat to 
world peace, Mr. Reagan proposed new plans to control the 
growth of nuclear weapons and reduce the likelihood of military 
confrontation. 
The Reagan administration's view of the Soviet Union may be 
summarized as shown on the national interest matrix in Figure 17. 
The U.S. defense-of-homeland interest in regard to the Soviet 
Union is listed at the vital level because that country is capable, 
and may have the will, to inflict severe damage on the U.S. 
homeland. Because of this, every President must calculate the 
implications of a military confrontation with Soviet forces any-
where in the world, particularly in Europe, because this could 
escalate quickly into a strategic nuclear war. Therefore, the Unit-
ed States has a vital interest not only in having the most modern 
weapons available to deter a Soviet attack on the United States but 
in being able to sustain damage to this country while preventing 
the collapse of its society and institutions. A President also needs 
to pursue serious arms negotiations with the Soviet leaders; 
success in such talks is a vital U.S. defense interest because 
successful negotiations would reduce the possibility of nuclear 
war. Ironically, a vital defense-of-homeland interest for the Unit-
ed States means that while it must build and deploy the most 
awesome nuclear weaponry in order to insure that U.S. leaders 
cannot be intimidated by the Soviet Union or any other hostile 
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power, it must also pursue serious arms control negotiations in 
order to stop the outbreak of such a war. 
The U.S. economic interest in the Soviet Union is growing 
because American farmers and manufacturers see a large export 
market there. The reaction of U.S. wheat farmers and manufac-
turers of energy-related equipment to President Carter's econom-
ic sanctions against Moscow following the invasion of 
Afghanistan is indicative of this interest, which had been 
spawned during the 1970s when trade with Eastern Europe was 
encouraged. President Reagan's reversal of the Carter sanctions, 
despite his strong anti-Soviet rhetoric, shows that increased ap-
prehension of Soviet military adventures is not strong enough to 
overcome the Republican Party's desire to provide export markets 
for its constituencies, such as western farmers. On the other 
hand, Mr. Reagan was firmly opposed to making financial credits 
available to the Soviet Union and East European countries, and 
he went through a serious confrontation in 1982 with European 
NATO leaders to underscore his point that the West should not 
finance the Siberian gas pipeline. With the lifting of martial law in 
Poland in 1983, Mr. Reagan eased some economic restrictions on 
that country but there was no sign that U.S. economic interests in 
Eastern Europe would grow so long as Eastern bloc countries 
were unable to pay hard currency for imports. The exception was 
grain, and the Soviet Union pays for that in hard currency. 
The most critical area of conflict between U.S. and Soviet 
interests, as it has been since 1945, is in the world-order catego-
ry-in those parts of the world that the Soviet leadership covets 
and that the United States is determined to deny to it. Specifically, 
Soviet leaders from Stalin onward have desired to extend Soviet 
influence over all of Germany in the West, Turkey and Iran in the 
South, Korea and Japan in the East; and they have also sought to 
neutralize China. These are near-term Soviet world-order inter-
ests, and Moscow has worked toward them steadily since 1945. 
Longer-term Soviet world-order interests include a dominant 
influence in Western Europe, Scandinavia, and the Mediterra-
nean countries; friendly, cooperating oil-rich Arab states; a neu-
tralized India and Southeast Asia; and an Africa that can be fully 
exploited for its minerals. In short, the Soviet Union desires to be 
the dominant imperial power in both Europe and Asia, just as it 
sees the United States being the dominant power in the Western 
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Hemisphere. That is what Soviet leaders mean by "equality" 
between the superpowers. 
All American Presidents since Truman have steadfastly op-
posed the fulfillment of these Soviet world-order interests. The 
North Atlantic Pact, the Baghdad Pact, the Manila Pact, the 
ANZUS Pact, and the bilateral defense treaties with Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines were all designed to thwart 
the Soviet Union's determination to expand its influence in Eu-
rope and Asia after World War II. This U.S. grand containment 
policy began to crack in the 1950s: Egypt's Gamal Nasser decided 
to accept arms from the Soviet Union in order to support his 
ambitions for a united Arab world; India and Indonesia took the 
lead in sponsoring a nonaligned group of nations that maintained 
friendship with the Soviet Union while denouncing Western 
colonialism; Ho Chi Minh decided to join with the Soviet Union 
and China to oust France and then the United States from Indo-
china; and even in the Western Hemisphere, the Soviet Union 
embraced the new Marxist dictator of Cuba and eventually made 
him the accomplice of Soviet ambitions in Latin America and 
Africa. 
The old containment policy has further eroded in the Middle 
East with the ouster of the Shah of Iran in 1979 and the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan ten months later. It threatens to break 
down also in Europe if West German public sentiment moves 
toward neutralism, and in Southeast Asia if China and the 
ASEAN countries are unable to contain Vietnam's territorial am-
bitions, supported by Moscow. Even in North America, Moscow 
is seeking to make things so uncomfortable for the United States 
in El Salvador that the United States will be obliged to shift 
attention and resources away from other areas in order to shore 
up interests closer to home. 
Finally, the ideological struggle between capitalism and so-
cialism, between freedom and oppression, between Christian 
values and atheism-to cite some of the ideological rhetoric used 
by conservative supporters of President Reagan-is not more 
than a major interest of U.S. policy-makers. This is because in the 
mid-1980s Marxism is no longer seen by most countries as an 
alternative to the free market system as a way of ordering modern 
society. Social welfare programs instituted in much of the First 
World during the past forty years have reduced disparities be-
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tween rich and poor in Western societies, so that the untamed 
capitalism of Marx's time is now heavily regulated in most ad-
vanced countries. Thus, the Soviet Union's Second World has 
little appeal except in some backward Third World states. The real 
problem is more economic than ideological in these areas, and 
U.S. policy since President Truman enunciated his Point Four 
program has been to provide economic hope to underdeveloped 
countries as the best way of limiting the appeal of Marxism. 
However, this erosion of Marxism is offset by Soviet training and 
support for armed insurgents in many countries, where they may 
have the ability to impose Marxist-Leninist rule. That seems to be 
the pattern in Nicaragua and El Salvador, and in certain African 
countries such as Angola and Ethiopia. 
U.S. National Security Council Policy toward the U.S.S.R. 
The Reagan administration came to power in 1981 convinced 
that U.S. national interests around the world were in serious 
jeopardy for several reasons: the growing Soviet military power, 
the unwillingness of several European NATO countries to be 
realistic about Soviet objectives in the Middle East as well as 
Europe, and the indecisiveness shown by both Republican and 
Democratic administrations during the 1970s in dealing with the 
U.S.S.R. Mr. Reagan's National Security Council was composed 
of "realists" who fully agreed with Truman's assessment thirty-
five years earlier that "force is the only thing the Russians under-
stand": Secretary of State Alexander Haig, whom Reagan had 
chosen because of his long experience in the national security 
field and his rapport with European leaders resulting from his 
tour as supreme commander of NATO; Secretary of Defense 
Caspar Weinberger, a hardheaded administrator and long-time 
associate of Mr. Reagan; Director of Central Intelligence William 
Casey, Mr. Reagan's campaign manager during the 1980 presiden-
tial race, who had had long experience in the intelligence field; 
Richard Allen, a conservative academic who had been Mr. Rea-
gan's foreign policy adviser during the election campaign and 
was appointed his Assistant for National Security Affairs. Vice 
President George Bush, who also had extensive experience in 
national security affairs-in Congress, in China, and as Director 
of the Central Intelligence Agency-played an important role in 
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National Security Council deliberations, as well. The President 
invited the U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations, 
Jeane Kirkpatrick, to join many NSC meetings. Mrs. Kirkpatrick, 
a conservative academic, was ideologically close to Mr. Reagan's 
own view of international Communism, and her views on U.S. 
policy in Latin America were given particular weight by the 
President. 
During the second year of the Reagan administration, the 
President replaced Richard Allen as National Security Adviser 
with William Clark, a long-time associate whom Mr. Reagan, 
while governor of California, had appointed to the California 
Supreme Court. Clark had been made Deputy Secretary of State 
in 1981 to give him training in foreign policy and national security 
affairs, with which he had had no previous experience. He 
shared the President's deep suspicion of the Soviet Union and the 
international Communist movement. When Judge Clark moved 
to the White House, the post of National Security Advisor was 
upgraded; unlike Richard Allen (who had reported to the Presi-
dent through Counselor Edwin Meese), Mr. Clark became one of 
the President's closest advisors. In the summer of 1983 he report-
edly was the architect of Mr. Reagan's decision to deploy Amer-
ican military forces to Honduras and naval units to the waters off 
Nicaragua. In October 1983, President Reagan decided to appoint 
Clark Secretary of the Interior and replace him in the White 
House with Robert McFarlane, Clark's deputy at the NSC. 
The President also replaced Secretary of State Haig in June 
1982 with George Shultz, an economist and business executive 
who had served in several Cabinet positions during the Nixon 
Administration. Shultz replaced Haig at a time of considerable 
disarray in the administration's foreign policy: Israel had invaded 
deep inside Lebanon without prior knowledge of the United 
States; the European allies were furious with President Reagan 
for imposing sanctions against U.S. firms and their licensees for 
selling pipeline equipment to the Soviet Union; and there was 
bitter controversy within the administration over arms control 
negotiations. 
Secretary of State Shultz, an academic by training and tem-
perament, seemed less concerned with crisis management and 
day-to-day issues in foreign policy and viewed it as his major 
responsibility to formulate a cohesive, long-range policy for deal-
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ing with the Soviet Union. His objective was to define U.S. 
national interests in a way that would win bipartisan support in 
Congress and among American foreign policy elites. His most 
formidable task was articulating a long-term policy toward 
Moscow that would be both realistic and consistent, and could 
serve as the basis of comprehensive negotiations with the new 
Andropov leadership. After a year in office and after discussions 
with many world leaders, including Soviet Foreign Minister An-
drei Gromyko, Shultz chose in June 1983 to address the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee on the Reagan administration's con-
sidered view of U.S. relationships with the Soviet Union. His was 
the definitive statement of U.S. national interests in relations with 
Moscow. 
In his prepared text, the Secretary said that "every postwar 
American President has come sooner or later to recognize that 
peace must be built on strength; President Reagan has long 
recognized this reality." Shultz recalled that in the previous two 
years the country had made a "fundamental commitment" to 
restoring its military and economic power as well as its moral and 
spiritual strength; having started on the path to rebuilding its 
strength, the Reagan administration was ready to engage the 
Soviet leaders in "constructive dialogue through which we hope 
to find political solutions to outstanding issues." The Secretary 
then elaborated how U.S. national interests were affected by 
Soviet objectives and policies: 
Certainly there are many factors contributing to East-West 
tensions. The Soviet Union's strategic Eurasian location 
places it in close proximity to important Western interests 
on two continents. Its aspirations for great international 
influence lead it to challenge these interests. Its Marxist-
Leninist ideology gives its leaders a perspective on history 
and a vision of the future fundamentally different from our 
own. But we are not so deterministic as to believe that 
geopolitics and ideological competition must ineluctably 
lead to permanent and dangerous confrontation. Nor is it 
permanently inevitable that contention between the United 
States and the Soviet Union must dominate and distort 
international politics. A peaceful world order does not re-
quire that we and the Soviet Union agree on all the funda-
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mentals of morals or politics. It does require, however, that 
Moscow's behavior be subject to the restraint appropriate to 
living together on this planet in the nuclear age. Not all the 
many external and internal factors affecting Soviet behavior 
can be influenced by us. But we take it as part of our 
obligation to peace to encourage the gradual evolution of the 
Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and eco-
nomic system, and above all to counter Soviet expansionism 
through sustained and effective political, economic and 
military competition. 4 
Shultz went on to say that detente, which had been pursued in . 
the 1970s, had not worked: "The policy of detente represented an 
effort to induce Soviet restraint. While in some versions it recog-
nized the need to resist Soviet geopolitical encroachments, it also 
hoped that the anticipation of benefits from expanding economic 
relations and arms control agreements would restrain Soviet 
behavior." The Secretary added that "unfortunately, experience 
had proved otherwise. The economic relationship may have 
eased some of the domestic Soviet economic constraints that 
might have at least marginally inhibited Moscow's behavior. It 
also raised the specter of a future Western dependence on Soviet 
bloc trade that would inhibit Western freedom of action toward 
the East more than it would dictate prudence to the U.S.S.R." 
Shultz thus sided with the hard-line group which, in the early 
1970s, had argued against detente because they believed it would 
weaken the West's resolve to resist Soviet pressure while having 
little tangible effect on Soviet pursuit of its ambitious world-order 
interests. 
Shultz said the Reagan administration's policy was not based 
on a containment theory, as enunciated in the Truman admin-
istration and followed for the next twenty years. "Unlike con-
tainment, our policy begins with the clear recognition that the 
Soviet Union is and will remain a global superpower. In response 
to the lessons of this global superpower's conduct in recent years, 
our policy, unlike some versions of detente, assumes that the 
Soviet Union is more likely to be deterred by our actions that 
4. "U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Context of U.S. Foreign Policy," Department of 
State Bulletin, July 1983, p.66. 
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make clear the risks their aggression entails than by a delicate web 
of interdependence. "5 Shultz thus underlined the Reagan admin-
istration's view that a large stick, rather than a large carrot, would 
be more effective in curbing such Soviet behavior that the United 
States considered prejudicial to its world-order interests. 
In this major statement of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, 
which was specifically approved by President Reagan, Secretary 
Shultz touched on three basic U.S. national interests. Regarding 
defense-of-homeland, he stated: "The central goal of our national 
security policy is deterrence of war; restoring and maintaining 
the strategic balance is a necessary condition for that deterrence." 
At the same time, he said, the United States was accelerating 
programs to strengthen its conventional capabilities: "To deter or 
deal with any future crisis, we need to maintain both our con-
ventional capabilities and our strategic deterrent." He also noted 
that arms limitation was part of the U.S. defense interest: 
"Strength and realism can deter war, but only direct dialogue and 
negotiation can open the path toward lasting peace." 
Regarding economic well-being, Shultz said that "economic 
transactions can confer important strategic benefits and we must 
be mindful of the implications for our security." But he added that 
U.S. policy is not one of economic warfare against the U.S.S.R.; 
East-West trade conducted on the basis of commercially sound 
terms and mutual advantage "contributes to constructive East-
West relations." It is noteworthy that on August 25, 1983, Secre-
tary of Agriculture John Block signed a new five-year grain agree-
ment with the Soviet Union, guaranteeing that supplies would 
not be interrupted for political reasons, as they had been by the 
Carter administration following the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. Moscow agreed to pay for this grain in hard curren-
cy, however. 
Shultz devoted a significant part of his testimony to world-
order interests and recited a long list of trouble spots where the 
administration believed the Kremlin's leaders were behaving in a 
way that was not conducive to peace and cooperation with the 
United States. His statement summed up the Reagan view of 
Soviet actions affecting U.S. world-order interests: "We must 
address the threat to peace posed by the Soviet exploitation of 
5. Ibid., 67. 
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regional instability and conflict. Indeed, these issues-arms con-
trol and political instability-are closely related: the increased 
stability that we try to build into the superpower relationship 
through arms control can be undone by irresponsible Soviet 
policies elsewhere. In our numerous discussions with the Soviet 
leadership, we have repeatedly expressed our strong interest in 
reaching understandings with the Soviets that would minimize 
superpower involvement in conflicts beyond their borders." 
Secretary Shultz ended his prepared statement to the Foreign 
Relations Committee with this summary of where relations with 
the U.S.S.R. stood in the summer of 1983: 
We have spelled out our requirements and our hope for a 
more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. The 
direction in which that relationship evolves will ultimately 
be determined by the decision of the Soviet leadership. 
President Brezhnev's successors will have to weigh the in-
creased costs and risks of relentless competition against the 
benefits of a less tense international environment in which 
they could more adequately address the rising expectations 
of their own citizens. While we can define their alternatives, 
we cannot decipher their intentions. To a degree unequalled 
anywhere else, Russia in this respect remains a secret. Her 
history, of which this secrecy is such an integral part, 
provides no basis for expecting a dramatic change. And yet 
it also teaches that gradual change is possible. For our part, 
we seek to encourage change by a firm but flexible U.S. 
strategy, resting on a broad consensus, that we can sustain 
over the long term whether the Soviet Union changes or 
not. 6 
Shultz's clear and balanced statement of U.S. interests and 
policy toward the Soviet Union was based on two important 
premises: first, that the course of firmness and strength he said 
the United States would follow in dealing with Soviet aggressive 
behavior would be sustainable over a long period of time-not 
just during the Reagan presidency; and second, that the new 
Soviet leaders who emerged after Yuri Andropov would be more 
6. Ibid., 72. 
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willing than their predecessors to curtail Soviet worldwide ambi-
tions. 
Although the Secretary predicted that the United States would 
sustain a firm but flexible strategy, regardless of whether the 
Soviet Union changed its policies, that remained to be seen, given 
the volatile political climate prevailing in the United States in 
1983-84. Why should Soviet leaders not think that they will even-
tually achieve their international goals by being patient and sim-
ply letting the dialectic political forces within the United States 
gradually force an accommodation to Soviet superiority in inter-
national affairs? From a Soviet perspective, the correlation of 
forces will be in their favor if the United States elects a new 
President every four years, and the party out of power panders to 
public criticism of huge defense budgets and the threat of nuclear 
war. 
If Secretary Shultz's analysis of U.S. interests in relation to the 
Soviet Union becomes the basis of a bipartisan formulation of 
U.S. policy, however, this new trend may continue into the 1990s 
regardless of which political party holds the White House, and 
notwithstanding the frequency with which the U.S. electorate 
changes Presidents. Soviet leaders may then have to scale down 
their ambitions or be prepared to run greater risks of armed 
confrontation with the United States. If we assume that Soviet 
leaders are as rational about the risks of nuclear war as are 
American leaders, the question then comes down to which side 
has the greater political will and staying power-in what Mr. 
Shultz sees as the continuing competitiveness of two super-
powers with worldwide interests. That is why it is essential that 
Soviet and American leaders have a clear perception of what each 
side considers to be its vital interests-those for which they will 
go to war. If a miscalculation is made-like Nikita Khrushchev's in 
Cuba in October 1962-the two leaderships must have a fail-safe 
system for containing the confrontation before it escalates into a 
large and possibly catastrophic conflict. If linkage policies failed 
to work in the 1970s and if arms treaties and East-West trade did 
not encourage the Brezhnev leadership to curtail adventurous 
policies in Africa, Asia, and Central America, the Reagan formula 
modeled on the Truman prescription may be more successful. 
This implies that the United States must have sufficient military 
power to convince Soviet leaders that they cannot win easy victo-
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ries in the Third World-such as Angola, Afghanistan, and Cam-
bodia-and certainly not in Central America. 
This reasoned approach of Secretary of State George Shultz to 
U.S.-Soviet relations came crashing down in September 1983 as 
the result of the Soviet shooting-down of a Korean commercial 
airliner over Sakhalin Island. Moscow's decision to blame the 
incident on the United States, by charging that the plane was on a 
spy mission, infuriated official Washington and most of the world 
community, especially when Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko 
subsequently said that his country reserved the right to shoot 
down any other airliner that crossed into Soviet territory. Presi-
dent Reagan's early response set the tone for U.S. official state-
ments, in Washington and at the United Nations, and probably 
resulted in Foreign Minister Gromyko's decision not to attend the 
U.N. General Assembly session-although he cited restrictions 
against the landing of Aeroflot planes in New York as his reason. 
On September 3, two days after the plane had been destroyed 
with the loss of 269lives, Mr. Reagan said that "the United States 
and many other countries of the world made clear and compelling 
statements that express not only our outrage but also our demand 
for a truthful accounting of the facts." He denounced the Soviet 
Union for ignoring the tradition of the civilized world that "has 
always offered help to mariners and pilots who are lost or in 
distress." He continued: "What can we think of a regime that so 
broadly trumpets its visions of peace and global disarmament 
and yet so callously and quickly commits a terrorist act to sacrifice 
the lives of innocent human beings? What can be said about 
Soviet credibility when they so flagrantly lie about such a heinous 
act? What can be the scope of legitimate mutual discourse with a 
state whose values permit such atrocities? And what are we to 
make of a regime which establishes one set of standards for itself 
and another for the rest of humankind?"7 
The Reagan administration seemed determined after this trag-
edy and the worldwide denunciations not to return to "business 
as usual" relationships with the Soviet Union. Yet Washington 
carefully stated that it would not cancel the recently concluded 
grain deal with Moscow, nor would it interrupt the arms reduc-
tion talks going on in Geneva. Although most NATO countries 
7. Washington Post, 3 Sept. 1983, p. A22. 
202 The Soviet Empire 
strongly denounced the Soviet Union and agreed to sanctions 
against Aeroflot flights into their countries, West European gov-
ernments were insistent that arms control discussions must pro-
ceed because public opinion-particularly in West Germany-
demanded these negotiations regardless of its revulsion over 
Soviet behavior in the Korean airline disaster. Therefore, the 
Reagan administration was not in a position to sharply alter its 
previous policies toward Moscow; but it turned up the volume of 
its anti-Soviet rhetoric to an unprecedented degree. 
Summing Up 
The United States and the Soviet Union since World War II 
have had quite different priorities in their basic national interests. 
The United States became deeply involved in promoting its eco-
nomic and world-order interests worldwide because there were 
few threats to its defense-of-homeland interest. The Soviet 
Union, on the other hand, was obsessed with defense-of-home-
land from 1945 until the early 1970s, when it reached nuclear 
parity with the United States. Its world-order and economic 
interests abroad have widened, however, as its fear of being 
attacked at home has lessened. Thus, the superpowers are today 
in the classic position of satiated and unsatiated competitors for 
international influence-not much different from Great Britain 
and Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century. That 
competition, unfortunately, resulted in a war that devastated 
European supremacy in world affairs and led, a generation later, 
to a second round that brought European civilization near to 
collapse. Whether the threat of nuclear holocaust will enjoin the 
new superpowers from pressing their competition to the brink of 
war is not certain; nevertheless, this threat has maintained the 
peace between them for forty years. Barring an all-out war, the 
great danger in the relationship during the next decade is that a 
test of wills may take place in an area in which both powers think 
they have vital interests at stake, and a local war will then turn 
into a larger one because neither side will believe it can afford to 
back down. This could happen in the Persian Gulf area, close to 
Soviet borders and therefore viewed by Kremlin leaders as right-
fully within the Soviet area of influence and not to be contested by 
the United States. A similar situation in reverse applies to the 
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unstable situation in Central America. This is not to say that war 
will occur in the Persian Gulf but rather that it is an area where the 
Soviet Union has great advantages in deploying force, if it 
chooses to do so, and where the United States would have few 
allies and great difficulty in bringing credible force to bear. That is 
why it is crucial that U.S. and Soviet leaders reach an understand-
ing on how far each side is prepared to go in pressing its view of 
vital world-order interests. 
9. Priorities among U.S. 
National Interests 
During the 1970s, three Presidents of the United States tried to 
redefine U.S. national interests in a way that would be more 
consistent with U.S. capabilities and the willingness of the Amer-
ican people to use the armed forces to defend vital U.S. interests. 
The Guam Doctrine, later called the Nixon Doctrine, made it clear 
that countries allied with the United States, particularly those in 
Asia, would be expected to bear the brunt of ground combat if 
they were attacked by hostile forces and that the United States 
would rely on its air and naval power to support them. When 
Great Britain withdrew its forces from bases in the Red Sea, the 
Persian Gulf, Singapore, and Malaysia in 1971, the Nixon admin-
istration decided not to replace them, as President Truman had 
reluctantly done when Britain withdrew from Greece and Turkey 
in 1947. Despite proposals by some strategists to have the United 
States fill the perceived power vacuum left by London's decision 
to withdraw from "East of Suez," President Nixon decided in-
stead to encourage the Shah of Iran to assume responsibility for 
security in the Persian Gulf area. He also sought agreement with 
Moscow to limit the presence of Soviet and American warships in 
the Indian Ocean. In Europe, Mr. Nixon pressed the NATO allies 
to accept more of the defense burden there. The detente policies 
initiated by the President and his foreign policy adviser, Dr. 
Henry Kissinger, led to the first strategic arms agreement with 
Moscow in 1972 and the Helsinki Accords in 1975 which set the 
postwar boundaries of the East European states. President Gerald 
Ford tried to limit U.S. commitments in East Asia, particularly 
after the Vietnamese Communist victory in South Vietnam in 
1975; he also continued the policy of encouraging Iran to be the 
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peacekeeper in the Persian Gulf area by selling it the most mod-
ern American military equipment. He continued the SALT proc-
ess with the Soviet Union, signing an interim SALT II agreement 
with President Brezhnev at Vladivostok in 1974. 
President Jimmy Carter tried during 1977 and 1978 to reduce 
the U.S. troop presence in many parts of the world, particularly 
in Korea where he wanted a complete withdrawal of American 
ground forces. He pressed Congress to approve the Panama 
Canal treaties so that the United States could avoid sending a 
larger force to defend the canal against an antagonistic popula-
tion, and he reduced U.S. military missions in many Latin Amer-
ican countries. In the Middle East, Mr. Carter exerted great efforts 
to achieve a peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors in order 
to prevent another Arab-Israeli war-one which he feared might 
engage U.S. and Soviet forces. But for all his efforts in Panama 
and at Camp David, Mr. Carter was unable to bring peace either to 
Central America, where the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua 
in 1979 threatened to turn that country and El Salvador into 
Communist regimes, or to the Middle East, where the Iranian 
revolution in 1978-79 completely upset the delicate balance of 
power in the Persian Gulf. Neither could he prevent the Iranian 
hostage crisis and the Iran-Iraq war. Therefore, beginning in 1980 
President Carter vastly expanded U.S. vital interests by declaring 
that the Persian Gulf area was "vital," thus setting in motion a 
greatly expanded U.S. military role in the Middle East-the op-
posite of what he had hoped to accomplish when he took office in 
1977. President Reagan expanded U.S. military commitments 
and presence in the Middle East by creating the Central Com-
mand, including the Rapid Deployment Force, and by building 
military facilities in Egypt, Oman, Somalia, and Kenya-in addi-
tion to expanding U.S. bases on the Indian Ocean island of Diego 
Garcia. Mr. Reagan also dispatched U.S. Marines to Lebanon in 
1982 in an effort to prevent renewed civil war there. In sum, 
presidential perceptions of U.S. national interests underwent a 
significant change in the twelve years between 1969 and 1981. 
Priorities among U.S. Interests 
This study has discussed many areas of the world in terms of 
their importance to U.S. national interests. The analysis is based 
on strategic, economic, political, and ideological factors that con-
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dition the way Americans view the world in the 1980s, taking into 
account the question of why certain areas of this planet seem to be 
highly important to us and why U.S. forces should be expected to 
engage in hostilities, if necessary, to defend them. Using the 
national interest matrix outlined in Chapter 1, Figure 18 sum-
marizes the findings of the previous chapters regarding the rela-
tive importance to the United States of twelve geographical sec-
tors of the globe. This breakout of U.S. world-wide interests 
suggests that most vital concerns of the United States are in the 
world-order category-areas that contribute significantly to in-
ternational security and to the global balance of power. Four of the 
six vital areas are tied to the United States by defense treaties: 
North America, Western Europe, Northeast Asia Oapan and 
South Korea), and the Southwest Pacific (Philippines, Australia, 
New Zealand). One additional area, the eastern Mediterranean, 
has strong security ties to the United States; another, the Soviet 
Union, is a continental power which can significantly threaten 
U.S. interests on a global scale. 
Figure 18 also suggests there are only two areas-North Amer-
ica and the U.S.S.R.-that vitally affect U.S. defense-of-home-
land interests: that is, those that can seriously threaten U.S. 
territory. North America clearly is at the vital, and potentially at 
the survival, level of defense interest because of the long un-
protected U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico, and the strate-
gic proximity of the islands off the U.S. coasts (Cuba, the 
Bahamas, Iceland, and Greenland). The Soviet Union is also in 
the vital category because of its ability to seriously damage Amer-
ican territory by submarine or air attack. Similarly, two areas of 
the world are vitally imporant to the U.S. economy: North Amer-
ica, which contains two of the top three trading partners of the 
United States (Canada and Mexico); and Northeast Asia, which 
includes Japan, the second largest trading partner of the United 
States, and South Korea, which is among the top ten. In terms of 
promotion of values (ideology), only two areas qualify at the vital 
level: that is, those in which the United States has a deep commit-
ment to the preservation (or building) of democratic institutions. 
These are Western Europe and North America. There is no sug-
gestion implied here that the United States should disregard an 
interest in human rights and social justice in other regions of the 
world; it does mean that the U.S. government should have an 
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Fig. 18. U.S. National Interests by Geographical Area 
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exceptionally high interest in seeing that democracy continues to 
flourish in Western Europe and in North America. This is es-
pecially important in Central America, which has had no real 
tradition of democracy and social justice since these small states 
obtained their independence from Spain. Yet it is essential that 
the attributes of democracy be implanted there. It should be clear 
from a look at this division of the world into vital, major, and 
peripheral interests that most U.S. national interests in the 1980s 
fall into the major and peripheral categories. This means that they 
should occupy considerable attention from U.S. policy-makers 
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Fig. 19. U.S. Worldwide Interests by Major Country 
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Fig. 19 (continued) 
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but should not become so crucial that a President is counseled to 
become militarily involved in them-unless they are directly 
threatened by the Soviet Union. 
Figure 19 represents an attempt to classify thirty important 
countries around the world according to their importance to the 
United States, using the four basic interests described in Chapter 
1 and suggesting the intensity of interest that each should entail 
for the United States in the 1980s. 
Analyzing National Interest Priorities 
In analyzing this breakout of U.S. national interests by coun-
try, it is important to make two qualifications. First, this study is 
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based on the assumption that international relations are, in the 
final analysis, determined by the leaders and governments of 
sovereign states, not by international organizations, private in-
stitutions, or multinational corporations. This is not to say that 
these organizations have no influence on government (their influ-
ence is heavy), but rather that decisions about trade policy, mili-
tary and economic assistance, the initiation of covert activities, 
the imposition of economic sanctions, and, finally, the decisions 
to engage in warfare are made by sovereign governments (see 
Chapter 2). Policy decisions by U.S. leaders are based on their 
perceptions of U.S. national interests. Second, there is no known 
way to predict how a particular U.S. administration will view the 
national interest when it is faced with a specific issue or crisis and 
must make a decision about the policy tools a President should 
employ to achieve policy objectives. The scholar's task is not to 
predict what a President will think or do, but rather to lay out a 
reasonable picture of what U.S. interests ought to be in terms of our 
historical experience, our economic and political needs, and our 
security requirements, consistent with both our ability and 
willingness to defend them in case of war. This discussion of 
where U.S. defense, economic, world-order, and ideological in-
terests lie in the 1980s is based on an objective analysis of why 
certain countries and regions are very important to the United 
States and a subjective judgment about how intensely the United 
States should be willing to defend its interests in relation to those 
countries. I do not claim this to be the only methodology for 
arriving at sound judgments about how the United States should 
decide its foreign policy and military strategy, but I do believe that 
the national interest approach suggested-particularly the matrix 
approach used to show the relative priority of countries in terms 
of basic U.S. interests-is a useful and perhaps a valuable way to 
plan U.S. national security policy. What follows is my effort to 
summarize the most important U.S. national interests in the 
1980s, using the four categories of interest described in Chapter 1 
as the framework for discussion. 
Defense of Homeland 
Figure 19 suggests that there are only four major countries in 
the world that vitally affect the defense of the United States: 
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Canada, Mexico, Britain, and the Soviet Union. (The Caribbean 
Basin is a collection of small countries in Central America and the 
islands of the Caribbean.) Recalling that defense of homeland is 
concerned with protection of the territory, population, and politi-
cal system of the United States, it is easy to see that Canada 
constitutes at least a vital and probably a survival defense inter-
est. This is because Canada's territory and air space are critical to 
the defense of the continental United States in any conflict involv-
ing the only other power capable of inflicting massive damage on 
the U.S. homeland-the Soviet Union. Mexico is a vital defense 
interest, and probably a survival one in case of war, because of its 
long, relatively uncontrolled border with the United States and its 
rapidly growing, impoverished population. This could pose a 
serious threat to the western United States if a war broke out in 
Central America or Mexico and millions of refugees tried to 
escape to the United States. Britain is a vital defense interest 
because of its strategic position in the North Atlantic athwart the 
sea routes that Soviet missile-carrying submarines must cross in 
order to approach the U.S. Atlantic coastline. In addition, Britain 
has naval and air resources that are essential for patroling the 
North Atlantic. Although not listed here, Iceland also must be 
considered a vital defense interest of the United States because 
the crucial U.S. military base located at Keflavik monitors Soviet 
submarine and air traffic in the North Atlantic. Greenland is 
similarly of vital strategic importance. Canada, Greenland, Ice-
land, and Britain are therefore crucial to the defense of U.S. 
territory because of their location and their ability to detect and 
monitor Soviet ship and aircraft movements near the U.S. coast-
line. The Soviet Union is a vital U.S. defense interest because it 
could destroy large segments of the U.S. homeland. 
The numerous countries listed as major in the defense-of-
homeland category all have an alliance or close defense relations 
with the United States. They are not, however, at the same level of 
importance to the defense of U.S. territory as the countries listed 
above. This is not to downgrade their importance to the security 
of the United States; it simply means that their contribution is not 
directly related to the defense of U.S. territory; their vital impor-
tance lies in the "favorable world order" category (see below). 
Argentina, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand, for example, 
have very little impact on the defense of North America. Turkey, 
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on the other hand, performs a key function for defense of the U.S. 
homeland: it provides U.S. intelligence services with crucial lis-
tening posts from which vital Soviet strategic information can be 
obtained through electronic surveillance. 
Economic Well-Being 
As with defense-of-homeland interest, only four major coun-
tries are vitally important to the United States economically. Two 
of them-Canada and Mexico-are also in the defense category. 
They are joined here by Japan, the second most important U.S. 
trading partner and among the world's strongest economies; and 
West Germany, the most important economic and financial 
power in Europe and one of the top U.S. trading partners. Saudi 
Arabia, whose petro-dollars invested in U.S. banks and whose 
decisive influence within the OPEC bloc give it great economic 
influence, is probably a major rather than a vital economic inter-
est to the United States. It might be argued that Great Britain 
ought to be a vital U.S. economic interest because of London's 
importance as a world financial center. However, the decline of 
the British economy over the past twenty years and the govern-
ment's abandonment of special Commonwealth economic ar-
rangements in favor of the European Common Market in the 
1970s make Britain less influential to U.S. economic interests. The 
same is true of France and Brazil; both are important economic 
powers whose importance may grow in the future, but whose 
economic strength is not vital to the United States today. 
Clearly the non-Communist world is far more interdependent 
economically than was the case ten or twenty years ago, and it 
may therefore be an oversimplification to judge U.S. economic 
well-being as vitally dependent on four countries, and affected 
very importantly by only another seventeen. It can be argued that 
none of them is among the poor Asian and African states that 
form the bulk of the "have-not nations," which joined together 
during the 1970s to demand a far greater effort by the northern 
industrialized nations to aid their development. Some of these 
countries, such as Zaire and Zimbabwe, are suppliers of key raw 
materials to the United States. Nigeria, by contrast, is listed as a 
major economic interest because it is the most important econom-
ic power in Africa. It is likely that other developing countries will 
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become major U.S. economic interests during the next five or ten 
years, but in the mid-1980s the countries listed in the vital and 
major categories constitute the areas to which the United States 
must give greatest economic priority for the foreseeable future. 
The country giving the United States the most serious eco-
nomic problems is Japan, which has become an economic super-
power in the last fifteen years. Government policy has enabled 
Japanese companies to target certain industries in the United 
States for special competition, particularly in autos, electronics, 
cameras, and even pianos. Using the free trade practices followed 
by the United States, Japanese manufacturers have penetrated 
the U.S. market in these and other fields in a major way, resulting 
in the decline of large U.S. industries and the layoff of hundreds 
of thousands of U.S. workers in 1981-82. Despite the Reagan 
administration's strong efforts to dissuade Congress from enact-
ing restrictions against imports of Japanese products, the U.S. 
auto industry, the auto unions, and many members of Congress 
now favor specific legislation limiting Japanese imports, under 
the rubric of "fairness" in trade practices. A strong possibility 
exists that Congress, under Democratic Party pressure, will enact 
restrictive legislation against Japan's products. Several Demo-
cratic candidates for president in 1984 indicated support for such 
legislation in order to placate American labor. 1 
World Order 
The furtherance of a favorable world order has been a U.S. 
mission since the end of World War II. As a result, the United 
States has entered into numerous military alliances and con-
cluded many defense agreements with countries in every part of 
the world. Some of them, most notably the fourteen European 
NATO partners and Japan, are clearly vital world-order interests 
because they contribute greatly to international security and to 
the world balance of power between the Soviet Union and the 
non-Communist countries. Others, like Saudi Arabia and the 
Philippines, contribute little except their land and strategic posi-
tion. The problem for American policy-makers has been to dis-
1. See Sidney Blumenthal, "Drafting of a Democratic Industrial Plan," New 
York Times Magazine, August 28, 1983, p. 31. 
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tinguish between those countries that are truly vital and those 
that are important but not vital to the world-order interests of the 
United States. If some are vital, is this because they provide 
modern, credible military forces that contribute measurably to 
the world-wide balance of power? Or are they believed to be vital 
simply because their location seems to be important to maintain-
ing the strategic balance with the Soviet Union? 
Figure 19lists eighteen countries whose territory and military 
forces are so important to the world balance of power and interna-
tional security that they must be considered vital world-order 
interests of the United States. In North America they are Canada, 
Mexico, Venezuela, and the countries of the Caribbean; in Europe 
they include Britain, France, West Germany, Norway, and Italy; 
in the eastern Mediterranean they are Turkey, Greece, Israel, and 
Egypt; in the Persian Gulf there is Saudi Arabia; and in East Asia 
they are Japan, the Philippines, and Australia. These are the 
anchors, so to speak, around which the United States projects its 
power worldwide. Most of these states have substantial military 
forces and contribute importantly to the regional balance of 
power in their areas. Others-among them China, Brazil, South 
Korea, Nigeria, and Thailand-are important friends of the Unit-
ed States but are not vitally important to the projection of U.S. 
military power in the world-even though they contribute to 
political stability in their areas. The Soviet Union is a vital U.S. 
world-order interest because it has the capability, and desire, to 
upset the world order in ways that are detrimental to the United 
States-as it did by sending Soviet forces into Afghanistan in 
1979, and Cuban forces with Soviet advisers to Angola in 1975 and 
to Ethiopia in 1977. 
One country on this list of vital world-order interests, the 
Philippines, contributes no forces to the security of areas outside 
its borders and nothing except its land to the U.S. worldwide 
balance of power. Yet this island country is considered vital 
because the United States maintains two of its most important 
strategic bases there: Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval 
Base. The United States agreed in 1983 to greatly increase the 
amount of aid provided to the Philippines as "rent" for these 
bases, a total of $900 million. However, the Marcos government's 
martial law has engendered increasing opposition within the 
country. The assassination of opposition leader Benigno Aquino 
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in August 1983, upon his return to Manila from the United States, 
shocked the Philippine population as well as many Americans, 
and Marcos's political position became more difficult because of 
suspicion that his government had arranged the killing. Presi-
dent Reagan canceled a state visit at the end of 1983, and the 
question began to be raised whether the Philippines could con-
tinue to be viewed as a vital U.S. interest if the Marcos policies 
turned the population toward extremism and anti-Americanism. 
Egypt, although it has no defense alliance with the United 
States, has been a vital world-order interest since the late 1970s 
when it made peace with Israel and agreed to cooperate militarily 
with the United States in the defense of the Persian Gulf. Egypt 
has the largest and best trained army in the Arab world, and it 
could be a key military force if war broke out in the Persian Gulf or 
in East Africa. Saudi Arabia and Israel are vital world-order 
interests for similar reasons. 
Promotion of Values 
An important part of American policy, historically and cur-
rently, is the promotion of American ideas of individual freedom 
and democratic institutions abroad. While no one argues that the 
United States should go to war solely to protect democratic gov-
ernments around the world, there certainly is a strong correlation 
between most U.S. defense alliances concluded since World War 
II and the democratic nature of governments in the countries 
included in the U.S. defense umbrella. Nearly all the countries 
listed as vital world-order interests in Figure 19 are democratic 
countries by U.S. standards. The exceptions are the Soviet Uni-
on, the Philippines, Turkey, and Egypt. Therefore, a general rule 
in American foreign policy should be that countries considered to 
be vital U.S. world-order interests for balance-of-power reasons 
should be at least major ideological interests as well. Such coun-
tries should be urged by the United States to sustain and improve 
their democratic institutions because this is important in building 
internal security against Communist and other totalitarian ide-
ology. Although President Carter overemphasized human rights 
in conducting his foreign policy, all U.S. Presidents need to 
suggest to allied governments, preferably in private, the strong 
U.S. belief that allied countries should not only allow but encour-
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age free speech and a free press, as well as regular, fair elections in 
which all elements of society can participate. 
There are a few countries whose democratic institutions are so 
important to the United States that it would cause great alarm in 
Washington if their governments were overthrown by a coup 
d'etat. These are strong U.S. allies whose adherence to a demo-
cratic form of government is vital to U.S. ideological interests 
worldwide: Britain, France, West Germany, and Italy in Europe; 
Japan and Australia in the Far East; Canada, Mexico and Venezue-
la in the Western Hemisphere. With the possible exception of 
Mexico these few countries are strongly wedded to democratic 
institutions--even though West Germany, Italy, and Japan have 
enjoyed it only since the late 1940s. It is an important part of the 
U.S. national interest to insure that democracy in these countries 
flourishes, not only as a benefit to the peoples concerned but also 
as an example to other nations of the advantages of strong demo-
cratic institutions based on the rights of individual citizens to 
choose their leaders. 
United States Policies in Relation to Interests 
This survey of the world in the mid-1980s, in terms of U.S. 
interests, leads to the conclusion that the United States is over-
committed internationally. U.S. forces are stretched to a dan-
gerous degree, not only in Western Europe, where the United 
States maintains a personnel total of some 326,000, but also in the 
Middle East, Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia (Philippines), and 
Northeast Asia Oapan and South Korea). In fact, the twelve 
carrier battle groups that the U.S. Navy currently has in commis-
sion are not considered sufficient to carry out all the commit-
ments the Navy has to maintain in every ocean of the world. 2 
There is general agreement that the U.S. Army, numbering 
785,000 personnel, is under strength in terms of the growing 
2. In 1983 there were twelve U.S. attack carriers in commissioned service, six 
assigned to the Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets and six to the Pacific fleet. The 
Navy normally keeps three carriers on the East coast of the United States and three 
on the West coast, for overhauls or training maneuvers. The Secretary of the Navy 
proposed to Congress in 1983 that this number be increased to fourteen carriers in 
order that the Navy could adequately take care of increased responsibilities in the 
Indian Ocean and the Caribbean. Congress accepted this plan. 
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commitments it has been given in the Rapid Development Force 
(now part of the Central Command) and its growing respon-
sibilities in the Caribbean and Central American region. The 
Reagan administration pledged that it would not reinstitute the 
military draft, although it is doubtful whether the all-volunteer 
force-even with increased enlistments during 1982-83--would 
be capable of manning an expanded Army, Navy, and Air Force in 
case of a serious international crisis. In addition, the Reagan 
administration faced growing congressional opposition in 1983 to 
large increases in defense spending while U.S. budget deficits 
were running at $200 billion per year and after cuts in domestic 
programs in the early 1980s resulted in serious domestic political 
repercussions. This was particularly true after the Democratic 
Party increased its majority in the House of Representatives in the 
1982 midterm elections. 
It seemed clear in 1983, bothfrom the size of U.S. military 
forces and the opposition to President Reagan's requests for a 10 
percent increase in defense expenditures that the United States 
was overcommitted in the world in terms of how much defense 
the country was willing to pay for and what countries it was 
prepared to fight for. The latter factor was reinforced in Sep-
tember 1983 when Congress debated giving the President au-
thority to keep sixteen hundred U.S. Marines in Lebanon for 
another eighteen months. 
Of the vital interests suggested in Figure 19, there is probably 
no doubt that the American people and Congress will eventually 
be persuaded that Central America-the long forgotten area on 
the U.S. doorstep-must be accepted as a serious U.S. security 
problem and that military and large economic aid must be 
granted these countries to give them a semblance of hope for the 
future and make them less susceptible to the Marxist-Leninist 
doctrines being pressed on them by leftist forces. 
In Europe, there is little doubt that the United States will 
continue to honor its commitment to protect Western countries 
against Soviet blandishments so long as they desire American 
protection. But neutralism in Denmark, West Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Greece could shatter the NATO consensus if 
pacifist or neutralist forces gain control of these governments. 
The same is true for Great Britain, although the shattering of the 
Labour Party in the elections of 1983, which was due to its sharp 
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leftward drift, make it likely that the Conservatives will remain in 
power for some time and thus give Britain a stronger role in 
NATO. 
Similarly, there is no doubt that the United States will in the 
foreseeable future defend Japan against Soviet pressures. Nev-
ertheless, Japan's reluctance to build up its armed forces to a size 
commensurate with its economic interests and political aspira-
tions opens the possibility that the U.S. Congress will impose 
sanctions on Japan's continuing economic penetration and domi-
nation of certain U.S. markets and that this kind of action will in 
turn harm the U.S.-Japan political relationship. If Prime Minister 
Nakasone remains in power and is able to move parliament to 
substantially increase the country's armed forces and defense 
effort, particularly if Japan increases its import of U.S. products as 
part of a military expansion, this will probably defuse the grow-
ing anti-Japanese sentiment in Congress. 
The United States will no doubt defend South Korea again, as 
it did in 1950, if it is attacked by North Korean forces. However, 
this commitment does not require the stationing of 40,000 U.S. 
ground forces in Korea, especially when U.S. Army personnel 
are in great demand elsewhere. Before the end of the 1980s, it 
should be possible for the United States, Japan, and China to 
provide jointly for South Korea's security, with the U.S. ground 
contribution being reduced to a small force of about 5,000. It 
should not be necessary for the United States to retain the pri-
mary responsibility to defend South Korea thirty years after the 
end of the Korean War, especially when China and Japan are 
moving toward greater economic cooperation and both have the 
Soviet Union as their principal adversary. The United States 
should therefore adjust its military role in Northeast Asia down-
ward and encourage Japan and China also to increase their mili-
tary cooperation. 
In Southeast and Southwest Asia, the Persian Gulf, eastern 
Mediterranean, southern Africa, and South America (minus Ve-
nezuela and Colombia), U.S. interests are overextended and will 
become more so unless U.S. political leaders resist the pressure to 
permit U.S. aspirations to outrun this country's willingness to 
incur financial and human costs. This is not to say that the United 
States has minimal interests in these regions or that the American 
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people would have no concern if countries in those areas suc-
cumbed to Communism-either through internal subversion (as 
in Afghanistan in 1978), civil war (as in Angola in 1975-76), or free 
elections (as in Chile in 1970). The United States had a major 
national interest in all of those countries and would have a similar 
one in others that might come under military pressure from 
Cuban, Vietnamese, or Libyan forces-to name several national 
groups that fit the category of surrogates for the Soviet Union. 
The essential point here is that although most threats to Third 
World countries generate substantial U.S. economic and military 
aid and political action by Washington, it is a completely different 
question to ask whether the United States should send its own 
forces to defend such a country if it has no specific defense 
alliance with the United States. For example, although the U.S. is 
committed by the Rio Treaty to defend any South American 
country if attacked from outside, it is doubtful that the United 
States should defend Argentina if it is attacked by Brazil or Chile, 
or vice versa; this is because U.S. interests in South America are at 
the major, not vital level. President Reagan's reluctance to send a 
large U.S. force to Lebanon in 1982-83 to preserve that country's 
independence, as President Eisenhower did in 1958, suggests that 
Lebanon in the 1980s is so unstable internally that Washington is 
unwilling to stake its prestige on declaring it a vital interest. 
Southeast Asia was downgraded to a major U.S. interest by 
President Nixon in 1969 when he carne into office, and President 
Ford upheld that judgment when he replaced Mr. Nixon. This 
accounts for the fact that Washington did not intervene when 
Hanoi launched its final offensive in South Vietnam in 1975, in 
clear violation of the Paris Agreements of 1973. For similar rea-
sons, President Carter decided not to offer any help to Cambodia 
when it was invaded by Vietnam in 1978. 
The area where it is most difficult for American political lead-
ers in the rnid-1980s to determine U.S. vital interests is in the 
Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. President Carter declared this 
to be a vital interest in 1980 for two reasons. First, he believed that 
the United States, Western Europe, and Japan were vitally depen-
dent on the continued flow of oil from the Persian Gulf and that 
this flow would be jeopardized if revolution swept the area-as 
had happened in Iran-and oil were used as a political weapon by 
220 Priorities 
the controlling states. Second, the United States could not toler-
ate having the Soviet Union extend its political influence south-
ward toward the Indian Ocean and bring the Arab countries, plus 
Iran, into its sphere of influence. President Reagan reiterated this 
position when he took office in 1981, and he expanded the U.S. 
Rapid Deployment Force. By 1983 the United States had estab-
lished military facilities in a number of countries adjacent to the 
Persian Gulf area, and it conducted joint military exercises with 
several countries in the region. 
There is no question that the Persian Gulf is very important to 
the United States and to the whole Western world because of its 
oil; what is doubtful is whether the oil in this area is so important 
that U.S. armed forces should be engaged in a major war there if 
the Soviet Union decides to take advantage of political turmoil in 
Iran and Iraq to extend its influence southward-perhaps by 
persuading Iran to give it a naval base on the Persian Gulf. If the 
Soviet Union does not use its own forces but employs diplomacy, 
aid, and subversion to convince Iran and other Persian Gulf 
countries to deal with Moscow rather than Washington, should 
the United States try to prevent this with the use of its own 
forces? I don't believe so. There is a strong likelihood that a large 
majority of Congress and the public would oppose the use of U.S. 
forces in the Persian Gulf under such circumstances, and the War 
Powers Act of 1973 gives Congress the option of refusing to 
sanction such a move. The congressional debate in September 
1983 on keeping 1600 Marines in Lebanon is symptomatic of the 
strong domestic resistance any President will encounter in seek-
ing Congressional approval to use force in the Persian Gulf. 
If, as I believe it will, the United States continues to be reluctant 
to use armed forces in the Middle East, the question must then be 
asked: why is the President planning to deploy forces where it 
will be extremely difficult for them to fight and prevail? The 
reason is that the presence of U.S. forces along the periphery of 
the Persian Gulf may slow down the erosion of Western influence 
there, an erosion resulting from the replacement of the Shah's 
regime in Iran by a revolutionary Islamic one. Buying time may 
help other countries in the region to strengthen their political 
regimes and make them less likely to be undermined by revolu-
tionaries encouraged by Iran or the Soviet Union. Deployment of 
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U.S., French, Italian, and British forces to Lebanon-and to the 
Indian Ocean-might have cautioned Moscow against using its 
own forces to exploit an attractive opportunity in Iran, Iraq, or 
Pakistan, or to support a South Yemen effort to overthrow the 
Saudi monarchy. 
The danger is that if the United States positions a sizable 
fighting force in the Indian Ocean, as well as in Egypt and Oman, 
the propensity to use it in case of local conflicts or internal strife 
will be very great. The host countries will not understand why 
U.S. forces are not used against hostile neighbors until Soviet 
forces are engaged. That was the problem that President Reagan 
confronted in Lebanon in the summer of 1983 and early 1984, 
when U.S. Marines were not reinforced and used in support of 
the Lebanese Army to defeat the militias of various political 
factions that refused to accept a political settlement of Lebanon's 
internal problems. By keeping the Marines at sixteen hundred 
men, the President could maintain that their mission was "peace-
keeping." In the Persian Gulf area, it may be very difficult for a 
President to refrain from intervening in local wars because large 
forces under the Central Command are being positioned to inter-
vene there. As occurred in Southeast Asia twenty years earlier, 
the desire to use American forces in combat, rather than have 
them sit on the sidelines, becomes overwhelming when local 
troops are engaged and one faction is being aided by an outside 
enemy. In Vietnam, the enemy was North Vietnam and China; in 
the Persian Gulf it could well be Iran, with Soviet backing if not 
full participation. 
Summing Up 
It is time for the United States to face the reality that it does not 
have the means or the will to defend more than North America, 
Western Europe, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, Turkey, Isra-
el, and Egypt in the foreseeable future. We may not even be 
willing to defend Israel and Egypt if they are unable to bring 
about real peace between themselves and among the Arab coun-
tries. The attitude of Americans toward the world has changed 
fundamentally since President John Kennedy said in January 1961 
that Americans would go anywhere and pay any price to defend 
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freedom. We are not returning to the isolationism of the 1930s, I 
believe, but as a people we are less willing to bear the defense 
burdens of the world than we were twenty years ago. A careful 
reshaping of American military strategy to fit a more modest 
conception of our vital interests is not only prudent in the 
mid-1980s; it is an absolute political necessity if this country is to 
avoid courting disaster as an overcommitted giant. 
10. Epilogue 
The early months of 1984 saw a number of significant interna-
tional events that directly affected U.S. national interests and 
foreign policy, and some others that were important but less 
significant to the well-being of the United States. These key 
events were: the continuing emplacement of U.S. medium range 
nuclear missiles in several European countries; the death of Sovi-
et leader Yuri Andropov and his replacement by Konstantin 
Chernenko; the withdrawal of American peace-keeping forces 
from Lebanon and the continuation of civil war there; the grow-
ing U.S. military involvement in Central America; and, perhaps 
most ominous, the escalation of the Iran-Iraq war in the Persian 
Gulf. Other important but less notable events were: the warming 
of political and economic relations between the United States and 
the Peoples' Republic of China, symbolized by the visit of Presi-
dent Reagan to Peking; the disunity shown in the European 
Common Market and the growth of neutralism in several NATO 
countries; the return to democratic government in Argentina 
following the overthrow of the military dictatorship; and the non-
aggression treaty signed between South Africa and Mozambique, 
which opened the possibility of peace also in Namibia. In addi-
tion, there were three important developments within the United 
States that had a direct bearing on its defense of homeland, 
economic, and world order interests. These were: the spectacular 
growth of the American economy while inflation remained at a 
moderate level; the steady expansion of the U.S. military arsenal, 
both in strategic and conventional weaponry; and the renewed 
willingness of the U.S. Government to use covert actions and 
economic pressure, as well as military aid, to effect policy 
changes in other countries. Despite the momentary decline of 
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U.S. prestige in the Middle East resulting from withdrawal of 
Marines from Lebanon, the mood of the American people and its 
government in the spring of 1984 was one of self-confidence, in 
contrast to the "malaise" that President Jimmy Carter complained 
about during the latter part of his tenure. 
The U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon was probably inevitable 
once the Reagan Administration decided in 1983 that it was not 
prepared to send a much larger military force to impose its will on 
the warring Lebanese factions and on Syria, the principal outside 
supporter of the anti-government militias. Israel had made its 
decision in August 1983 when it pulled its forces back from Beirut 
and left American peacekeeping forces exposed to hostile 
Lebanese factions. Although some in the Reagan Administration, 
notably Secretary of State George Shultz, favored keeping the 
Marines in Beirut and reinforcing them, it was unmistakably clear 
by February 1984 that the American public was strongly opposed 
to a U.S. military presence in Lebanon and that the Democratic 
leadership in Congress was prepared to exploit this sentiment 
against Mr. Reagan in an election year. Had the President waited 
longer to extricate the American force from its militarily exposed 
position, Lebanon would have loomed ever larger as an election 
issue at a time when Mr. Reagan's political prospects were other-
wise generally favorable. 
The withdrawal from Lebanon had its political price in the 
Middle East, however. Pro-Western countries such as Jordan, 
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia viewed the action as a sign of American 
weakness. King Hussein of Jordan, despite earlier assurances to 
President Reagan, decided not to participate in preliminary peace 
talks with Israel. The prestige of Syria was considerably increased 
by the American decision, and other Arab countries were obliged 
to pay greater attention to Syria's interests not only in Lebanon, 
but also in the Palestinian issue and in the Iran-Iraq war. The U.S. 
withdrawal also had an effect on the ruling Likud coalition gov-
ernment in Israel. The opposition Labor Party called for the total 
withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, and this stand prom-
ised to become an important issue in the July 1984 Israeli general 
elections. 
Finally, the withdrawal from Lebanon rekindled a ten-year-old 
debate within the United States about the War Powers Act and the 
role of Congress in deciding when and how the President may 
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use U.S. military forces outside the United States. In April1984, 
the Reagan Administration launched a drive to repeal this legisla-
tion, which had been passed over a presidential veto in 1973. 
Secretary of State Shultz called it an infringement on the Presi-
dent's constitutional power to define and defend U.S. national 
interests abroad, and the issue seemed certain to be debated in 
the 1984 presidential election campaign. 
The brutal Iran-Iraq war neared the completion of four years, 
and a strong possibility emerged in the spring of 1984 that Iran 
would overwhelm Iraq's defenses by human wave attacks and 
then move on to Baghdad. Iraq used air power against Iran's oil 
ports and bombed commercial ships moving out of its harbors. 
More dangerous, however, was Iraq's use of chemical weapons 
against Iranian forces. Although the Baghdad government de-
nied it had used chemical agents, United States and United 
Nations observers verified their use and President Reagan called 
for a worldwide ban on the manufacture and detonation of these 
weapons. Nevertheless, Iraq seemed determined to employ 
whatever weapons were available to defend its homeland against 
Iranian troops. As the largest and most dangerous conflict going 
on in the world in 1984, the Iran-Iraq war had the potential of 
escalating and drawing in other countries-not excluding the 
Soviet Union and the United States. President Reagan warned 
Iran on several occasions not to interfere with the shipping of oil 
from the Persian Gulf to international markets; if the Khomeini 
government nevertheless tried to block the oil traffic by mining 
waters or bombing a tanker, this could quickly lead to armed 
conflict with U.S. naval forces stationed near the Strait of Hor-
muz. The question of what would happen to Iran when the 
Ayatollah Khomeini died was another issue. If civil war erupted 
in Iran, should the United States become involved with aid to one 
of the factions? That remained one of the most serious questions 
that would face the American President in the not distant future, 
if not in 1984 then surely in 1985 or 1986. 
By far the most divisive foreign policy issue within the United 
States in early 1984 was Central America, and what should be 
done about El Salvador and Nicaragua. This was not as much an 
East-West issue as it was an internal political one within the 
United States. Clearly, the Soviet Union was not prepared to go to 
war with the United States over Nicaragua or El Salvador, any 
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more than it was about to defend Grenada when the United 
States invaded it in October 1983 to protect American citizens. 
The real issue was whether the American public and Congress 
were willing to permit the President to use strong measures, 
including military force, to insure that communist revolutions 
did not sweep over all of Central America and then threaten the 
stability of Mexico. In April1983, President Reagan staked out his 
position that Central America was a vital interest to the United 
States and that he planned to provide large amounts of both 
economic and military assistance in an effort to prevent the 
collapse of non-communist regimes-even though existing gov-
ernments left much to be desired in terms of human rights and 
social justice. The Kissinger Commission, set up by the President 
to give him bipartisan recommendations on what should be done, 
delivered its report in January 1984; but this comprehensive study 
was promptly criticized by the Democratic leadership in Congress 
because it generally supported President Reagan's policies. A 
related issue was whether Congress should continue to finance 
covert assistance to Nicaraguan rebels (contras) who were in-
creasingly effective in disrupting Nicaraguan port facilities and 
harassing Sandinista military forces in northern and southern 
Nicaragua. At issue was whether this covert aid was for the 
purpose of overthrowing the Sandinista government (which the 
rebels intended) or whether it was meant only as harassment, to 
persuade the government in Managua to change its ways and 
stop supporting insurgents in El Salvador (which Congress pre-
ferred). In early April1984, the U.S. Senate debated these issues 
in detail and gave the President a resounding victory in terms of 
economic and military aid to El Salvador and covert aid to Nic-
araguan rebels. The Democratic-controlled House of Represen-
tatives was not as forthcoming, but there were signs that congres-
sional opposition to the President's policies in Central America 
was eroding, as the American public became aware of the stakes 
involved in this area near the U.S. southern border, and of the 
extent of Cuban involvement in support of insurgent forces in 
the region. In contrast to Lebanon, where American public opin-
ion persuaded the President to withdraw U.S. forces, on Cen-
tral America the American public seemed receptive to the idea 
that stronger U.S. measures were required to protect this vital 
area. 
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The relationship of the United States and Western Europe will 
in the long run be the most fundamental of all U.S. world order 
interests, but the political climate on both sides of the Atlantic 
early in 1984left much to be desired. President Reagan's hard-line 
policies had clearly eroded European confidence about the future 
of East-West relations. While European and American govern-
ments took satisfaction from the successful deployment of U.S. 
Pershing II and cruise missiles, there was an undercurrent of 
apprehension among many sensible Europeans about whether 
the United States could be trusted with the fate of Europe in a 
nuclear age. On the one hand, there seemed to be growing doubt 
about whether any American President would risk nuclear war 
for the sake of Western Europe; and at the same time, there was 
growing fear that American policy toward the Soviet Union might 
goad Moscow into taking actions that would precipitate a con-
ventional war in which Europe would be destroyed whether 
nuclear weapons were used or not. Despite these doubts, a 
change in alliance relationships did not appear imminent so long 
as the leaders of Britain, France, West Germany and Italy remain 
strong "realists"; the danger lay in the fact that opposition parties 
in Britain, West Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark were 
moving toward neutralist positions in the East-West struggle for 
world influence and pledged themselves to pursue anti-nuclear 
and neutralist foreign policies when they return to government 
power-probably before the end of the decade. If either West 
Germany or Britain abandoned NATO's strategy based on nuclear 
deterrence and sought accommodation with the Soviet Union, 
this would have a profound effect not only in Europe but also in 
Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Indeed, Western 
Europe is the most vital interest of the United States outside 
North America, and the loss of these strong allies would signifi-
cantly upset the world balance of power to the detriment of the 
United States. East Asia may soon become more important as a 
vital economic interest, but it does not compare with Europe in 
political influence in most parts of the world. 
Finally, the Soviet Union remained an enduring competitor of 
the United States for world power and influence, and it gave no 
sign of slackening its determination to stay in the great power 
race. The transition from Yuri Andropov to Konstantin Cher-
nenko was a smooth one, and the Politburo seemed to have set in 
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place the cast of characters who will lead the next government-
which could occur within the next several years. The very large 
Soviet naval exercises in the Atlantic in April 1984 and the 
Kremlin's continued hard-line policy against renewed nuclear 
weapons negotiations indicated a toughness of attitude that ran 
counter to arguments made by some Reagan Administration 
officials that the Soviets would have to negotiate a nuclear arms 
deal when it became clear they could not divide the West over the 
Euromissile issue. Although the Kremlin seemed willing to talk 
about renewal of cultural and scientific exchanges and the re-
opening of trade links, there was no real evidence early in 1984 
that Moscow was prepared to change its policy on the rela-
tionship between Pershing II and SS-20 missiles and thereby 
concede that U.S. medium range weapons were in Europe to stay. 
Soviet leaders seemed convinced that additional political mileage 
could be squeezed out of European public opinion on the nuclear 
weapons issue, particularly in West Germany where anti-nuclear 
groups continued their campaign and the Social Democrats de-
cided to join rather than fight them. 
In 1984, perhaps more than usual, the world waited for the 
U.S. electorate to decide who would lead the United States in the 
next four years and for signals of the kind of policies the new 
Administration would pursue. The leadership in Moscow appar-
ently decided after the Korean plane tragedy in September 1983 
that they would not deal with Mr. Reagan until it was clear 
whether he would be president another four years. West Euro-
peans were torn between discomfort over Mr. Reagan's tough 
policies toward the Soviet Union and concern that another candi-
date might be a less effective alliance leader. Ronald Reagan was a 
known quantity, Europeans said, one who at least followed a 
consistent policy. Consistency in American foreign policy, in-
stead of the ups and downs and turns of the 1970s, was what most 
of the world looked for in 1984. A key question thus emerges: If 
Ronald Reagan is reelected in November 1984, will he necessarily 
continue the policies established in his first term or decide on 
significant changes in the way the United States looks at and deals 
with the rest of the world? If Walter Mondale gets the Democratic 
nomination and is elected, will he abandon the policies set in 
motion by Mr. Reagan or continue the "peace through strength" 
philosophy? As we look at the future of American foreign policy, 
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we may ask: Are U.S. national interests in the 1980s coming into 
sharper perspective so that the new President and Congress can 
forge a foreign policy consensus? Or are the divisions in the 
country around perceptions of national interest still so deep that 
any president will have to struggle mightily to set a steady foreign 
policy course during the remainder of the 1980s? 
My view is that we are seeing the reemergence of a consensus 
in foreign policy that will produce a new, more pragmatic view of 
U.S. national interests. This will entail a move away from the 
globalism of the past thirty years and give the President a man-
date to be tough-minded about establishing priorities among the 
many foreign claims on this country's economic resources, mili-
tary power, and psychological strength. There is no reason why 
the United States should not be able to continue as a great world 
power and at the same time take a detached view of some areas 
and issues in the world that are either beyond the ability of the 
United States to change (Lebanon is an example) or so tenuous in 
terms of the U.S. stake that they are not worth a confrontation 
with the Soviet Union (Poland and Afghanistan, for instance). If 
one believes, as I do, that the Kremlin's leaders are not resigned 
to world war and are interested in ways to reduce tensions, it 
surely would be a wise course to keep open negotiating channels 
at every level and to explore fully the areas of mutual interest. 
Clearly, the United States must have a strong defense and a 
strong desire to defend its interests while negotiating; but neither 
Soviet nor American leaders will be able to drive the other side 
into a surrender or humiliation-no matter how much military 
power they hold. Therefore, prudence strongly suggests that 
Washington and Moscow should be willing to think about mea-
sures of accommodation in 1985 and beyond-in their mutual self 
interest. 
This page intentionally left blank
Acheson, Dean, 135-36 
Adelman, Kenneth, 167 
Aden, Gulf of, 171 
Afghanistan, 58, 83, 93, 124, 177, 178, 
219, 229; Soviet invasion of, 10, 12, 
26, 41, 45, 122, 125, 127, 147, 153, 179, 
189, 190, 193, 214; U.S. response to 
invasion, 42, 88, 92, 122, 179, 189-90, 
192, 198 
Africa, 156-57, 168-74, 215 
Agency for International 
Development (AID), 34, 36 
Agriculture, Department of, 36 
Air Force, U.S., 41, 45, 91, 148, 152 
Alaska, 55, 126 
Algeria, 156 
Allen, Richard, 194, 195 
Allende, Salvadore, 157 
Andropov, Yuri, 57-58, 83, 196, 199, 
223, 227 
Angola, 71, 172, 173, 175, 180, 194, 214; 
civil war, 26, 170-71, 189, 219 
ANZUS Pact, 135, 146, 193 
Aquino, Benigno, 14, 214-15 
Arab-Israeli wars: (1973), 41-42, 43, 46, 
91; (1967), 106, 108, 129 
Arab oil embargo (1973), 12, 20, 23, 
24, 82, 126 
Arafat, Yasser, 111, 115 
Arens, Moshe, 109 
Argentina, 16, 54, 157, 159, 223; and 
Falkland Islands, 14-17, 29, 159-68 
arms control negotiations, 190-92, 195, 
198, 201-02, 228 
Army, U.S., 41, 45, 216 
Index 
Asia, 132-55, 204, 218-19 
Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), 151-52, 152n, 153, 
193 
Atlantic Ocean, 159, 168, 170, 211 
Australia, 135, 146-47 
Austrian Peace Treaty, 98 
AWACS planes, 37, 42, 43, 169 
Axis powers, 134 
Baghdad Pact, 121, 122, 153, 193 
balance of power, 21-22, 88, 126, 198, 
215, 227; principle of, 3, 134 
Baltic region, 81, 82 
Batista, Fulgencio, 70 
Beard, Charles, 1-2 
Begin, Menachem, 107, 108, 109, 110, 
113, 114, 115 
Beirut, Lebanon, 109, 111, 115, 116, 130 
Belgium, 89, 170 
Berlin Blockade, 80, 186 
Bialer, Seweryn, 181 
Bishop, Maurice, 78 
Black Sea, 118, 186 
Block, John, 198 
blockades, 44, 75 
Bolshevik Revolution, 184 
Brazil, 54, 157, 158-59, 212 
Brezhnev, Leonid, 41, 47, 123, 188, 
199, 200 
Brezhnev Doctrine, 180 
Brown, Harold, 47 
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 13 
budget deficits, 37, 95 
Bull, Hedley, 101, 102 
232 
Bundy, McGeorge, 99 
Burma, 137 
Bush, George, 194 
Cambodia, 132, 138, 141, 151, 153, 189, 
219 
Camp David Accords, 107, 108, 111, 
112, 113, 205 
Canada, 54, 70; relations with U.S., 
55; trade with U.S., 56, 57-58, 59; 
U.S. interest in, 56-57, 58-60, 69, 72, 
73, 74, 86, 206, 211, 212 
Caribbean Basin, 56, 57, 60-61, 62, 72, 
155, 177; U.S. interest in, 58, 73, 
74-75, 77, 168, 211 
Carter, Jimmy, 146, 154, 190, 205, 219, 
224; and Camp David Accords, 112; 
and Cuba, 71-72; and grain 
embargo, 41, 89, 179, 189, 192, 198; 
and human rights, 21, 171, 182, 215; 
and Iranian crisis, 11, 12, 13, 26, 28, 
82, 182, 205; and Middle East, 45, 
107, 120, 122; and Panama Canal 
treaty, 58; and Persian Gulf policy, 
23, 42, 47, 122-24, 126, 219-20; and 
Soviet Union, 88, 123, 179, 189, 192 
Carter Doctrine, 124, 125 
Casey, William, 194 
Castro, Fidel, 55, 70, 71, 183, 193 
Catholic Bishops: Pastoral Letter, 73 
Central America, 58, 60, 72, 74-76, 
77-78, 89, 155, 168, 183, 203, 223; 
U.S. interest in, 57, 61-70, 168, 207-
08, 211, 217, 225-26 
Central Command, 95, 205, 217, 221. 
See also Rapid Deployment Force 
Central Europe, 94, 98-99, 176 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 39, 
43, 71, 187, 194 
Central Treaty Organization 
(<CENTO), 122, 153 
Chad, 169 
Chernenko, Konstantin, 223, 227 
Chiang Kai-shek, 135 
Chili, 54, 157-58, 159, 219 
China, People's Republic of, 33, 134, 
135, 143, 147, 148-51, 154-55, 176-77, 
178, 223; and Korean War, 13, 25, 46; 
Index 
and Soviet Union, 148, 150, 152, 177; 
and Vietnam, 137-38, 140, 193 
Churchill, Winston, 121, 133, 184, 185 
Clark, William, 195 
Cold War, 186, 187, 190 
Colombia, 55, 69, 70, 156 
Commerce, Department of, 37, 41 
Common Market, 87, 93, 212, 223 
Communism, 177, 180, 182, 184, 
193-94, 196; in Africa, 170, 172-73; in 
Asia, 138-41, 176-77; in Central 
America, 65-66, 69-70, 77-78, 166; in 
Eastern Europe, 80, 185; in 
Mediterranean, 106 
Congress, U.S., 61, 62, 65, 66-67, 69, 
74, 76, 78, 80, 103, 105, 116, 126, 213, 
224; and budgets, 95; and El 
Salvador, 20, 26, 77; Foreign Affairs 
committees, 116; and foreign aid, 
35-36, 77, 120; and foreign policy, 
27, 39, 46, 58, 66, 90, 98, 111, 124, 
144, 171, 180, 229; and presidential 
power, 6, 7; House, 66, 77, 121, 139, 
217, 226; Senate, 7, 66, 77, 121, 139, 
163, 196, 199, 226 
Congressional Budget Office, 124-25 
containment policy, 21, 105, 106, 117, 
121, 122, 127, 186, 193, 197 
covert actions, 38-40, 60, 66, 71, 171, 
213 
cruise missiles, 49, 59, 89, 90, 93, 227 
Cuba, 55, 57, 67, 70-72, 73, 75, 78, 
180; in Africa, 171, 172, 173; Bay of 
Pigs, 39, 60, 71; missile crisis, 10-11, 
19, 23, 42-43, 44, 50, 53, 71, 74, 96, 
182, 187-88, 200; support of 
subversion, 58, 66, 70, 171, 172, 226; 
U.S. acquisition, 4; U.S. trade 
embargo, 23, 41 
, Cyprus conflict, 20-21, 119-20 
Czechoslovakia, 45, 80, 180, 188 
Defense, Department of, 34, 38, 42, 
43, 46, 128 
defense interest: defined, 8 
deGaulle, Charles, 22 
Democrats, 4, 63, 64, 65, 69, 144, 194, 
213, 217, 224, 228 
Index 
Denmark, 93 
Der Spiegel, 57 
detente policies, 83, 84, 88, 92, 97, 
189, 197, 204 
Diego Garcia, 205 
Diem, Ngo Dinh, 138 
diplomatic recognition, 32-33, 43-44 
Dodd, Christopher J., 63-65, 76 
Dominican Republic, 45, 60 
drug trade, 77 
Dulles, John Foster, 121, 138 
East Asia, 132-55, 193 
Eastern Europe, 72, 73,80, 83, 89, 97, 
189; and Soviet Union, 178; trade 
with West, 92, 93, 192 
East Germany, 90, 93; reunification, 
97-99 
East-West trade, 83, 85 
economic assistance, 35-36 
economic interest: defined, 8 
Eden, Anthony, 166 
egoism, 3-4 
Egypt, 107, 117, 122, 129-30, 156, 170, 
174, 205, 215; Israeli War, 41-42, 91; 
peace with Israel, 168, 215; Suez 
crisis, 82; U.S. aid to, 37-38, 169 
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 106-07, 121, 
122, 138, 139, 141, 166, 186-87, 190; 
and Cuba, 70-71; and Lebanon, 11, 
45, 219; NATO commander, 81; and 
U-2 incident, 39, 187 
El Salvador, 38, 58, 65, 67, 190, 193, 
194, 205, 225, 226; civil war, 20, 64, 
66, 70, 71 
Enders, Thomas, 76, 163 
Ethiopia, 171, 189, 194, 214 
ethnic groups in U.S., 20-21 
European Economic Community. See 
Common Market 
Falkland Islands War, 14-17, 43, 
159-68, 175 
Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), 46 
Food for Peace program, 36 
Ford, Gerald, 154, 204-05, 219; and 
Angola, 26, 71 
Foreign Affairs, 99, 101, 105 
Foreign Service, U.S., 33 
Formosa. See Taiwan 
233 
France, 85, 89, 103, 133n, 170, 176, 178, 
185; colonial empire, 137, 138; and 
Suez crisis, 82; U.S. interest in, 
86-87, 212 
Fulbright-Hays Act, 33 
Galtieri, Leopolda, 17, 161 
Gaza Strip, 111, 112, 113, 115 
Gemayal, Amin, 115, 116 
Geneva Accords (1954), 138 
Geneva Conference (1955), 187 
Golan Heights, 112 
Goldwater, Barry, 66 
Good Hope, Cape of, 159 
Great Britain, 84, 89, 90, 93, 103, 131, 
137, 170, 176, 178; Conservative Party 
in, 218; and Falkland Islands, 14-17, 
159-68; Labour Party in, 103, 217; 
Middle East forces of, 85, 177, 204; 
and Suez crisis, 23, 29, 82; and U.S., 
20, 55, 79-80; U.S. interest in, 87, 
211, 212 
Greece, 85, 105, 107, 118-20, 129; and 
NATO, 82, 106, 107; and U.S. bases, 
86n, 90, 91, 93, 108, 120 
Greenland, 55 
Grenada, 12, 61, 70, 78, 226 
Gromyko, Andrei, 196, 201 
Guatemala, 58, 60 
Habib, Philip, 109 
Haig, Alexander, 49, 65, 108, 109-10, 
194, 195; and Falkland Islands War, 
160, 161, 162, 163, 165, 166 
Haile Selassie, 171 
Hamilton, Alexander, 1, 2 
Hawaii, 55, 133 
Helsinki Accords (1975), 97, 204 
Hinton, Dean, 77 
Hitler, Adolf, 10, 79, 80, 127, 132, 133n, 
134 
Ho Chi Minh, 138, 193 
Honduras, 53, 58, 195 
Hormuz, Strait of, 43, 47, 225 
Horn, Cape, 159 
234 
"hot-line," 50, 123 
Howard, Michael, 101-02 
humanitarian aid, 34 
human rights policies, 8, 21, 36, 
64-65, 69, 75, 76, 147, 171-72, 215-16 
Hungary, 45 
Hussein (King), 112, 115, 224 
Iceland, 91, 211 
"idealism," 2-4, 5 
Ideals and Self-Interest in America's 
Foreign Policy, 3 
Idea of National Interest, The, 1 
immigration, 77 
imperialism, 4 
In Defense of the National Interest, 2 
India, 121, 122, 153-54, 193 
Indian Ocean, 95, 106, 147, 151, 154, 
155, 170, 177, 219; U.S. forces in, 42, 
85, 93, 204, 205 
Indochina, 193 
Indonesia, 127, 137, 140, 151-53, 193 
Information Agency, U.S., 33, 35 
Information Service, U.S., 33, 35 
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance. See Rio Pact 
intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs), 10, 18-19, 49 
Iran, 106, 107, 121, 123, 127-28, 131, 
177, 178, 204-05, 221; hostage crisis, 
13, 43, 122, 205; oil, 126, 219; 
revolution, 22, 42, 122, 147, 220; 
Shah's fall, 12, 82, 118, 127, 177, 193 
Iran-Iraq War, 43, 124, 125, 205, 220, 
223, 224, 225 
Iraq, 106, 107, 121 
Irony of American History, The, 3 
Israel, 107, 117, 215, 224; defense of, 
45; and Egypt, 42, 168; invasion of 
Lebanon, 85, 107, 108-18, 195, 224; 
U.S. aid to, 77 
Italy, 80, 93, 185 
Jackson, Henry, 189 
Jamaica, 74 
Japan, 126, 130-31, 132, 147, 155, 176; 
and China, 132, 148; industry, 144; 
oil needs, 126, 151; trade, 56, 153, 
Index 
213; U.S. interest in, 142-45, 177, 193, 
212, 213, 218; World War II, 10, 
132-34, 141 
Japanese Self-Defense Force, 142 
Jefferson, Thomas, 2 
Jerusalem, 112, 114 
Jewish population in U.S., 20, 114, 172 
Johnson, Lyndon, 28; and Dominican 
Republic, 45; and Vietnam, 13, 
19-20, 21, 24, 25-26, 46, 89, 96, 123, 
138-40, 141, 188 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 55, 68, 138 
Jordan, 112 
Kamchatka, 179 
Kennan, George, 3, 99, 105 
Kennedy, John F., 28, 52, 187-88, 
221-22; and Berlin crisis, 46; and 
Cuba, 11, 40, 42-43, 44, 46, 53, 71, 
74, 96, 187-88; and Southeast Asia, 
42, 45, 138, 139, 140, 141 
Kenya, 169, 173, 205 
KGB, 39 
Khomeini, Ayatollah, 128, 225 
Khrushchev, Nikita, 10, 52, 53, 96., 
187, 188, 200 
King, Mackenzie, 59 
Kirkpatrick, Jeane, 75, 163, 164, 165, 
166, 195 
Kissinger, Henry, 148-49, 157, 171, 172, 
188, 189, 204 
Kissinger Commission. See National 
Bipartisan Commission on Central 
America 
Kohl, Helmut, 89, 90 
Korea, 47, 132, 137, 147-48, 150, 
154-55, 177, 179, 193, 205, 218 
Korean airline disaster, 40, 52, 94n, 
179, 201, 202, 228 
Korean War, 10, 13, 23-24, 46, 81, 147, 
154, 186-87, 218 
Laos, 42, 138, 141, 151, 153, 187 
Latin America, 54, 156. See also 
Central America, South America 
Lebanon, 29, 108-18, 229; and Israel, 
85, 107, 108-18, 195, 224; 
peacekeeping operation, 18, 24, 27, 
Index 
103, 115, 205, 217, 220, 221, 223; 
war, 23, 108-18 
Lend-Lease aid: to Great Britain, 80; 
to Soviet Union, 80, 121, 184 
Lenin, Nikolai, 184 
Libya, 156, 169-70; and Sudan, 38, 42, 
169, 170; U.S. relations, 43 
linkage policies, 85, 189, 200 
MacArthur, Douglas, 25, 46, 146 
McFarlane, Robert, 195 
McNamara, Robert, 24, 99, 100-01 
Mahan, Alfred T., 4 
major interest, 50, 52; defined, 10, 
12-13; distinguished from vital 
interest, 17-28 
Malacca, Straits of, 151 
Malaya, 137, 140, 147 
Malvinas. See Falkland Islands War 
Manila Pact (1954), 140, 151, 193 
Marcos, Ferdinand, 214-215 
Marines, U.S., 45, 115, 116, 130, 217, 
220, 221, 224 
Marshall Plan, 80, 81, 106 
Mediterranean region, 81, 168; 
eastern, 82, 105-20, 186, 206 
Meese, Edwin, 195 
Mexico, 54, 57, 60, 61, 96; oil, 126; 
relations with U.S., 56; trade with 
U.S., 56; U.S. interest in, 69, 72, 73, 
74, 86, 206, 211, 212 
Middle East, 81, 95, 106-18, 193; U.S. 
interest in, 22, 113-14, 116-18, 223-24 
military assistance, 37-38 
military strategies, 41-50 
Mitterand, Francois, 89 
mobilization, 45-46, 73 
Mondale, Walter, 228 
Monroe Doctrine, 2, 54, 156 
Moral Man and Immoral Society, 3 
Morgenthau, Hans, 2, 3 
Morocco, 156, 174 
Mossadegh, Mohammed, 107, 121 
Mozambique, 170, 223 
Mubarak, Hosni, 108, 130 
Nakasone, Takeo, 143, 218 
Namibia, 172, 173, 223 
235 
Napoleonic Wars, 178 
Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 107, 153, 193 
National Bipartisan Commission on 
Central America, 77, 226 
national interest, 1-30, 50, 205-29; 
defined, 6-14; economic view of, 1-2; 
matrix, 14-17, 15, 28, 31, 51, 57, 
86-87, 87, 117, 117, 119, 129, 143, 159, 
167, 174, 184, 191, 206, 207-09, 210 
National Press Club, 135, 136 
national security, 2, 4, 31 
National Security Act (1947), 39 
National Security Council, 13, 14, 31, 
138, 194; policy role, 41, 46 
NATO, 12, 16, 61, 81-103, 108, 120, 156, 
178, 186, 201-02, 213, 227; bases, 168; 
defense budgets, 91, 96; nuclear 
forces, 47, 49, 190; problems, 90-94, 
97-102, 182; resistance to U.S. 
policies, 23, 41, 82-83, 194. See also 
North Atlantic Pact 
Navy, U.S., 42, 44, 45, 133, 148, 151, 
159, 216; deployments, 53; 6th Fleet, 
43 
Nazism, 80, 121, 131, 176, 178, 184 
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 137, 153 
Netherlands, 89, 133n 
New York Times, 67-68, 74 
New Zealand, 135, 146-47 
Nicaragua, 12, 52-53, 58, 60, 67, 70, 
75-76, 78, 162, 183, 190, 195, 225, 226; 
aid to El Salvador rebels, 66; civil 
war, 64, 226; Sandinistas, 12, 58, 61, 
71, 73, 74, 75-76, 96, 205, 226; Soviet 
and Cuban aid, 38 
Niebuhr, Reinhold, 3 
Nigeria, 175, 212 
Nixon, Richard, 27, 157, 180, 188, 189, 
204, 219; and Arab-Israeli War, 41-42, 
43; and Arab oil embargo, 23, 126; 
and China, 149, 154; "economic 
shocks," 20, 37; resignation, 82; and 
Vietnam, 44, 139 
Nixon Doctrine, 204 
North America, defense of, 55-56, 59, 
74 
North American Air Defense Accord 
(1958), 59 
236 
North Atlantic Pact, 29, 31, 54, 59, 73, 
80, 106, 186, 193; signing, 81, 81n. See 
also NATO 
Northeast Asia, 132 
nuclear war threat, 29-30, 47, 48-50, 
99-102, 191, 200, 202 
nuclear weapons, 99; deployment of, 
48-49, 94, 189-90, 223, 227; possible 
use, 47-50, 100-01. See also cruise 
missiles, Pershing missiles, SS-20 
missiles 
Nutting, Wallace, 75 
oil, 124, 125, 126, 147, 172, 219, 225; 
Asian, 133, 151; U.S. interest in, 22, 
74; Western Europe interest in, 20, 
84-85, 126 
Olympic Games, 33, 189; boycott, 
89 
Oman, 85, 205 
OPEC, 12, 126, 212 
Open Door policy, 132 
Organization of American States 
(OAS), 163-64; Council, 161-62; 
Foreign Ministers, 163 
Osgood, Robert, 3-4 
Pacific Trust Territories, 135 
Pakistan, 106, 107n, 121, 122, 123, 130, 
153-54, 177 
Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO), 109, 110, 111, 115 
Palestinians, 111, 113; homeland issue, 
108, 111, 112, 114, 128 
Panama, 55, 69, 70; Canal treaty, 58, 
205; Canal Zone, 40, 55, 61, 62 
Papandreou, Andreas, 119 
Peace Corps, 34 
Pearl Harbor, 10, 134 
peripheral interest: defined, 10, 13-14 
Pershing missiles, 48, 49, 89, 90, 93, 
227, 228 
Persian Gulf, 95, 106-07, 147, 177, 202; 
defense of, 37, 42, 47, 205, 215; oil 
supplies, 85, 106, 124, 125, 151, 225; 
U.S. forces in, 93, U.S. interest in, 
120-29' 219-21 
Philippines, 133, 135, 145-46, 155, 176, 
Index 
213; U.S. acquisition, 4, 132, 145; 
U.S. bases, 146, 214 
Point Four Program, 34, 194 
Poland, 10, 80, 83, 88, 176, 185, 229; 
Solidarity, 84, 92, 179; U.S. trade 
sanctions, 40-41, 192 
Politics Among Nations, 2 
Portugal, 91, 170 
Potsdam Conference, 185-86 
Power, Freedom, and Diplomacy, 5 
President (U.S.): policy instruments 
of, 31-53, 32n; role in foreign policy, 
6n, 7, 9,14 
propaganda, 34-35 
public interest, 6 
public opinion, 24-25, 26-27 
Qaddafi, Moammar, 169 
Radford, Arthur, 138 
Rapid Deployment Force, 85, 95, 124, 
125, 129, 205, 217, 220; See also 
Central Command 
Rapid Deployment Forces: Policy and 
Budgetary Implications, 124 
Reagan, Ronald, 37, 41, 48, 71, 88, 89, 
90,152,154,193,215,223, 225;and 
Africa, 171; and arms control, 49, 59, 
84; and Caribbean Basin Plan, 37, 
62, 68, 69, 74, 96; defense policies, 
95, 146, 190-92, 194-202, 216-17; and 
El Salvador, 20, 61; European view 
of, 87, 227; and Falklands War, 
159-66; and Lebanon, 24, 27, 45, 
108-18, 219, 221, 224; Middle East 
policies, 50, 107, 108-18, 120, 122, 
124-25,130,169,170,205, 220;and 
Poland, 40-41, 84, 88; and Soviet 
Union, 85, 89, 92, 93, 98, 103, 149, 
180, 190-202, 227, 228-29; trade 
policies, 145, 149, 213 
"realism," 2-4, 5 
Republicans, 4, 63, 65, 69, 135, 149, 
192, 194 
Revolutionary War, 60 
Rhee, Syngman, 137 
Rhodesia. See Zimbabwe 
Index 
Rio Pact (1947), 54, 73, 156, 158, 161, 
164, 219 
Rogers, Bernard, 99-100 
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 58-59, 
79-80, 121, 133, 134, 184, 185 
Roosevelt, Theodore, 4 
Rosenau, James, 5 
Rusk, Dean, 22 
Sadat, Anwar, 107, 108, 130 
Sakhalin, 179, 201 
Sandinistas. See Nicaragua 
Saud, Ibn (King), 121 
Saudi Arabia, 20, 37, 121, 126, 128, 130, 
212, 213, 215, 221; U.S. aid to, 43 
Schmidt, Helmut, 89, 97 
scientific and cultural exchanges, 
33-34 
Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, The, 5 
Seabury, Paul, 5 
Shah of Iran, 12, 82, 107, 118, 121, 127, 
204 
Sharon, Ariel, 109, 112 
Shultz, George, 103, 110, 115, 116, 
195-200, 201, 224, 225 
Siberian gas pipeline, 12, 41, 83, 89, 
103, 180, 192 
Sidra, Gulf of, 43, 50, 169 
Simpson, Alan, 77 
Sinai Peninsula, 112, 113 
Singapore, 151 
Smith, Gerard, 99 
social justice, 69, 75, 76 
Somalia, 169, 171, 173, 205 
Somoza, Anastasio, 58, 183 
South Africa, 170, 173-74, 223 
South America, 156, 157-68 
South China Sea, 151 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO), 107n, 122, 151, 152, 153 
Soviet Union, 97, 132, 176-203; and 
Afghanistan, 10, 12, 26, 41, 45, 93, 
122-23, U4, 125, 130, 150, 153, 177, 
189; and Africa, 170, 171, 172-73, 183, 
192, 200; and Asia, 181, 183, 192, 200; 
and China, 152, 192; and Eastern 
Europe, 45, 72, 73, 80, 83, 84, 92, 97, 
178, 181, 185; and Middle East, 
237 
U2-23, 124, 125, 127, 128, 131, 183, 
220, 221; prestige of, 22-23; support 
of insurgent forces, 57, 67-68, 194; 
and U.S., 92, 93, 98, 177-78, 179-80, 
183, 184-203, 206, 227-28; and 
Vietnam, 137-38, 140; and Western 
Europe, 80, 81-82, 92, 94, 190, 192 
Spain, 82, 85, 86n, 90, 91, 93 
Spanish-American War, 132 
Spanish cultural influence, 56, 60 
Speakes, Larry, 169 
"Spirit of Geneva," 98 
SS-20 missiles, 48, 49, 83, 84, 93, 228 
Stalin, Josef, 25, 80, 121, 184-85, 186 
State Department, 13, 43-44, 115, 
164-65; and Congress, 36; policy 
roles, 33, 34, 37, 38, 41 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT), 22, 99, 182, 190, 204-05 
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks 
(START), 191 
Sudan, 169, 170 
Suez crisis (1956), 23, 82, 106, 166 
Suharto, General, 140, 152 
Sukarno, Achmed, 137, 140, 152, 153 
Sumatra, 133, 151 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 
Europe (SHAPE), 81 
survival interest, 50; defined, 9, 10 
Syria, 107, 108, 115-16, 122, 180; Israeli 
War, 91 
Taiwan, 135, 148-51, 177, 193 
technical assistance, 34 
terrorism, 43 
Thailand, 132, 140, 141, 151-53, 154, 177 
Thatcher, Margaret, 16, 85, 90, 92, 161, 
166, 172 
Third World nations, 27, 38, 85, 93, 
153, 177, 181, 188, 189, 201, 219 
Times (London), 160 
Tito, Marshal, 153, 186 
Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 123, 139 
trade policies, 36-37, 40-41, 83, 84, 92, 
97, 180, 192, 198, 201; protectionist, 
36, 93, 144-45, 213, 218 
Treasury Department, 36, 37, 41 
Trudeau, Pierre Elliott, 56, 59, 60n 
238 
Truman, Harry S., 80, 106, 121, 122, 
129, 135, 146, 185-86, 188, 193, 204; 
aid programs, 34, 80, 105, 194; and 
Korea, 11, 24, 25, 45, 46, 134 
Truman Doctrine, 105, 106, 118, 186 
Tunisia, 156 
Turkey, 105, 107, 118-20, 121, 122, 129, 
178, 211-12; and NATO, 82, 106, 107; 
and U.S. bases, 90, 91, 108 
United Nations, 36, 135, 150, 172, 181, 
225; Charter, 16; General Assembly, 
166-67, 201; Resolution 242, 112; 
Security Council, 26, 40, 110, 160, 
164 
United States: and Falklands War, 
16-17, 159-65; and Middle East, 
106-31, 219-21; and South Asia, 107; 
and Soviet Union, 92, 93, 98, 105, 
176, 177-78, 184-203; vital interests, 
19, 107, 120, 124, 127, 129, 207, 210-21 
values interest: defined, 8 
Vance, Cyrus, 13, 149 
Venezuela, 54, 55, 69, 74, 156; and 
Falklands War, 16 
Vietnam, 132, 137-38, 150, 151, 153, 
179, 180, 193, 204, 219 
Vietnam War, 18, 20, 24, 29, 67, 82, 
138-41, 147, 148, 151, 152, 153; and 
Congress, 27, 126; economic impact 
of, 14; mining Haiphong Harbor, 44; 
VietCong, 140 
Villa, Pancho, 10 
vital interest, 50, 52, defined, 9, 11-12, 
13, 18-19; distinguished from major 
interest, 17-28 
Voice of America, 35 
War of 1812, 2, 60 
War Powers Act (1973), 27, 46, 220, 
224 
Index 
Warsaw Pact, 45, 47, 91, 92, 94, 97, 178 
Washington Post, 67, 75, 89 
Weinberger, Caspar, 48, 68, 124, 125, 
149, 194 
West Bank, 111, 112, 113, 115; Israeli 
settlements, 114 
Western Europe, 78-104, 130-31, 189; 
defense of, 26, 29, 47, 49, 81-82, 87, 
94, 99-102, 103, 186, 227; and Middle 
East, 89, 90, 91; oil needs, 84-85, 90, 
91; and Soviet Union, 81, 83, 85-86, 
88, 89, 182; U.S. forces in, 91, 94, 
95-96, 98; U.S. interest in, 86, 102-
04, 206-07, 217-18, 227; U.S. relations 
of, 87-89, 90 
West Germany, 84, 85, 89, 90, 93, 120, 
144, 176, 185, 228; Bundestag, 90, 95; 
Conservative Party, 89, 95; and 
NATO, 82, 92, 97-99, 103, 186; 
reunification, 97-99; Social 
Democratic Party, 103; U.S. forces 
in, 80, 90, 93, 95; U.S. interest in, 
86-87, 212 
Williamsburg, Virginia: summit 
conference, 84, 90 
Wilson, Woodrow, 2 
Wolfers, Arnold, 4 
World Bank, 36 
World War I, 3 
World War II, 10, 59, 61-62, 79-80, 121, 
131, 132-34, 135, 158, 176, 184-85 
Yalta Conference, 121, 185 
Yalu River, 13, 25, 46 
Yemen, 124, 221 
Yugoslavia, 186 
Zaire, 172, 173, 175, 212 
Zimbabwe, 171-72, 212 
